Showing posts with label berkshire hathaway. Show all posts
Showing posts with label berkshire hathaway. Show all posts

Saturday, April 18, 2009

The Third Way in the inflation/deflation debate

The inflation vs. deflation call may well be the call of the decade for investment policy. On one side are the inflationists, who argue that all this fiscal and monetary stimulus is bound to create inflationary pressures once the world economy begins to recover. On the other side are the deflationists, who argue that the de-leveraging process has unleashed powerful deflationary forces.

There may be a Third Way out of this debate – and that Third Way is even more scary than either of the scenarios contemplated by the two factions.


Do you believe Warren Buffett?
The conventional economic view is exemplified by the likes Warren Buffett. In his latest letter to Berkshire shareholders, he wrote [emphasis mine]:

This debilitating spiral has spurred our government to take massive action. In poker terms, the Treasury and the Fed have gone “all in.” Economic medicine that was previously meted out by the cupful has recently been dispensed by the barrel. These once-unthinkable dosages will almost certainly bring on unwelcome aftereffects. Their precise nature is anyone’s guess, though one likely consequence is an onslaught of inflation.

The Federal Reserve is well aware of these concerns. In a speech on April 14, 2009, Ben Bernanke stated that:

I can assure you that monetary policy makers are fully committed to acting as needed to withdraw on a timely basis the extraordinary support now being provided to the economy, and we are confident in our ability to do so.

Avner Mandelman of Giraffe Capital suggested that the Obama Administration is positioning Paul Volcker in the wings for a liquidity mop-up once the financial crisis is over. It is unclear, however, how much political will there is to take the pain once it is clear that an economic recovery has begun.


Deflationists: Proof by counterexpample
When I went to school back in the Dark Ages, math classes had a technique of “proof by counterexample”. Conventional wisdom holds that all this stimulus is going to result in inflation some time down the road.

Japan is the proof by counterexample. During the Lost Decade, the Japanese government spent like crazy and the BoJ adopted a policy of quantitative easing. Debt to GDP ballooned. The government built roads to nowhere. Yet the economy didn’t recover.

One of the leaders of this deflationist movement is Richard Koo, whose webcast is long but well worth watching. He argues that as long as government spending displaces consumer spending (because consumers are saving and not spending), there will be no inflation. The appropriate policy in this case, according to Koo, is for government to spend until it hurts and spend some more.


The Third Way: Down the hyperinflation road?
Simon Johnson, formerly of the IMF, wrote a disturbing article about the current financial crisis that compares past emerging market crises to the current one [emphasis mine]:

[T]o IMF officials, all of these crises looked depressingly similar. Each country, of course, needed a loan, but more than that, each needed to make big changes so that the loan could really work. Almost always, countries in crisis need to learn to live within their means after a period of excess—exports must be increased, and imports cut—and the goal is to do this without the most horrible of recessions. Naturally, the fund’s economists spend time figuring out the policies—budget, money supply, and the like—that make sense in this context. Yet the economic solution is seldom very hard to work out...

Typically, these countries are in a desperate economic situation for one simple reason—the powerful elites within them overreached in good times and took too many risks. Emerging-market governments and their private-sector allies commonly form a tight-knit—and, most of the time, genteel—oligarchy, running the country rather like a profit-seeking company in which they are the controlling shareholders…

Squeezing the oligarchs, though, is seldom the strategy of choice among emerging-market governments. Quite the contrary: at the outset of the crisis, the oligarchs are usually among the first to get extra help from the government, such as preferential access to foreign currency, or maybe a nice tax break, or—here’s a classic Kremlin bailout technique—the assumption of private debt obligations by the government. Under duress, generosity toward old friends takes many innovative forms. Meanwhile, needing to squeeze someone, most emerging-market governments look first to ordinary working folk—at least until the riots grow too large.
Johnson’s contention is unless the government of the day is willing to take on the entrenched elites and force them to take the pain, the path of least resistance is rising inflation and possibly hyperinflation.

Certainly America’s elites have enjoyed some very good times. William Hester of Hussman Funds has documented the elevated levels of profit margins in this past economic cycle, which indicates the bulk of the gains were tilted towards the suppliers of capital, as opposed to the suppliers of labor.


How real is the American Dream?
The classic measure of income inequality is the Gini coefficient. High Gini coefficients for the U.S. is well documented. In of itself, this is not necessarily a bad thing as high gaps between rich and poor could serve as a strong incentive for wealth creation. However, an OECD study also showed low social mobility in the U.S., as defined by the correlation of the Gini coefficient of parent and offspring, compared to more “egalitarian” countries like Denmark and Norway. High Gini coefficients combined with low social mobility indicates that elites are entrenched and the American Dream is only a dream.




Wall Street is the new elite
Today, the best way to get into Treasury or the Fed seems to be to work for Goldman Sachs. Nobel laureate Joe Stiglitz complained about the entrenchment of the Wall Street/Washington axis:

“America has had a revolving door. People go from Wall Street to Treasury and back to Wall Street,” he said. “Even if there is no quid pro quo, that is not the issue. The issue is the mindset.”

Wall Street has become the new elite.


The Argentina/Mexico/Russia solution?
Stephen Roach warned of reviving the Debt Frankenstein to revive America, which only would only serve to stretch the current economic imbalances. This appears to be the consensus of policy makers around the world and lead us down the Third Way hyperinflation path. Such a path would likely result in an era of rising inflationary expectations, to be followed by a deflationary collapse.


Signposts to watch for
Right now, there is widespread discontent with Wall Street. The question of whether that level of dissatisfaction leads to real reform is the key to resolving this issue. These are mostly social attitude indicators and difficult to quantify. Here are some signposts that I would watch for in the months to come:

Do the tax protests gain any traction? Recently there were calls for “teabag” tax revolt protests. I interpret these as a backlash from the Establishment elite to try to retain power. Redressing either the Horatio Alger style opportunity implicit in the American Dream through high social mobility or redressing the level of Gini coefficients in the U.S. are signs that the elites are losing power. Other signs to watch for: do conservative commentators like Larry Kudlow gain or lose followers?

Do any American politicians say the S-word? The willingness of Americans to change their attitudes will be another important milestone in the road to restructuring and reform. For many years Americans have been conditioned to get something for nothing. American were content to trade U.S. debt for cheap Chinese goods. Not once did George W. Bush mention the word “sacrifice” when he began the Global War on Terror. Today, the U.S. faces trillion dollar deficits and Barack Obama is not preparing the country for the tax hikes (remember the “sacrifice” word) to come. One commentator went even further and suggested that this will doom his second term.

What happens to inflationary expectations? Watch the pricing of TIPS and inflation swaps. The current picture is inflationary expectations dropped late last year and they are now on an upswing. Levels, however, are not as elevated as they were a year ago.


Base case: inflation
At this point, my base case is inflation and a repeat of the 1970s sideways market in equities. However, I am watching these indicators carefully and I am willing to be persuaded otherwise.

If you are interested, I have begun a longer email list for inflation bulls. There is no cost and I will keep your email address to myself. Drop me a line and sign up here.

Monday, August 25, 2008

A modest proposal (for hedge fund investors)

The news of the demise of former CNBC anchor Ron Insana’s venture has been a catalyst for more questions about the hedge fund business model. Are these project returns persistent (also here)? Are there cheaper alternatives?


Looking for uncorrelated pure alphas
I have a modes proposal for hedge fund investors in light of these difficulties. The story of hedge fund investing has been to look for a pure alpha stream, however you want to define it, that is uncorrelated with the return pattern of existing asset classes.

If that’s the case, why not go into the gaming (or casino) business?

In the gaming business, the house has an edge in any game you play and takes steps to enforce that edge (e.g. tossing out the card counters at Blackjack, etc.) The customers know it, but they still keep coming.

Statistically, the return pattern of every game that a customer plays is uncorrelated with any other. The advantage of being in the gaming business means that you don’t have the problem of the shifting correlation problem: The return correlations of seemingly uncorrelated factors and asset classes converging to 1 during periods of financial crisis.

The main difference is the fee structure. In a hedge fund, you typically pay 2% and 20% with a lockup. In the gaming business, the lockup remains. However, there are significant overhead cost to keep the lights on in a gaming operation. However an investor can gain some of the benefits of economies of scale if there are such a venture can achieve sufficient size.



Addendum: After reading the comments, maybe some readers didn't get the joke which was modeled on Swift's satire A Modest Proposal. This post was meant as a call for a thought experiment as to the rationale behind hedge fund investing.

What this post was not:
  • A call for hedge fund investors to gaming: I am well aware that the gaming industry is economically sensitive and cyclical. These are obvious limitations to the gaming industry.
  • A call to buy gaming stocks: See comment above about the gaming industry. However, do think about the cash flows of the business because when you engage in direct investment you need a long-term horizon, much like the lockups that you see in the hedge fund industry.

to have to explain my jokes...

Tuesday, July 22, 2008

The secret of Warren Buffett’s success

Years ago I was asked what kept us from being Warren Buffett. My reply was "how Buffett picked stocks was fairly well-known. The problem was the inability of managers to tolerate excessive tracking error." This was quant-speak for "portfolio managers spent too much time building benchmark hugging portfolios for business reasons".

There has been much written about how Warren Buffett picks stock. Jeff Matthews had a great series of posts on this topic:


It's not just about picking stocks
One of the effects of Buffett’s approach is that he won’t buy companies whose businesses he doesn’t understand or he deems “too difficult to run”. As a result, the portfolio will contain very few companies in certain industries, such as Technology. As any good quant can tell you, a lot of return risk can be explained by industry weightings and such a lopsided portfolio will have returns that are very different from the S&P 500.

I have written before that running a portfolio is a lot more than picking stocks, which people have focused on for Buffett. It’s also about benchmarking, portfolio construction and trading.


Warren has a plan - and sticks to it
Could the secret of Warren Buffett’s success be the way he benchmarks himself? Indeed there is some evidence of that as this study shows that despite Berkshire's vaunted investment results, its Sharpe ratio is only 0.64.

In many cases, Berkshire Hathaway buys the whole company and seems to only consider the value of that cash flow stream at purchase time. Buffett et al seems to care less about the value of the company in the marketplace after its purchase. After all, the value of Berkshire Hathaway’s unlisted subsidiaries are not reported anywhere nor can they reported since there is no publicly listed value for these companies. After BRK acquires them, they only get valued by the market based of their aggregate cash flows, asset values, etc.

Could Berkshire's investment policy be just a form of Economic Value Added (EVA), as popularized by Stern Stewart & Co? Under the EVA analytical framework, your objective in running a company is to make sure the returns on your investments are above the cost of your funding. Since Berkshire buys and doesn't sell, its investment policy seems to be consistent with the concepts of EVA: buy cheaply and never mind what the market thinks in the interim because you are managing through the economic cycle.


You can build your own Berkshire Hathaway
You may argue that “Warren Buffett has the means to buy the whole company, but I don’t. I don’t have the luxury of doing the same thing.”

It can be done. I once worked with a taxable family trust that held an equity portfolio with many positions with very low cost basis (and therefore large capital gains liability if the position were to be sold). The objective of the trust was to provide its current beneficiaries with an income stream while preserving the inflation adjusted value of the capital for future generations.

The trustees decided to focus the portfolio on holding dividend paying stocks with good growth prospects. They created a synthetic benchmark based on the dividend growth metrics to measure the portfolio’s performance. Returns were measured on an after-tax basis. The hurdle rate for selling a stock with an embedded capital gain therefore was higher than normal because of the higher after-tax cost of replacing the dividend stream.

As the portfolio manager for one of the trust’s portfolios, I found myself in the unusual situation of apologizing every time the market went up, even if the portfolio had outperformed: “Sorry, we made money for you this quarter (but that means that we can’t re-balance the portfolio and sell anything without taking the capital gains hit)”. Conversely, market declines were welcome because it afforded an opportunity to harvest some capital losses so that the portfolio could be re-balanced on a tax-efficient basis.


Know yourself, be disciplined and march to your own drumbeat
The story of this trust is an example of an investor knowing his objectives and sticking to them. In this case, the trust knew its objective and created its own benchmark. The trustees focused on dividends and their growth rates (just as Berkshire Hathaway focuses on cash flows and their growth). What the market pays for those investments in the interim was mostly noise that could be ignored.

If you know yourself and can be disciplined in the same way, you can do the same.