Commodities poised to rally?

Much has been made of the upside technical breakout experienced by the US Dollar last week, but when I dissect the components of USD strength, I found that much of the breakout was attributable to Yen weakness. In fact, the other components of USD are all testing support, which suggests that the euro and commodities are poised to rally here.

At first glance, the USD breakout looks impressive, especially on the weekly chart:

Now consider how weak the JPYUSD has been:

Now consider the EURUSD rate, which is testing technical support:

The commodity weakness story is well known. Disappointment over Chinese growth has been a principal driver, but the flip side of that coin has been USD strength. The commodity sensitive Aussie Dollar is also testing a key technical support zone:

So is its cousin, the Canadian Dollar.

In fact, if you were to consider the EURAUD cross as a measure of the strength of Europe, the euro is turning up against the commodity sensitive Aussie Dollar as it has staged an upside breakout through a resistance level. Viewed in that context, is the euro that weak or is it just weak against the USD?

As I have shown, most of the other components of the USD Index other than the Yen are sitting on technical support. I also wrote to watch for the re-test of the recent bottom in gold as a clue to market direction (see The golden canary in the coalmine). As the chart below shows, GLD hit that technical re-test level on Friday and the silver/gold ratio is stabilizing indicating that most of the blind panic selling of gold is over.

All of these conditions are lining up to suggest that commodities are poised to rebound. The euro, commodity sensitive currencies and gold are all at key technical support levels. As I write these words, precious metal prices are substantially in the red. Watch for signs of stabilization, or better yet, reversal on the day. If that were to happen, expect that the rotation back into cyclical sectors will continue and stock prices to continue to grind higher.




Cam Hui is a portfolio manager at Qwest Investment Fund Management Ltd. ("Qwest"). This article is prepared by Mr. Hui as an outside business activity. As such, Qwest does not review or approve materials presented herein. The opinions and any recommendations expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions or recommendations of Qwest.

None of the information or opinions expressed in this blog constitutes a solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security or other instrument. Nothing in this article constitutes investment advice and any recommendations that may be contained herein have not been based upon a consideration of the investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any specific recipient. Any purchase or sale activity in any securities or other instrument should be based upon your own analysis and conclusions. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Either Qwest or Mr. Hui may hold or control long or short positions in the securities or instruments mentioned.

Upside breakouts everywhere

As the major US averages grind to more new highs, I am seeing signs of confirmed upside breakouts everywhere. Consider, for example, this relative performance chart of SPY against IEF, which is the ETF for 10-year Treasuries. The ratio staged an upside breakout on the weekly chart, with relative resistance a some distance away indicating considerable upside potential for stocks.

Across the Atlantic, the FTSE 100 staged an upside breakout:

The same could be said of large cap eurozone stocks, as represented by the Euro STOXX 50:

And then there's Greece. Yes, remember that Greece? The Greece whose rating that Fitch recently upgraded.

The European markets are healing, as the WSJ reports even Greek companies are now tapping the bond markets for financing:

Greek commercial refrigeration and glass bottle producer Frigoglass’s debut bond sale is the latest sign investors are growing more optimistic about Greece, the company’s chief executive said in an interview with Dow Jones Newswires Tuesday.

Frigoglass Monday sold a €250 million ($324.3 million) five-year bond–the second debt sale from a Greek company in as many weeks as the country’s corporate bond market emerges from a deep freeze.

The risk-on mood was also reflected in this account of Slovenia's successful bond financing, after Moody's downgraded the country to junk after its roadshow:

Then the big day came – books reopened, bids were even stronger than during the first attempt and Slovenia sold 3.5bn worth of 5 and 10y bonds. On Friday, the new Sloven23s traded up by more than 4 points, which means yield fell by more than 50bp from the 6% the government paid. A fairy tale ending.

Key risks
Though momentum is positive for stocks in most developed markets, it isn't necessarily all clear sailing ahead. My biggest concern is that China and China related plays look punk. Here is the Shanghai Composite in a well defined downtrend:

Industrial commodities are also exhibiting a similar downtrend pattern:

The AUDCAD currency cross, where Australia is more China sensitive and Canada more US sensitive, looks downright ugly.

In the US, Ed Yardeni pointed out that forward Street consensus earnings growth is showing signs of stalling. While this isn't a bearish signal yet, it does bear watching. Should forward estimates growth turn negative, it would create considerable headwinds for equities.

My takeaway from the current environment of powerful stock momentum is, "It's ok to get long, but don't forget to look over your shoulder and maintain a tight risk control discipline."



Cam Hui is a portfolio manager at Qwest Investment Fund Management Ltd. ("Qwest"). This article is prepared by Mr. Hui as an outside business activity. As such, Qwest does not review or approve materials presented herein. The opinions and any recommendations expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions or recommendations of Qwest.

None of the information or opinions expressed in this blog constitutes a solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security or other instrument. Nothing in this article constitutes investment advice and any recommendations that may be contained herein have not been based upon a consideration of the investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any specific recipient. Any purchase or sale activity in any securities or other instrument should be based upon your own analysis and conclusions. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Either Qwest or Mr. Hui may hold or control long or short positions in the securities or instruments mentioned.

The golden canary in the coalmine

Shortly after the market closed, the WSJ published Jon Hilsenrath's article Fed Maps Exit From Stimulus in which the Fed discusses a gradual withdrawal of QE:

Federal Reserve officials have mapped out a strategy for winding down an unprecedented $85 billion-a-month bond-buying program meant to spur the economy—an effort to preserve flexibility and manage highly unpredictable market expectations.

No doubt the markets will get spooked by this "leak" and as I write these words, ES futures are moderately in the red. The question is, "How much and how far?"


Watch gold for clues to market direction
For me, the canary in the coalmine is the gold price, which is highly sensitive to expectations of monetary stimulus. Gold has staged a tactical V-shaped bottom and the silver/gold ratio has stabilized, which is constructive (see Watching silver for the bottom in gold). Gold rallied to fill in the gap left by its free fall in April - so now what?

With the news that the Fed is starting to think about an exit from QE, the near term downside risk is evident. There are many opinions about the fallout of this "leak". Josh Brown has two sides of the story. On one hand, he believes that with sentiment excessively bullish, we are tactically headed for a hard correction. On the other hand, he seems more relaxed longer term.

As for myself, I am watching for a re-test of the April lows in gold to see if that low can hold as a sign for the risk-on trade. Longer term, the April decline caused considerable short-term technical damage, but the long-term uptrend remains intact. The other key issue is whether the uptrend can hold here.

A Lost Decade or a "beautiful deleveraging"?
Will this Fed action be a repeat of the Japanese experience where the authorities go through ease-tighten cycles that caused ups and downs in stock prices? This will be a test of Ray Dalio's beautiful deleveraging thesis where the United States has undertaken just the right mix of austerity, money printing and debt restructuring.

David Merkel wrote a timely post recently entitled Easy In, Hard Out (updated):

My view is that there is no such thing as a free lunch, not even for governments or central banks.  Any action taken may have benefits, but also imposes costs, even if those costs are imposed upon others.  So it is for the Fed.  At the beginning of 2008, they had a small, clean, low duration (less than three years) balance sheet on assets.  Today the asset side of their balance sheet is much larger, long duration (over 6 years), negatively convex, and modestly dirty as a result. 

 He went on to outline the risks [emphasis added]:

Fed tightening cycles often start with a small explosion where short-dated financing for thinly capitalized speculators evaporates, because of the anticipation of higher financing rates. Fed tightening cycles often end with a large explosion, where a large levered asset class that was better financed, was not financed well-enough. Think of commercial property in 1989, the stock market in 2000 (particularly the NASDAQ), or housing/banks in 2008. And yet, that is part of what Fed policy is supposed to do: reveal parts of the economy that are running too hot, so that capital can flow from misallocated areas to areas that are more sound. At present, my suspicion is that we still have more trouble to come in banking sector. Here’s why:

We’ve just been through 4.5 years of Fed funds / Interest on reserves being below 0.5% — this is a far greater period of loose policy than that of 1992-1993 and 2002 to mid-2004 together, and there is no apparent end in sight. This is why I believe that any removal of policy accommodation will prove very difficult. The greater the amount of policy accommodation, the greater the difficulties of removal. Watch the fireworks, if/when they try to remove it. And while you have the opportunity now, take some risk off the table.

Zero Hedge put it more forcefully:

It is possible a steep decline in financial assets would ensue with the lowest part of the capital structure being hurt the most. The Fed has chased investors all in the same direction; into risk-seeking securities. Few care about “right-tail” events, but should investors decide to pare risk in reaction to a hint of ‘tapering’, the overshoot to the downside may surprise many. The combination of too many sellers, too few buyers, and dreadful (and declining) liquidity means a down-side overshoot is highly likely. It would provide the Fed with their answer as to whether they have been creating market bubbles.

It appears that the Federal Reserve is well aware of these risks. In a speech last week, Ben Bernanke said that the Fed was closely monitoring the market for signs of excessive risk appetite, such as reaching for yield [emphasis added]:

We use a variety of models and methods; for example, we use empirical models of default risk and risk premiums to analyze credit spreads in corporate bond markets. These assessments are complemented by other information, including measures of volumes, liquidity, and market functioning, as well as intelligence gleaned from market participants and outside analysts. In light of the current low interest rate environment, we are watching particularly closely for instances of "reaching for yield" and other forms of excessive risk-taking, which may affect asset prices and their relationships with fundamentals. It is worth emphasizing that looking for historically unusual patterns or relationships in asset prices can be useful even if you believe that asset markets are generally efficient in setting prices. For the purpose of safeguarding financial stability, we are less concerned about whether a given asset price is justified in some average sense than in the possibility of a sharp move.

The Fed being aware of a problem is the first step. Whether they can either react, either preemptively or after the fact, in the correct manner is another problem.

I prefer to watch the golden canary in the coalmine to see how the markets react, or over-react to the news that the Fed is mapping out a plan to gradually withdraw from quantitative easing.

Cam Hui is a portfolio manager at Qwest Investment Fund Management Ltd. ("Qwest"). This article is prepared by Mr. Hui as an outside business activity. As such, Qwest does not review or approve materials presented herein. The opinions and any recommendations expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions or recommendations of Qwest.

None of the information or opinions expressed in this blog constitutes a solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security or other instrument. Nothing in this article constitutes investment advice and any recommendations that may be contained herein have not been based upon a consideration of the investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any specific recipient. Any purchase or sale activity in any securities or other instrument should be based upon your own analysis and conclusions. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Either Qwest or Mr. Hui may hold or control long or short positions in the securities or instruments mentioned.

The 3rd Way in the cyclical/defensive debate

Here's a thought. About a month ago, I wondered out loud that whether the defensive sector rally could be better characterized as the outperformance of Value over Growth stocks (see A Value rally, or a defensive sector rally?)

Now that cyclical (and growth oriented) sectors have surged relative to the defensive sectors, the Value stocks have similarly pulled back against Growth stocks. The chart below of the Russell 1000 Value Index relative to the Russell 1000 Growth Index shows that the relative uptrend of Value vs. Growth is still intact.

If my analysis of Value vs. Growth is the more appropriate framework, then it may be time to start buying Value now (and it may represent the third way in the cyclical vs. defensive sector debate of whether the cyclical rebound is a fakeout or true revival).




Cam Hui is a portfolio manager at Qwest Investment Fund Management Ltd. ("Qwest"). This article is prepared by Mr. Hui as an outside business activity. As such, Qwest does not review or approve materials presented herein. The opinions and any recommendations expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions or recommendations of Qwest.

None of the information or opinions expressed in this blog constitutes a solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security or other instrument. Nothing in this article constitutes investment advice and any recommendations that may be contained herein have not been based upon a consideration of the investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any specific recipient. Any purchase or sale activity in any securities or other instrument should be based upon your own analysis and conclusions. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Either Qwest or Mr. Hui may hold or control long or short positions in the securities or instruments mentioned.

Secular bull or bear?

As US equities have rallied in the last couple of weeks, there has been much discussion about the rotation in sector leadership from defensively oriented sectors to the deep cyclical sectors. Does the rotation mean that this market is truly ready to take off to further new highs? What does it all mean?

I have spent a fair amount of time pondering that question (see my recent post Sell in May?). My conclusion is where you come down on the question of whether this is the start of a new secular bull market where stocks move to new highs or whether we are just seeing the top of a range-bound secular bear.

To explain, consider this long-term chart of the Dow, where the market has seen alternating secular bulls, where stocks rally to multi-decade highs, and secular bears, where the market remains range-bound for years.

Still a secular bear market
My main belief is that we remain in a secular bear for two main reasons: demographics and valuation. I have written about the demographics issue before (see Demographics and stock returns and A stock market bottom at the end of this decade). For stocks to go up, there has to be more buyers than sellers at a given price. The propensity of Baby Boomers, as they move into retirement, is to take money out of stocks. In order for equities to rise, those negative fund flows have to be met by the retirement savings of their children, the Echo Boomers. Two research groups looked into this topic (see papers here and here). Their conclusion - the inflection point at which the fund flows of Echo Boomers moving into stocks start to overwhelm the Baby Boomers taking money out is somewhere between 2017 and 2021.

In addition, long-term valuations don't appear compelling. I have long considered the market cap to GDP ratio as a proxy for an aggregate Price to Sales ratio for the stock market. The chart below from Bianco Research via Barry Ritholz, shows this metric, whose history goes all they way back to 1925, to be well above its long-term average. In addition, note that instances of falling market cap to GDP ratios correspond with secular range-bound bear markets.

Another reason for the long-term secular bear case comes from John Hussman, an investor for whom I have much respect. His latest 10-year return projections for the SPX is about 3.5% (see My answer to John Hussman). Even with bonds yields at microscope levels, a 3.5% return expectation for US equities is nothing to get overly excited about.

The bull case (and it's always important for investors to consider opinions contrary to his own) is represented by Ray Dalio's "beautiful deleveraging" concept (see my post Falling tail risk = new secular bull?). Dalio believes that the United States has undergone a "beautiful deleveraging" process in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008. A "beautiful deleveraging" involves just the right amount of austerity, debt restructuring and money printing. He went on to observe that, by contrast, Europe has gotten it all wrong and that region is likely to be mired in a Lost Decade.

If Dalio is correct, then the rotation that we are observing from defensive to cyclical sectors is another sign of a new upleg in equity prices and therefore the start of a new secular bull.


The intermediate term outlook
While my analysis of the secular bull vs. bear is based on a long-term multi-year investment time frame, what about the intermediate term time frame for the next several weeks to months?

Here's what's bothering me about the emergence of the cyclical leadership. First of all, commodities look positively sick. Here is a chart of the industrial metals. Does this look like the basis for a cyclical rebound?

In addition, the Citigroup Surprise Index has been turning down, both in the US and globally. Despite Friday's NFP upside surprise, the internals of the employment report appeared to be negative and it was before long that there were a cacophony of voices pointing out the weaknesses in the report (for examples, see here, here and here).

I agree with the blogger MicroFundy when he pointed out the divergences between the macro picture and US stocks:

I think we are getting real close to a major inflection point. It seems like every macro-economic data point I come across is saying one thing – the same thing. There is an extremely high correlation between all the varying data points and indicators. Data like the 10yr treasury yields, PMI manufacturing, durable goods orders, copper prices, international (ex Japan) stock markets, inflation expectation, margin levels etc – are all saying that the (global &) US economy is slowing, and that the risks of deflation/contraction/recession are growing.


The only thing diverging from this pattern in all of the charts below is the US equity markets.

His conclusion is "something's gotta give":

There are two extreme scenarios that can “correct” the above divergence, although I believe it will be a combination of the two.

1 – We could see a correction of 15-20% that would put the US equity markets back in line with most of the charts above. It would then be priced closer to fair value based on most of the recent economic data.

2 – The economic data can pop back up. Whether it was because of the payroll tax increase, sequestration, or some other seasonal event(s)… maybe this is/was just a blip on the radar these last few months, and the economic data will “catch up” to the US equity markets.

If these scenarios were mutually exclusive, I would bet the farm on #1. A realistic base case assumption though, is a combination of the two. I am anticipating a good 10% correction combined with a small pickup in some of the macro data.

Either way, something’s gotta give. The level of divergence here is bordering historical, and the relative and absolute over-valuation of some of these high-yield names are frightening.

With Europe mired in recession, commodity markets signaling that Chinese growth is stalling, the US is once again holding up the world. If the American economy is holding up the world, then why is US equity performance faltering against global equities? The chart below shows the relative performance of SPY against ACWI (All-Country World Index). If we are indeed seeing a launch of a new secular bull, shouldn't the US, which has been the beneficiary of the "beautiful deleveraging", be leading?

A bearish bias
While I have outlined my bias for the bear case, investing is about probabilities and I honestly don't know how this market is going to resolve itself. While the bear case is compelling, Street earnings and revenue estimates continue to get revised upwards (as per Ed Yardeni).

Until we see some sort of negative macro surprise that cause estimates to get revised downwards, the stock market is likely to grind higher. As I wrote last week, there is no catalyst yet for a bearish impulse for stocks yet.



Cam Hui is a portfolio manager at Qwest Investment Fund Management Ltd. ("Qwest"). This article is prepared by Mr. Hui as an outside business activity. As such, Qwest does not review or approve materials presented herein. The opinions and any recommendations expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions or recommendations of Qwest.

None of the information or opinions expressed in this blog constitutes a solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security or other instrument. Nothing in this article constitutes investment advice and any recommendations that may be contained herein have not been based upon a consideration of the investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any specific recipient. Any purchase or sale activity in any securities or other instrument should be based upon your own analysis and conclusions. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Either Qwest or Mr. Hui may hold or control long or short positions in the securities or instruments mentioned.

Tech revival? Watch AAPL

There was some excitement this week about the relative breakout of the Technology sector against the market:

Given the dominant weight of Apple in the Technology sector, consider the relative performance of an equal weighted Tech index. the equal-weighted NASDAQ 100 (QQEW) against the SPX. While the XLK has rallied out of a relative downtrend against SPX, QQEW remains range-bound against the market. In other words, the average Tech stpcl has performed in line with the market in general.

The rally out of the downtrend is far more evident in AAPL:

So if you start to get excited about the potential rally in Technology stocks, pick the appropriate benchmark and know what you are betting on.



Cam Hui is a portfolio manager at Qwest Investment Fund Management Ltd. ("Qwest"). This article is prepared by Mr. Hui as an outside business activity. As such, Qwest does not review or approve materials presented herein. The opinions and any recommendations expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions or recommendations of Qwest.

None of the information or opinions expressed in this blog constitutes a solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security or other instrument. Nothing in this article constitutes investment advice and any recommendations that may be contained herein have not been based upon a consideration of the investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any specific recipient. Any purchase or sale activity in any securities or other instrument should be based upon your own analysis and conclusions. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Either Qwest or Mr. Hui may hold or control long or short positions in the securities or instruments mentioned.

Technical analysis as behavioral finance

A couple of items came across my desk that, in combination, made me think about how we think about finance today. The first was Mark Buchanan's review of Gary Gorton's book Misunderstanding Financial Crises where the author took down the blindness of economists and, by extension, the theory of rational expectations [emphasis added]:

I think it's the most convincing book I've read so far that links the mechanisms of the recent crisis to crises in the past. In effect, he argues that the crisis was the direct result of the uncontrolled creation of money by the shadow banking sector, and ultimately took place as a classic bank run, no different from runs in the past, except that this run took place mostly out of public view because it didn't involve ordinary bank deposits. The new kind of money in this bank run was stuff such as repo agreements and commercial paper which played the role of money for financial institutions. In 2007-2008, when lenders lost confidence (for good reason) in the mortgage-backed collateral backing this money, they demanded that money back, and the financial system seized up.

The explanation is convincing and wholly natural. The argument is most convincing because Gorton does a masterful job of placing this bank run in the context of the long history of past runs. And also because Gorton, as an economist, places blame squarely on the economics profession (himself included) for being asleep at the wheel:

Think of economists and bank regulators looking out at the financial landscape prior to the financial crisis. What did they see? They did not see the possibility of a systemic crisis. Nor did they see how capital markets and the banking system had evolved in the last thirty years. They did not know of the existence of new financial instruments or the size of certain money markets. They did not know what "money" had become. They looked from a certain point of view, from a certain paradigm, and missed everything that was important... The blindness is astounding. That economists did not think such a crisis could happen in the United States was an intellectual failure.

It seems to me that there is a certain amount of denial among economists. I have noticed, in talking about the ideas in this book with my economist colleagues, that there is a fairly clear generational divide on this. To younger economists and graduate students, it is obvious that there was an intellectual failure. Some older economists are inclined to hem and haw, resorting to farfetched rebuttals. It is clear that this is a sensitive issue, as like banks no one wants to have to write down the value of their capital.

...One other thing of interest. Gorton in a late chapter, when discussing the spectacular failure of the rational expectations paradigm, quotes University of Chicago economist James Heckman, winner of the economics' Nobel Prize (yes, that's not its actual name) in 2000, from an interview he did with John Cassidy in 2010.

Why didn't economists saw the financial crisis coming? What happened to rational expectations?

In a recent interview, Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman explained his problem with the rational agent and rational expectations hypothesis this way:

Think of the kind of market that Adam Smith described. You can get a lot of insight into how just the right amount of bread gets to London in the morning by assuming that the baker and the other participants in the market pursue their own interests in a sensible manner. The rational-agent model takes this idea to its logical extreme. If you want to predict the behavior of a market, you are best off assuming individual agents who act in a way that is predictable and fairly simple—for example by assuming that the participants are similarly motivated and exploit all their opportunities. I am not an economist, but I find it hard to imagine that they will ever give up the use of schematic individual agents, even if they endow these agents with a little more realistic psychology. And I see no reason why they should.

The rational agent model has more questionable consequences in the domain of policy because the assumption that individuals are rational in the pursuit of their interests has an ideological coloring and policy implications that many would view as unfortunate. If individuals are rational, there is no need to protect them against their own choices. At the extreme, no need for Social Security or for laws that compel motorcycle riders to wear helmets. It is not an accident that the department of economics at the University of Chicago, one of the most illustrious in the world, is known both for its adherence to a strict version of the rational actor model and for very conservative politics.

Rational expectations: Is this an anomaly?
The other item of note was a post at George Washington's blog (via Zero Hedge) showing how much more likely an American is to die from heart disease, car accidents and other common causes of death than from terrorism:

– You are 17,600 times more likely to die from heart disease than from a terrorist attack
– You are 12,571 times more likely to die from cancer than from a terrorist attack
— You are 11,000 times more likely to die in an airplane accident than from a terrorist plot involving an airplane
— You are 1048 times more likely to die from a car accident than from a terrorist attack

Now ask yourself, how much has the United States government spent on combating terrorism compared to heart disease, cancer and automobile accidents? If this had been academic finance literature, then these mis-pricing or mis-allocation of resources would be termed an anomaly, much like low P/E or small capitalization were deemed to be market anomalies in the 1970's.

Here's another thought from the Chicago school: If the world needed to be rid of terrorism, or __________ [insert the dictator of your choice], wouldn't the market have done it?


In praise of behavioral finance
Behavioral finance is the school of thought that tries to understand human behavior in the context of what "should" be rational expectations. I have long believed that technical analysis is a branch of behavioral finance.

I recently wrote an essay about the evolution of thinking about technical analysis and why it works. You can read it here.



Cam Hui is a portfolio manager at Qwest Investment Fund Management Ltd. ("Qwest"). This article is prepared by Mr. Hui as an outside business activity. As such, Qwest does not review or approve materials presented herein. The opinions and any recommendations expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions or recommendations of Qwest.

None of the information or opinions expressed in this blog constitutes a solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security or other instrument. Nothing in this article constitutes investment advice and any recommendations that may be contained herein have not been based upon a consideration of the investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any specific recipient. Any purchase or sale activity in any securities or other instrument should be based upon your own analysis and conclusions. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Either Qwest or Mr. Hui may hold or control long or short positions in the securities or instruments mentioned.

Negative divergences

Further to my last post (see Sell in May?) I am seeing more negative divergences that create more concerns for the bull case. The recent rally, which has been led by the golds and deep cyclicals, have all the appearances of a dead cat bounce rather than the start of a sustainable advance.

Last week, I suggested that traders should watch the silver/gold ratio for signs of a sustainable rally (see Watch silver for the bottom in gold). The idea was that silver, being the more volatile poor man's gold, should display positive relative strength against gold and lead a precious metal rally if these metals are in the process of making a sustainable bottom. Look at what's happened to the silver/gold ratio since then:

We can see how the oversold rally developed by analyzing the price charts of the gold and silver ETFs. GLD has certainly staged a classic capitulation and rally pattern to fill in the gap left by its recent freefall:

But what about silver? Sure, this poor man's gold rallied, but the rebound has been weak and the gap was not filled, which suggests to me that this advance is an oversold rally and the next major move in precious metals is likely to be down.

As confirmation of the bearish commodity trend, the entire industrial metals complex remains weak despite the rebound in gold and oil:

In my previous post, I also wrote about watching the AUDCAD currency cross rate, with the premise that the Australian Dollar is more sensitive to growth in China and the Canadian Dollar is more sensitive to growth in the American economy. A breach of the uptrend in this cross rate would would be a signal that the market's belief that Chinese growth is slowing, which would be negative for the global growth outlook. The breakdown in this currency pair cannot be regarded as good news for the prospects of Chinese growth.

Another concern is the disappointing South Korean April exports, which were just released and missed expectations at 0.4% compared to estimates of 2.0%. The South Korean economy is regarded as cyclically sensitive as the country is highly exposed to trade with China and Japan.

In addition, Cullen Roche at Pragmatic Capitalism recently pointed out that the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index is turning down in every major region in the world. As a reminder, a economic surprise index reading below zero is indicative of more misses than beats on economic data. Falling surprise indices around the world suggests, therefore, that global economic growth is starting to stall.

As we wait for the decisions of the Federal Reserve and ECB this week, it will be a test of market psychology of whether bad news is good news, i.e. economic slowdown will lead to central bank stimulus, which is bullish, or bad news is bad news.



Non-confirmation of SPX new highs
Moreover, with the SPX making new marginal highs, I am not seeing the breadth confirmations from the 52-week highs and lows. While these kinds of breadth divergences can last for months, it nevertheless raises a red flag about the sustainability of this stock market rally.

Here's another puzzle. If the stock market is making new highs, why is the VIX/VXV ratio (which I described in a previous post here and first pioneered by Bill Luby, see his original post) sitting at only 0.91, which is barely below my "sell signal" mark of 0.92? What is the term structure of the option market telling us?

This is not investment advice
One final point. I have outlined a number of negative divergences that suggest a bearish tone for stocks, but I have not outlined the timing of any trades. In my last post entitled Sell in May? I sketched out a number of likely triggers for to get more defensive. Since then, I have had a number of emails and other responses asking if and when I would write about when those events are triggered and, by extension, when it's time to sell or short the market.

Let me make this very, very clear: Those triggers are just a set of suggested triggers. It will be up to each individual reader to make up his or her own mind as to what to do if and when each event is triggered. Don't expect me to hold your hand and shout "sell" for you. You are responsible for your own portfolio and your own profit and loss statement.

For the readers who are waiting for me to tell when to buy or sell, I strongly suggest that you re-read my previous post about why the contents of this blog does not represent investment advice. This blog is a forum for discourse, not pre-digested investment or trading advice.



Cam Hui is a portfolio manager at Qwest Investment Fund Management Ltd. ("Qwest"). This article is prepared by Mr. Hui as an outside business activity. As such, Qwest does not review or approve materials presented herein. The opinions and any recommendations expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions or recommendations of Qwest.

None of the information or opinions expressed in this blog constitutes a solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security or other instrument. Nothing in this article constitutes investment advice and any recommendations that may be contained herein have not been based upon a consideration of the investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any specific recipient. Any purchase or sale activity in any securities or other instrument should be based upon your own analysis and conclusions. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Either Qwest or Mr. Hui may hold or control long or short positions in the securities or instruments mentioned.

Sell in May?

As we approach the end of April, the inevitable question of seasonality arises. Is it time to sell in May and go away?

While many of my intermediate and long term technical indicators are starting to line up, indicating that it may be prudent to start selling now, I am not seeing the bearish trigger yet. To review, let's consider the charts from the three major regions of the world, US, Europe and China.


What does defensive leadership mean?
In the US, the stock market remains in an uptrend. The SPX, as shown below, remains in an uptrend and it is above both its 50 and 200 day moving average. For traders, it may be premature to get overly bearish without some catalyst or trigger.

The warning signs are there. Defensive sectors have been leading the market. Analysis from Thomson-Reuters shows that the defensive sectors have fared the best in the May-October period during the 21st Century. Is the market is anticipating a downturn or correction?

Consider the chart below of the relative performance of Utilities against the market. The sector appears to be making a saucer shaped relative bottom, which is an indication that the intermediate term outlook for relative performance is positive.

Similarly, look at the relative performance of Consumer Staples. The sector staged a relative upside breakout in late March and remains in a relative uptrend, though it got over-extended and pulled back last week.

As well, take a look at the relative performance chart of Healthcare. Like Consumer Staples, this sector staged a relative upside breakout in March and has also pulled back recently, though the relative breakout remains intact.

Meanwhile, cyclical stocks appear to be rolling over against the market. The chart below of the Morgan Stanley Cyclical Index against the market shows CYC to be failing at a relative resistance level and starting to roll over in relative performance.

The defensive vs. cyclical theme has also played out in the real estate sector. Consider the relative performance of the cyclically oriented homebuilding group, which was on a tear for all of last year, but it is now consolidating sideways after violating a relative uptrend.

By contrast, the chart below of the relative performance of the more defensively and yield oriented REITs against the market shows that this group staged a relative upside breakout in early April, pulled back but the relative breakout remains intact.

Premature to go short
Is it time to get bearish and get short the market? Not yet. I consider the US market to be at a crossroad. The rally last week was led by an oversold bounce in gold and other resource sectors. As the chart below shows, gold has rallied to mostly fill the gap from its recent freefall. We now need to watch if there is any follow through or if gold (and the stock market/risk-on trade) can continue upwards from here.

Another bearish setup has been the relative performance of stocks to Treasuries. As the relative performance chart below shows, stocks remain in a minor relative downtrend to bonds after breaking down from a recent relative uptrend.

In addition, the longer term chart of the 10-year yield shows that bond yields remain in a downtrend and the recent uptick looks like a flag pattern, which is a continuation pattern indicating that bond yields are likely to fall further. As well, David Rosenberg (via Pragmatic Capitalism) indicated that recent sentiment polls showed that there were virtually no bond bulls around. If bond yields fall (and bonds therefore rally), it would likely be bearish for stocks.

However, stocks continue to grind upward because of its fundamental underpinnings of positive earnings momentum. Earnings Season is coming roughly in line with historical experience. Thomson-Reuters reports that with about 20% of the SPX companies reporting, 67% of the companies have beaten earnings expectations, which is in line with the historical experience, but only 44% have beaten on revnues. Nevertheless, Ed Yardeni pointed out that  forward earnings estimates are still rising - which should support the bullish impulse in stocks.

To get more bearish on US equities, I would like to see some combination of:

• Earnings getting revised downwards, or more misses in earnings reports;
• More misses in the high frequency economic releases, e.g. New Deal Democrat pointed out that much of the miss in last Friday's GDP report was attributable to a fall in government spending;
• Major averages to decline below their 50 dma; and
• Failure of cyclical sectors to regain their leadership and defensive sectors to outperform.

Europe: Waiting for the ECB?
Moving across the Atlantic, the pattern of the European bourses bear an uncanny resemblance to the American one. Despite the well publicized problems in the eurozone, European stocks remain in an uptrend. The chart below of the STOXX 600 shows the index to be above its 50 and 200 day moving averages, though there is some work for the bulls to do as the index is approaching overhead resistance.

As well, I pointed out last week (see Commodity weakness is likely localized) that peripheral country markets were outperforming the core European markets even as stocks declined. This is evidence of rising risk appetites in Europe.

It appears that the market is expecting further stimulus from the European Central Bank this week. Recent economic releases have been so weak, so bad that they're good. Conditions have weakened to the extent that the ECB may be forced to take further action to stimulate the eurozone economies. As Benn Steill and Dinah Walker of the Council on Foreign Relations pointed out, a rate cut is not necessarily a done deal as it may run counter to the ECB's price stability mandate:

In those Eurozone countries where the monetary transmission mechanism is still working normally—Austria, Finland, France, Germany, and the Netherlands—the GDP-weighted-average inflation rate is 1.8%, right near the ECB’s target. France, with 1.1% inflation and 10.8% unemployment, would appear a strong candidate for a rate cut, but not the others. Germany has 1.8% inflation and only 5.4% unemployment. The other three all have above-target inflation rates: Austria at 2.4%, Finland 2.5%, and the Netherlands 3.2%. Austrian unemployment is low, at 4.8%. Dutch unemployment is a moderate 6.4% Only Finnish unemployment is high, at 8.2%.


Some will argue that a bout of robust inflation in the north is just what is needed to restore competitiveness in the south. But the ECB will have to willfully ignore its price-stability mandate if it is to justify a rate cut right now, and it will almost certainly need to apply more radical tools if it is to aid the south quickly. “The ECB is obviously in a difficult position,” German Chancellor Angela Merkel said on April 25. “For Germany, it would actually have to raise rates slightly at the moment, but for other countries it would have to do even more for more liquidity to be made available and especially for liquidity to reach corporate financing.”

In Europe, my bearish triggers are a combination of watching for:

• Peripheral market underperformance
• A possible negative reaction to ECB action. Assuming that there is a rate cut, could the market buying the rumor and selling the news?

China: Markets shrugging off weakness
In China, most of the recent economic releases have been below Street expectations. What's more worrying are indications that the new leadership is more concerned about financial system stabililty than growth (via Kate Mackenzie of FT Alphaville):

The official Xinhua report is here and its headline suggests some worry at the economic growth rate. “China needs to cement its domestic economic growth momentum and guard against potential risks in financial sectors,” seems to be the key line, from the third paragraph, although it goes on to point out that Q1′s 7.7 per cent growth that had many China watchers worried was in fact higher than the 7.5 per cent official target.

Then there’s this:

While focusing on improving the quality and efficiency of economic development, the country should keep a proactive fiscal policy and prudent monetary policy while making them more targeted, it said.

Hmm… more targeted…

Bloomberg’s take is here and they’ve also noted that the official statement focused on risks despite the slowdown; they also point out the emphasis on boosting the consumption (ie, rebalancing the economy; which as we’ve outlined before, can’t really happen unless growth slows).

Translation: Don't expect more stimulus measures if the economy slows further. Despite these concerns, the markets have shrugged off signs of Chinese weakness. A good measure is the relative performance of the Australian stock market (EWA) to MSCI All-Country World Index (ACWI) as most of Australia's raw material exports go to China. EWA remains in a relative uptrend against ACWI, though there was a recent minor violation of the relative uptrend:

Another key indicator that I have been watching is the AUDCAD currency cross. Both Australia and Canada are resource-based economies, but Australia is more sensitive to Chinese growth while Canada is more sensitive to American growth. The AUDCAD violated an uptrend that began last October on Friday, but I would like to see some further weakness to confirm that this trend violation is not a minor one as we saw in the above chart of EWA against ACWI.

Investor or trader?
Let's go back to the original question, is it time to sell in May?

My inner investor thinks that it may be prudent to trim back some equity holdings, but my inner trader says, "Not yet." He is still waiting for a bearish trigger. I became a reluctant bull in late March (see An uncomfortable bull). Even though my Trend Model turned neutral briefly two weeks ago, it flipped back to risk-on last week and I am still inclined to give the bull case the benefit of the doubt - for now.

My inner trader is still waiting for the aforementioned bearish triggers before getting more defensive.




Cam Hui is a portfolio manager at Qwest Investment Fund Management Ltd. ("Qwest"). This article is prepared by Mr. Hui as an outside business activity. As such, Qwest does not review or approve materials presented herein. The opinions and any recommendations expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions or recommendations of Qwest.

None of the information or opinions expressed in this blog constitutes a solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security or other instrument. Nothing in this article constitutes investment advice and any recommendations that may be contained herein have not been based upon a consideration of the investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any specific recipient. Any purchase or sale activity in any securities or other instrument should be based upon your own analysis and conclusions. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Either Qwest or Mr. Hui may hold or control long or short positions in the securities or instruments mentioned.