Showing posts with label portfolio management. Show all posts
Showing posts with label portfolio management. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 31, 2021

What's a safe withdrawal rate?

I was recently asked my opinion on what a safe withdrawal rate for a deferred-tax pension plan managed with the Trend Asset Allocation Model. 

As a reminder, the Trend Model has shown equity-like returns with balanced fund-like risk. The latest update of the model shows another strong month, with a one-month return of 2.5% compared to 1.7% for the 60/40 benchmark and a YTD return of 18.0% compared to a 60/40 return of 12.8% (full details here). Model returns are based on out-of-sample signals, though based on a hypothetical asset mix.



The full post can be found here.

Saturday, February 6, 2021

Outside-the-box risk control = Better returns

After last week's wild market swings, it's time to have a sober discussion about risk control. I know that risk control isn't a sexy topic, but better portfolio risk control can lead to better overall returns.


The framework of analysis will not be the conventional description of risk as it is stylistically shown above. Instead, I offer some "outside the box" thinking and focus on the following:
  • Mis-specifying investment objectives and risk preferences
  • How to take advantage of volatility
  • Regime change risk in the form of:
    1. Unexpected tail-risk
    2. Changes in market environment (conventional regime change);
    3. Slow changing regimes that investors may be unaware of;
    4. Changes in modeling assumptions.
The discussion range from practical suggestions for individual investors to big picture issues more relevant to professional portfolio managers.

The full post can be found here.

Wednesday, August 26, 2020

Tech is eating the market

Mid-week market update: I have written about how Big Tech is dominating the market. Here is another perspective of how tech stocks are eating the market. The combined market cap of FANGMAN (Facebook, Apple, Nvidia, Google, Microsoft, Amazon, Netflix) is reached all-time highs and nearing a total of $8 trillion.


The angst over Big Tech is growing, and until the parabolic rise reverses, major stock market averages are likely to continue to grind higher.

The full post can be found here.

Monday, July 31, 2017

How Covel inadvertently exposed the chasm between investors and traders

As a rule, I don't do book reviews. However, regular readers know that I am a big fan of trend following models and I use them extensively in my asset allocation work. When a publicist offered a free review copy of Michael Covel's Trend Following, 5th Edition: How to Make a Fortune in Bull, Bear and Black Swan Markets, I jumped at the chance.



The book also featured a forward by Barry Ritholz. Ritholz's partner Josh Brown recently wrote that they use trend following techniques for tactical asset allocation, which is a sensible decision that I wholeheartedly agree with:
At my firm, we use trend for tactical asset management. It takes everything above into account- not only the things, but people’s actual reaction to the things, a sort of realpolitik for markets. Will it always work? Doubtful. What is the downside when it doesn’t work? What is the expected benefit when it does? Is there a behavioral aspect to why it makes sense to include tactical in client portfolios? We think so. Not everyone would agree that this is worthwhile.
After all that buildup, the book left me vaguely disappointed. Covel's approach has been to be a cheerleader for traders who use trend following techniques without digging into the deeper issues that face investors. He treats trend following almost as a magic black box that everyone should use. He doesn't take the next step to discuss the characteristics of this class of strategies, which sophisticated investors think about when they consider the use of such techniques have a place in their portfolio.

The full post can be found at our new site here.

Tuesday, May 5, 2015

The trouble with factors

Factor investing is hot these days. Invesco recently documented the rise of "smart beta" ETFs at ETF.com:
Overall, smart-beta ETFs accounted for over 17% of U.S. ETF net inflows in 2014, despite representing less than 11% of the total assets. Today there are more than 350 smart-beta ETFs available in the U.S. comprising over $230 billion in AUM, up from just 212 products and $64.8 billion in 2010.1 Over the past year, institutional decision-makers—including public and private pensions, endowments and foundations, and registered investment advisors who manage institutional assets—have become more familiar with the smart-beta category.
The article explained that "smart beta" funds really represent a form of factor investing, with factors in use such as low vol, dividend yield, fundamental weight, which is a form of value tilt:
In the simplest terms, smart-beta ETFs follow indexes based on alternative weighting methodologies. Many of these alternative weighting methodologies (such as low volatility, high dividend and fundamentally weighted) have historically delivered favorable risk-adjusted returns and varying returns across different market regimes. As a result, institutions are increasingly looking to smart-beta ETFs as a complement to and a replacement for both their traditional market-cap-weighted ETFs and their actively managed positions.

Portfolio construction with factors
In addition to using factors at the stock portfolio level, factor investing has migrated to portfolio construction. A participant at the recent Sixth Annual Southeast Asia Institutional Investment Forum revealed how some institutions had adopted the risk factor allocation as a substitute for asset allocation in their portfolios:
What’s the secret sauce for making a multi-asset strategy successful? This past December, in Singapore, I asked the speakers on my panel at the Sixth Annual Southeast Asia Institutional Investment Forum and their answers all shared one thing in common: risk factor allocation.
Some examples of techniques used by some very large institutions:
Chiew Kit Tham, managing director at GIC, told the conference participants that they have pared back the number of asset classes in their program from 39 to six for this reason. GIC is a sovereign wealth fund set up by the Singapore government and manages hundreds of billions of the country’s foreign reserves. Instead of asset classes, GIC now focuses on a set of factors that they want to be exposed to: equity risk with a bias towards emerging markets growth equities, real estate, and private equity. They consider these the main drivers of their portfolio risk and return. Secondary drivers include factors such as momentum, size, value, credit, and carry.

Richard Brandweiner, CFA, CIO of First State Super, added that they have also shifted attention away from asset classes. “Benchmarks asset classes are quite arbitrary and are increasingly less relevant. We focus on what systemic exposures we try to capture with a certain asset class and target a portfolio with the desired mix of exposures,” said Brandweiner.

In a similar vein, Nachcha Protpakorn, deputy secretary general of the US$20 billion Thai Government Pension Fund (GPF) discussed their focus on long-term macroeconomic drivers. She believes the practice allows them to take advantage of shorter-term opportunities without wandering too far away from the long-term policy portfolio.
In effect, these institutions are moving towards the Norway model, which is an approach pioneered by Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM). Such an approach requires a shift in thinking about overall portfolio construction. Instead of thinking about assets and their characteristics, these investors now focus on the factor characteristics and factor risk premiums.
The shift from asset classes to factors requires changes in the portfolio construction process.

For example, target allocations to specific asset classes become an afterthought. Brandweiner’s advice: “Avoid silos in thinking. Think of portfolio construction from a factor perspective, such as duration, credit, and currency. There is no bucket for a particular private equity or infrastructure fund but think of their contribution as a group.”

Tham gave a similar example: To add high yield to a portfolio, an investor will need to reduce exposures to the equity and credit factors. Similarly, there will be no target allocation to active and passive components of the portfolio.

These components are switchable in terms of exposures to factors. Once appropriate funds are identified based on their risk-return trade-offs, etc., allocations can then be set in line with their factor exposures. Tham highlighted a case where they would sell the “policy portfolio” to make room for the new active funds added.

The trouble with factors
While I appreciate the different perspective that factor investing contributes, it doesn't represent the Holy Grail of Investing. Replacing asset exposures with factor exposures at a portfolio level has the benefit of changing the way of thinking to a macro mindset, which can be helpful for the right kind of organization, it is unclear to me whether such a shift actually raises returns or reduces risk.

I recently encountered MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 5128-15, entitled Facts About Factors, by Paula Cocoma, Megan Czasonis, Mark Kritzman and David Turkington. Here is the abstract:
It has become fashionable to allocate portfolios to factors rather than to assets. The often stated motivation for this approach is that factors are less correlated with each other than assets; therefore, factors afford greater opportunity for diversification. This argument is specious, of course, because ultimately the portfolio must be invested in assets. It is, therefore, impossible to produce a better in-sample portfolio by describing the portfolio as a set of factors than assets. There are several potentially legitimate arguments, though, for favoring factor stratification over asset stratification. It could be that factors are easier to forecast than assets, because investors are better able to relate current information to future factor behavior than to future asset behavior. Unfortunately, we have no way of testing this conjecture generically. But there are several testable conjectures. Perhaps risk estimated from high-frequency returns predicts risk over longer horizons more reliably for factors than for assets. Or the statistical properties of large samples may predict the statistical properties of small samples more reliably for factors than for assets. Or, for the same sample size, the statistical properties of factors may be more stationary from one sample to the next than they are for assets. Finally, it may be that reducing the dimensionality of a large set of assets to a smaller set of factors reduces noise more effectively than reducing dimensionality to a smaller set of assets. We offer empirical evidence of the validity, or lack thereof, of these testable conjectures.
The main conclusions of the research says that it's hard to prove that there is an added benefit of factor based portfolio construction:
Some investors propose using factors instead of assets as the building blocks for forming portfolios, because factors appear to be less correlated with each other than assets
and thus seem to afford greater potential for diversification. These ostensibly low correlations, however, reflect the fact that the asset combinations used to mimic factors include short positions in some of the assets and not superior diversification opportunities. We have shown that it is impossible to generate a superior in‐sample portfolio, given the same constraints, by regrouping assets into factors if the investable units are assets from which the factors are formed.

We also considered the possibility that investors are more skilled at relating current information to future factor behavior than to future asset behavior. However, we conceded that we could not test this conjecture generically, because skill is investor‐specific.

However, we did test whether the statistical properties of factors are more stationary than the statistical properties of assets. We found no evidence that factors produce more stable results across varying frequencies, nor from large samples to small samples, nor across independent samples. On the contrary, we found evidence of the opposite, on average.

Finally, we tested whether reducing the dimensionality of a larger set of assets to a smaller set of factors reduces noise more effectively than reducing the dimensionality to a smaller set of assets. Again, we found no evidence that factors are meaningfully more effective than assets at noise reduction.
Bottom line, it's a useful approach but it's not the Holy Grail:
Where does this leave us? In our view, the case is yet to be made that investors should use factors as building blocks for forming portfolios rather than assets. We do believe,
however, that investors may be able to gather useful insights about the performance of their portfolios by attributing performance to factor exposures in addition to asset exposures. And we believe as well that investors may be able to manage risk more effectively by considering a portfolio’s factor exposures in combination with its asset exposures. Beyond these applications, investors must decide for themselves whether they have greater conviction about future factor behavior or future asset behavior.

The challenges of stock based factor investing
When I think about factor based stock investing, or "smart beta" funds, a number of issues come up. Before I do, let me explain the typical steps taken to calculate factor exposures and returns:
  1. Condition the factor, or scrub the data: Supposing that your "factor" is E/P, or the inverse of the P/E ratio (as sorting on E/P deals with negative earnings properly). You might want to throw out any companies with an E/P of more than 50% (or P/E less than 2) as bad data. If your factor is Size, quants often condition on log(market cap) in order to build a better linear relationship.
  2. Calculate the Z-score: Z = (Conditioned factor - Sample average) / Sample standard deviation
  3. Calculate the factor return for a single period: Regress the excess return of a group of stocks to the Z-score exposure of those stocks.
  4. Repeat steps 1 to 3 for factor returns for other periods.
Having done the messy part of performing factor analysis myself, a number of problems arise with using factors to generate stock level alpha.
  • "Smart beta" single factor portfolios are so 1970s. The idea of factor exposures came from academic research done in the 1970s as a way of investigating the Efficient Market Hypothesis. If the market is efficient, as the theory goes, then you shouldn't be able to construction portfolios with market betas equal to the market with better than market returns. Thus, a number of academics found a whole slew of "anomalies", such as the small cap anomaly (or factor), the low P/E anomaly, the low P/B anomaly and so on. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a number of institutions created mandates for quantitative money managers to invest based on these factors, which we mostly know as value factors today. Sophisticated quant managers have moved on from single factor portfolios and I explain some of the other techniques used by quants today below. Somehow, what was a very old single factor idea has become new again, largely because of marketing hype.
  • How stable are factor returns and "anomalies"? That's a good question. Cullen Roche recently wondered out loud if there are any reliable factors. That is a problem that all quants face. A 2003 paper by Motohiro Yogo entitled "A consumption based explanation of expected stock returns" found that value and size factors were highly pro-cyclical. Value and small caps tended to perform well in economic expansions and underperformed during recessions. Since the economy spent more time in expansion, it could account for the value and size effect found in the anomalies literature. I would also note that one of the results from the MIT paper was:
We found no evidence that factors produce more stable results across varying frequencies, nor from large samples to small samples, nor across independent samples. On the contrary, we found evidence of the opposite, on average.
  • Do you use naive or pure factors? Supposing that you were using E/P as a factor. Would you rank E/P across all stocks in the market (naive), or would you rank them on a sector or industry neutral basis, which is a "pure" factor return? In my experience, using the "pure" factor approach creates a number of problems. First, the magnitude of the factor alpha falls as the number of sectors and industry rise, indicating that the factor is capturing a sector or industry alpha rather than a stock alpha. Second, slicing and dicing by too many industries creates a problem of some industries with a sample size problem. How confident can you be of a statistical and quantitative approach to factor investing if there are only 3 or 5 stocks in your industry sample?
  • Should you customize factor exposure by sector or industry? A typical "smart beta" fund will apply a single factor across all sectors of the market. For example, a fundamentally weighted fund using sales as a weighting factor would weight positions by sales instead of market cap. Such an approach is equivalent to using Price to Sales as a factor to derive alpha and control risk. But fundamental sector analysts will tell you that Price to Sales may not make sense for certain sectors. For example, what bank analyst uses "sales" as a metric? On the other hand, growth stocks trade on momentum factors and applying a value measures like Price to Sales to a growth stock universe will give you a portfolio concentrated on failed growth stories. Intelligent investors know that certain metrics are appropriate for certain sectors and industries and inappropriate for others. 
  • Factor returns are not linear. Recall how factor returns are calculated. You regress the excess return of a group of stocks to the Z-score of factor exposure for those stocks. The underlying assumption is that, on average, the returns to a factor are roughly linear and are well behaved and there are no severe twists in the return distribution. Imagine an example where the factor is Size, or market cap. During a single period, large caps returns are roughly zero, medium caps returns are very high and small caps are negative. A linear regression will its best try fit a straight line to that relationship. In our example, the returns to Size (market cap) is then positive because of the large outperformance of medium cap stocks. In real-life, these kinds of U-shaped distributions in factor returns happen all the time. On the other hand, if a portfolio is weighted in mainly large cap stocks, its performance will be very different to the Size factor return because of the skew in the data. Now try explaining that to your client.
Now that I have thoroughly trashed factor analysis, it doesn't mean that it doesn't have its place in quantitative investing. Investors need to go beyond the marketing hype and understand how factors are constructed, how a portfolio is formed using factor analysis and the limitations of that approach.

Don't just believe the backtests. Your own mileage will vary.

Tuesday, November 25, 2014

Rebalancing your portfolio for fun and profit

This is part two of a two part post on portfolio rebalancing (see How to rebalance your portfolio (NAAIM maniac edition) for part one).

The standard practice among portfolio managers is to establish a rebalancing discipline for their portfolios. A typical process would involve the following steps:
  1. Determine the target asset mix, which could change depending on market conditions.
  2. Re-balance if:
    • The asset mix weights moves more than a certain percentage, e.g. 10%, from the target weight; or
    • Periodically, e.g. on an annual basis
These are all sensible rules that have long been practiced in the investment industry. In essence, the strategy involves taking profits on winning asset classes and averaging down on losers as a form of risk-control discipline.

Then I came upon an intriguing paper by Granger, Greenig, Harvey, Rattray and Zou entitled Rebalancing Risk. Here is the abstract:
While a routinely rebalanced portfolio such as a 60-40 equity-bond mix is commonly employed by many investors, most do not understand that the rebalancing strategy adds risk. Rebalancing is similar to starting with a buy and hold portfolio and adding a short straddle (selling both a call and a put option) on the relative value of the portfolio assets. The option-like payoff to rebalancing induces negative convexity by magnifying drawdowns when there are pronounced divergences in asset returns. The expected return from rebalancing is compensation for this extra risk. We show how a higher-frequency momentum overlay can reduce the risks induced by rebalancing by improving the timing of the rebalance. This smart rebalancing, which incorporates a momentum overlay, shows relatively stable portfolio weights and reduced drawdowns.

Monthly rebalancing does the worst
You would think that, for example, given the massive losses seen during the Lehman Crisis episode, that a rebalanced portfolio where the investor bought all the way down would see superior returns. Interestingly, that was not the case.

In the paper, the authors compare and contrast a simple drift weight strategy, i.e. not rebalancing at all, with a fixed weight monthly rebalancing strategy. The chart below shows how that the monthly rebalanced portfolio actually showed a higher risk profile than the passive drift portfolio. (There were other examples in the paper, but I will focus on this period for the purpose of this post).


By contrast, they advocate a partial momentum strategy. In essence, this amounts to the application of of a trend following system to rebalancing. The idea is, as the stock market goes down and the bond market goes up, you keep overweighting your winners (bonds) and don't rebalance the portfolio until momentum starts to turn. As the chart below shows, the portfolio with the partial momentum overlay performed better than either the monthly rebalanced or passive drift weight portfolio.



Talking their book?
These are intriguing results and a demonstration of the positive effects of using trend following techniques for portfolio construction. However, I would add a couple of caveats in my read of this paper.

First, three of the five authors work for MAN Group, which is known for using trend following techniques in their investing. While this paper does show the value of these kinds of techniques, I am always mindful that researchers may be "talking their own book". As regular readers are aware, I extensively use trend following models in my own work, but I am cognizant of the weaknesses of these models.

In particular, these models perform poorly in sideways choppy markets with no trends. As an example, consider this chart of sugar prices for the period from 1891 to 1938. Unless the trend following system is properly calibrated, the drawdowns using this class of model are potentially horrendous.



As another example, try wheat prices for the 1872 to 1944 period:


A second critique of the approach used by the paper is the use of monthly rebalancing as one of the benchmarks. In practice, no one rebalances their portfolio back to benchmark weight on a monthly basis. A more realistic rebalancing technique might be a rule based rebalancing approach of rebalancing either annually or if the portfolio weights drift too far from the policy benchmark.

To be fair, however, the monthly rebalancing approach is an extreme one that does differentiate between a passive drift weight and a more frequently rebalanced portfolio.


Value vs. Momentum
In summary, this is an intriguing paper that compares and contrasts the use of price momentum, or trend following, techniques of chasing winners to a value-based rebalancing strategy of buying assets when they are down.

Before going out and blindly implementing a trend-following based re-balancing program, I urge portfolio managers to further study these approach and adopt it to their own circumstances. Your mileage will vary.

Wednesday, November 19, 2014

How to re-balance your portfolio (NAAIM maniac edition)

Here is a real head scratcher that`s been bothering me for the past several weeks. I have had a number of discussions with investment professionals and I have had no satisfactory answer. Why does the NAAIM survey of equity exposure experience such wild swings (chart via agd capital management)?


As the chart shows, the NAAIM equity exposure index has swung wildly from under 20% to over 80% in the past four years. These kind of volatility is more consistent with panic and euphoria of swing traders or reflect the risk tolerance of hedge funds than plain vanilla individual investor investment mandates.

Most professional investors would have a process where they establish an investment objective for their client, with an asset allocation benchmark, e.g. 50% stocks, 50% bonds. They would then vary their exposure by 5-10% around that benchmark. Under extreme market conditions, a typical target variance from benchmark might be 20% from policy weight.

So how does the NAAIM sample have such wild swings?


Questions for your manager
If I were an individual investor entrusting my money to a discretionary RIA, which is the NAAIM membership is drawn from, I would ask the following questions, which would be entirely appropriate as discretionary managers are held to a fiduciary standard:
  • As you have assessed my personal financial objectives, what do you consider to be my proper policy weight?
  • How much variation would you tolerate from policy weight as an active decision?
  • What is your re-balancing process? How often do you re-balance and what kinds of events would cause you to re-balance the portfolio?
The wild variation of the NAAIM survey sample can be explained in two ways. First, it could be the result of passive drift. In a raging bull market, equity weights could creep up to a level way beyond target weight. Conversely, in a devastating bear market, equity weights could plummet to extremely low levels.

As well, the swings in NAAIM equity weights could be the result of active decisions by the managers to buy or sell equities. However, it is hard for me to comprehend that in the space of last few weeks that the NAAIM managers panicked and sold their equity positions down to historically low levels and then panicked again to buy back into the stock market. Do they have a process, or are they just flying by the seat of their pants?


What is the re-balancing process?
For well constructed balanced portfolios. the last round of stock market weakness should not have been a disaster. US large caps, as measured by the SP 500, down about 10% peak-to-trough and small caps seeing a substantially higher draw-down, but the bond market rally has offset much of those losses.

A saner question might be: Once you've established a policy or target weight, when should you re-balance your portfolio?

Regardless of what path you or your investment manager chooses to create a portfolio re-balancing process, make sure that there is a process, rather than the apparent seat-of-the-pants approach shown by the NAAIM survey sample. In a future post, I will discuss different ways of re-balancing portfolios - sort of a "re-balancing your portfolio for fun and profit" post.

Tuesday, March 3, 2009

I didn't make these rules!

I would like to thank everyone who gave me the feedback on my post In defense of the mutual fund manager, both online and by email.


What’s handcuffing the fund manager?
Pity the poor fund manager. Not only can he not even beat plain vanilla index funds, now a study shows that fund managers are bad market timers. What is handcuffing the fund manager?

The problems that the fund manager faces can be separated into the four categories:

  • Alpha generation is hard
  • Turning good investment ideas into investment performance is hard
  • The System really doesn’t like people who think “outside the box”
  • Mis-aligned incentives


Alpha generation is hard: A case of low signal-to-noise ratio

Henry Kaufman, in the Wall Street Journal, recently wrote that:

Why do our computers work so well -- except when we use them to manage derivatives and hedge funds? The answer lies in methodology. In science and technology, we rely on the scientific method: experimental design with dependent and independent variables and with reproducible results.

Economists and financial experts like to fancy themselves as exact scientists as well. Back in the 1960s, when we landed on the moon, economists emulated the terminology of Space Age navigation. They spoke of "midcourse corrections" and of bringing in the economy for a "soft landing." Since then, quantification and modeling have only grown thicker in the economics profession, where econometricians and other "quants" employ complicated analytical techniques and mathematical formulas.
Investing isn’t engineering. Good investment professionals and quants understand that we work in a business that has a low signal-to-noise ratio. It isn’t physics. You can’t repeat experiments. Investment returns depend on human behavior, which is fickle and depend on people’s hopes and fears.

As an illustration of how difficult investing is, a study shows that the Sharpe ratio of legendary investors like Buffett, Robertson and Soros don’t significantly top 1.1. Who of us, as mere mortals, can hope to top those kinds of results?


Turning good investment ideas into investment results is hard!
Even if you a good investment idea, putting it together into a portfolio, or what quants call the task of alpha transference, is not easy. Peter Schiff had the right grand idea, but his implementation was lacking. He was not alone as many others were in the same boat.

How sure are you of your idea? How much do you want to bet on it? How do you manage risk (your client’s risk, your business risk and your career risk)?

When do you trade? How do you time your trade? If you are a large fund, how do you move in and out of a position without leaving footprints in the market?

If things didn’t work out, what happened? Did your selection techniques fail? Did your risk control fail? Did all parts of your investment process work together or were they fighting each other?

These are all issues that a fund managers need to address and face.


Do we really want people who think “outside the box”?
We all like to see innovative thinkers. We laud people who think “outside the box”. The reality is that society and organizations really don’t want people to think too far outside the box.

Frankly, people who do that are mavericks. It’s hard to manage mavericks. They tell their superiors to FOAD (the last two stand for “And Die”). A frequent theme seen in Hollywood movies is the rebel who defies the system and win. How many rebels have you actually seen in real life do that?

One example of a maverick who won was Colonel John Boyd. He spearheaded the design of important U.S. fighter planes and had a strong influence in U.S. military thinking over the years. However, the system doesn’t like rebels. My question is: "If he was so great, why did he retire in 1975 a colonel? Why didn’t he have some stars on his shoulders?" (Imagine someone with the stature of a Myron Scholes retiring after a long career at an investment bank with the rank of a junior director and you get the idea.)

The System is not built to accommodate rebels. It certainly does not reward them.

Here in Vancouver, there has been a long-standing tradition among the engineering students at the local university to engage in creative hijinks and pranks. Years ago, they stole the Speaker’s Chair from the provincial parliament. I recall one instance when a number of student engineers managed to steal the emergency lights from a police car. At one level, these are creative activities that should be encouraged. At another level, they are anti-social and disruptive and people who engage in such destructive behavior should be punished. Recently, a story emerged that some engineering students got caught trying to suspend a car from a bridge. Some of them may get charged. Criminal records may be involved and possibly future careers may be destroyed.

In defense of the System, we can’t let every rebel and maverick run wild. Should mavericks like the Unabomber be made a hero? What about the perpetrators of the Oklahoma City bombings? What about the member of the Red Brigade? Baader-Meinhof gang? Weatherman underground?


A case of mis-aligned incentives
Tom Brakke, who writes the blog Research Puzzle, correctly pointed out that fund managers at actively unconnected to investors. In other words, there is a severe case of mis-aligned incentives.

The current paradigm is: asset allocation accounts for most of an investor’s risk and return, followed (in equity-land) by country allocation, sector allocation, along with style (value/growth), sector and market cap. As a result, we allocate by these style boxes: international, emerging markets, domestic equities, large/small cap, value/growth, etc. Fund managers are expected to stay within their mandate and remain fully invested. Their job is to beat their style benchmark (e.g. large cap growth).

There are funds that are permitted to be opportunistic and rotate between asset classes but those funds are relatively rare (e.g. Hussman Funds). While every few years or so, there have been calls to reform the fund management industry, I don’t see any looming competitive threats that will compelling a drastic re-thinking of this investment paradigm. A few years ago, hedge funds might have posed a serious threat had they been able to generate pure alpha, but it turns out that what hedge funds mostly deliver are different forms of beta, which in aggregate are not worthy of their 2 and 20 fee structures.

I didn’t make these rules. Until something radical happens to challenge the business model of fund management, we are stuck with the current paradigm.


Addendum: Barry Ritholz at Big Picture has an interesting post about conflicts of interest and mis-aligned interest at the asset allocation level for individual investors.

Wednesday, January 28, 2009

Feedback on a book project

I would like to ask for your help in giving me some feedback.

Over the years, I have watched as a number of experienced friends and colleagues move from the sell side to the buy side and struggle with the business realities of the money management business. Their problems were mainly attributable to the fact that there is a lot more to investment management than knowing what to buy and sell.

I have posted on this topic (see part 1, part 2 and part 3). I decided to work on a book outlining some of the issues surrounding the business of investment management, as training in this topic seems to be severely deficient. Just as dentists come out of dental school knowing all about dentistry, but most don’t know anything about running a dental practice, analysts come out of business school knowing little about investment management.

I have outlined a table of contents for the proposed book. I would welcome any comments from investment professionals or MBA students in business programs.

How do you feel about this topic?

Is there anything else that I should address?

Please leave your feedback in the comment section or email me at cam at hbhinvestments.com.


-------------------------------

Table of Contents


Introduction: Just because you can cook doesn’t mean you can run a restaurant
Investment management is a business, treat it that way.


Part I: The Investment Process
Chapter 1: The investment process is the production line of your business
Selection: Deciding on what to buy and sell
Portfolio construction: How much do you buy and sell?
Portfolio Implementation: Trading is a game of inches
Review and Control: Putting it all together

Chapter 2: Product Engineering and the Client Relationship Benchmark
Learning to actively listen
Building a client relationship benchmark is the key to business risk management
The defined benefit pension plan client
The individual client
The Family Office client
The hedge fund trader
Introducing the Factor Analyzer

Chapter 3: Portfolio construction and optimization
The fundamental law of active management
Why use a portfolio optimizer
Portfolio construction the fundamental way
Quantitative risk models have many flavors
Stupid quant tricks, or how to use risk models
Sizing your stock bets
The cautionary tale of manager A: When to use optimization

Chapter 4: Trading is a game of inches
The best execution standard
Legal, regulatory and ethical considerations
Measuring execution costs
Trading intelligently: No one-size-fits-all solution

Chapter 5: Troubleshooting your portfolio
The Deming system
Measure, measure, measure!
Is selection positive? But portfolio performance negative?
Dealing with difficult or unexpected macro environments
Learning from failure
Investment philosophy, business model and business risk


Part II: Marketing and Client Relationship Management
Chapter 6: Marketing to gatekeepers
The due diligence process: The 5Ps
Maintaining discipline to stay on message
The mutual fund gatekeeper
The consultant gatekeeper

Chapter 7: Managing client relationships
Business risk management
Client reporting and communication: telling your story
Being proactive to build relationships
Using clients for product development
The portfolio dispersion conundrum
The investment process change conundrum


Part III: Hedge Fund Operations
Chapter 8: So you want to start a hedge fund?
The hedge fund business model
The business plan
The hedge fund startup organization: personnel functions and requirements
Legal structure and financial structure
Operational issues
The hedge fund due diligence process
Risk control
Managing the process well enough to grow and survive

Tuesday, July 22, 2008

The secret of Warren Buffett’s success

Years ago I was asked what kept us from being Warren Buffett. My reply was "how Buffett picked stocks was fairly well-known. The problem was the inability of managers to tolerate excessive tracking error." This was quant-speak for "portfolio managers spent too much time building benchmark hugging portfolios for business reasons".

There has been much written about how Warren Buffett picks stock. Jeff Matthews had a great series of posts on this topic:


It's not just about picking stocks
One of the effects of Buffett’s approach is that he won’t buy companies whose businesses he doesn’t understand or he deems “too difficult to run”. As a result, the portfolio will contain very few companies in certain industries, such as Technology. As any good quant can tell you, a lot of return risk can be explained by industry weightings and such a lopsided portfolio will have returns that are very different from the S&P 500.

I have written before that running a portfolio is a lot more than picking stocks, which people have focused on for Buffett. It’s also about benchmarking, portfolio construction and trading.


Warren has a plan - and sticks to it
Could the secret of Warren Buffett’s success be the way he benchmarks himself? Indeed there is some evidence of that as this study shows that despite Berkshire's vaunted investment results, its Sharpe ratio is only 0.64.

In many cases, Berkshire Hathaway buys the whole company and seems to only consider the value of that cash flow stream at purchase time. Buffett et al seems to care less about the value of the company in the marketplace after its purchase. After all, the value of Berkshire Hathaway’s unlisted subsidiaries are not reported anywhere nor can they reported since there is no publicly listed value for these companies. After BRK acquires them, they only get valued by the market based of their aggregate cash flows, asset values, etc.

Could Berkshire's investment policy be just a form of Economic Value Added (EVA), as popularized by Stern Stewart & Co? Under the EVA analytical framework, your objective in running a company is to make sure the returns on your investments are above the cost of your funding. Since Berkshire buys and doesn't sell, its investment policy seems to be consistent with the concepts of EVA: buy cheaply and never mind what the market thinks in the interim because you are managing through the economic cycle.


You can build your own Berkshire Hathaway
You may argue that “Warren Buffett has the means to buy the whole company, but I don’t. I don’t have the luxury of doing the same thing.”

It can be done. I once worked with a taxable family trust that held an equity portfolio with many positions with very low cost basis (and therefore large capital gains liability if the position were to be sold). The objective of the trust was to provide its current beneficiaries with an income stream while preserving the inflation adjusted value of the capital for future generations.

The trustees decided to focus the portfolio on holding dividend paying stocks with good growth prospects. They created a synthetic benchmark based on the dividend growth metrics to measure the portfolio’s performance. Returns were measured on an after-tax basis. The hurdle rate for selling a stock with an embedded capital gain therefore was higher than normal because of the higher after-tax cost of replacing the dividend stream.

As the portfolio manager for one of the trust’s portfolios, I found myself in the unusual situation of apologizing every time the market went up, even if the portfolio had outperformed: “Sorry, we made money for you this quarter (but that means that we can’t re-balance the portfolio and sell anything without taking the capital gains hit)”. Conversely, market declines were welcome because it afforded an opportunity to harvest some capital losses so that the portfolio could be re-balanced on a tax-efficient basis.


Know yourself, be disciplined and march to your own drumbeat
The story of this trust is an example of an investor knowing his objectives and sticking to them. In this case, the trust knew its objective and created its own benchmark. The trustees focused on dividends and their growth rates (just as Berkshire Hathaway focuses on cash flows and their growth). What the market pays for those investments in the interim was mostly noise that could be ignored.

If you know yourself and can be disciplined in the same way, you can do the same.

Wednesday, February 20, 2008

Examining your assumptions: The Fundamental Law of Active Management

This is one of a series of posts on the importance of understanding the assumptions behind a quantitative model. As I understand it, the Richard Grinold paper on the Fundamental Law of Active Management is now part of the CFA reading:



What Grinold means by the above formula is that a manager’s value-added (Information Ratio) is a function of his selection skill (Information Coefficient) and the number of opportunities (N) he has.

No doubt thousands of CFA candidates have read this, memorized the formula and nodded sagely. They may have even tried to apply it in their working lives. Let's look at some of the underlying assumptions behind this model and understand how a blind application of this work may lead to suboptimal results.

What do you mean by IC? Most quants think they know how to measure IC, at least mathematically. However, the Information Coefficient for any selection process will vary according to time horizon. Is your IC the same for 1 day as for 1 month or 1 year? If you assume a flat IC for any time horizon and not incorporate trading cost assumptions this model will generate portfolio turnover that is uncontrollably high. Grinold in his later works elaborated on this turnover issue (see Grinold and Stuckelman, 1993; also Grinold and Kahn, 1995).

What do you mean by N? N is the number of independent opportunities available. If you are running a 100 stock portfolio does that mean that the number of independent opportunities, or ideas, is 100? What if you were picking stocks based on some fundamental criteria (e.g. low P/E) or macro theme (e.g. rising inflationary expectations). Is N equal to 1, 100 or somewhere in between?

Putting it into English

While I am a math geek as much as the next quant, I like to put the ideas into English when I apply them to the real world. The idea behind the Fundamental Law of Active Management is to size the bets according to the edge you have.

Grinold's work is actually a thematic variation on Kelly’s Criterion. John Kelly was a Bell Labs engineer in the 1950s who posed the following problem. Supposing a gambler overheard underworld types fixing a horse race on the telephone, but there was noise on the line. What should the gambler bet given this knowledge and the level of noise (= probability of correct information) on the line? This discussion could then be generalized to a treatise on information content, signal-to-noise ratio, etc.

Thursday, January 17, 2008

What do you after you've made your picks (part 3)

I have had a number of discussions over the years with investment professionals, most of whom are in the brokerage community, who believe that the investment management process is straightforward. You just need to pick the right things: the right stocks, the right sectors, countries, themes, etc. The rest is just the “messy” business of implementation.

In practice, I have found that as a portfolio manager I only spent about one-third to one-half of my time figuring out my picks. All that other “messy” stuff, if improperly managed, can lead to distressing results. Some examples are:

- Our diagnostics show that our selection process worked, but why did we underperform?
- We got fired over a misunderstanding???
- I’d hate to tell you this but John the portfolio manager and Mary the trader are continuously at each others’ throats…

This is one in a series of posts on all that "messy" stuff: What do you do after you’ve made your picks. I would emphasize that there is no one size fits all answer. Your mileage will vary. (See part 1 on Reading your client and part 2 on Portfolio Construction).


Trading: Not an afterthought
A lot of investors spend so much time on selection that trading is treated as an afterthought. In some shops the responsibility for trading and execution is relegated to the most junior person on the team. This is an enormous mistake.

Portfolio management can be a game of inches. In many of the surveys that I have seen over the years, the difference in ten-year returns between the first quartile and the median manager for a US large cap S&P 500-like mandate has varied between 0.8% to 1.5%. You can make all the right picks, get your portfolio construction and risk control right and easily lose it all in trading. (Admittedly this example is somewhat extreme as the spread between median and first quartile managers tend to be much higher in other kinds of mandates but I am just trying to prove a point here.)


How do you measure trading costs?
There are several popular ways of measuring trading costs:

- Commission (which is what many brokers focus on when I talk to them)
- Commission + Execution shortfall against a benchmark (usually VWAP, or Volume Weighted Average Price)
- Commission + Execution shortfall + Opportunity costs (or the cost of not trading)
- Implementation shortfall vs. a paper portfolio

Once upon a time, execution benchmarks such as VWAP weren’t prevalent that we had to explain the concept to a lot of brokerage firms that we dealt with. Today this is a commonly accepted benchmark to measure execution. While it is a valid concept there are limitations to the measure as a trading cost measure:

- The size of trade may be too big, in which case you become VWAP
- The stock that you are trading may be too thin for a VWAP benchmark as it may only trade in blocks
- Volume is migrating away from the floor of the NYSE and NASDAQ to the upstairs market and dark pools and therefore VWAP does not accurately measure the actual trades done
- There is an arms race going on out there: With the prevalence of VWAP as a benchmark, many brokers now have VWAP matching trading algorithms, where they slice and dice a block trade into smaller orders to feed into the market. Others have also developed algorithms to spot these types of orders.

What about the costs of not trading? Many years ago one institution used to base the bonus of the trading desk on the difference between the execution price and VWAP. As a result, the traders tried very hard to buy only on the bid and sell only on the ask. The executed prices against VWAP looked great, but very little of the order got done. In the case of the said institution, friction developed between the portfolio managers and the trading desk as a result of this mis-aligned incentive system.

If you add in opportunity costs you have a more complete picture. This approach was suggested by Wayne Wagner, who co-founded the Plexus Group to do execution cost measurement, now part of ITG. Supposing that a trade didn’t executed, then opportunity cost is the difference between the decision price (the price at the time you decide to trade) and the ending price for the measurement period.

A more holistic way of approaching the trading cost measurement is to run a parallel paper model portfolio. Put in the changes to the portfolio when you decide to buy or sell and measure the returns of the paper portfolio against the actual portfolio. The difference is implementation cost. The problem with this approach is that it does not disaggregate costs.


What to do?
There are vendors and brokerage firms with trading cost estimate models. These models work on average but actual results can vary greatly from the estimate. I am a proponent of customizing the way you trade to the speed of the idea that you are trying to trade.

A deep-value investor (and deep-value investors are usually early in the timing of their trades) should probably be patient and buy only on or below the bid price and sell on or above the ask price. On the other hand, if you have fast breaking information (a mining company had a big strike or a biotech’s has just announced results on one of their drugs) buying on the bid and selling on the ask is the wrong thing to do.

My suggestion: Undertake a study to understand the reasons behind your trades and their short-term price momentum. Are the trades chasing momentum or are they showing negative momentum? Is post-trade momentum positive or negative?

In conclusion, there is no one-size-fits-all solution for the same reason that trading cost estimate models only work well on average. Trade lists with consistent positive price momentum call for an aggressive style of trading, while negative momentum trade lists call for a more patient style.

Thursday, January 10, 2008

What do you do after you’ve made your picks? (Part 2)

I have had a number of discussions over the years with investment professionals, most of whom are in the brokerage community, who believe that the investment management process is straightforward. You just need to pick the right things: the right stocks, the right sectors, countries, themes, etc. The rest is just the “messy” business of implementation.

In practice, I have found that as a portfolio manager I only spent about one-third to one-half of my time figuring out my picks. All that other “messy” stuff, if improperly managed, can lead to distressing results. Some examples are:

- Our diagnostics show that our selection process worked, but why did we underperform?
- We got fired over a misunderstanding???
- I’d hate to tell you this but John the portfolio manager and Mary the trader are continuously at each others’ throats…

This is one in a series of posts on all that "messy" stuff: What do you do after you’ve made your picks. I would emphasize that there is no one size fits all answer. Your mileage will vary. (See part 1 on Reading your client here).


Portfolio Construction: how much to buy and sell
If the selection process is about deciding on what to buy and sell, portfolio construction is about deciding on how much to buy and sell. I would break down this process into the following steps:

- Deciding on your benchmark
- Deciding on what your bets are: minimizing your un-intended bets and properly sizing your intended bets

What are your bets?
You should only make bets only when you have an edge. What is the essence, or the underlying themes, of your selections and how confident you are about them?

Risk models can help and I am a big fan of them. A portfolio manager with a risk model can see more easily see his bets and therefore eliminate or minimize his un-intended bets and properly size his intended bets. Size the intended bets according to Grinold’s principles: a manager’s value-added (Information Ratio) is a function of his selection skill (Information Coefficient) and the number opportunities (N) he has.

There is no one size fits all solution in choosing risk models. It depends on your selection process. A top-down manager should probably use a risk model that focuses mainly on macro-economic risk factors to analyze his portfolio. A traditional bottom-up stock selector or sector rotator might want to use a fundamental factor model, such as the one pioneered by Barra. Traders with shorter term time horizons may be better served by principal component models, as offered by firms such as APT and Northfield.


Should you optimize your portfolio?
Some managers use risk models just to analyze and understand their risk exposures. Others take the additional step of asking the risk model to construct the portfolio for them through an optimization process. This quantitative technique may not be suitable for investors with fundamentally driven processes as this group often have trouble numerically specifying many of the inputs to the optimizer.


Portfolio Optimization: What kind of painter do you want to be?
Managers who use optimization need to understand the nuances of the optimizer and how it interacts with the forecast alphas. I would use the analogy of being a painter and knowing what you want to paint. A quant with an index-plus, or a low tracking error active mandate, will keep the risk aversion parameter high with fairly low forecast alphas. This would be the equivalent of painting a series of subtle colors with smooth transitions between colors.

One of the frustrations of the optimizer output from index-plus style optimizations is that the optimizer will often replace one stock ranked "hold" with another that is ranked "hold" for risk control reasons. If the intent is a to build a "pedal-to-the-metal" portfolio, then the manager needs to take steps to emphasize the tails, or extremes, of the forecast alpha score distributions. In other words, only buy stocks ranked "buy" and sell stocks ranked "sell". This would be the equivalent of painting a bright colorful mosaic, compared to the dull but subtle colors of the index-plus mandate.

Sunday, January 6, 2008

What do you do after you’ve made your picks? (Part 1)

I have had a number of discussions over the years with investment professionals, most of whom are in the brokerage community, who believe that the investment management process is straightforward. You just need to pick the right things: the right stocks, the right sectors, countries, themes, etc. The rest is just the “messy” business of implementation.

In practice, I have found that as a portfolio manager I only spent about one-third to one-half of my time figuring out my picks. All that other “messy” stuff, if improperly managed, can lead to distressing results. Some examples are:

- Our diagnostics show that our selection process worked, but why did we underperform?
- We got fired over a misunderstanding???
- I’d hate to tell you this but John the portfolio manager and Mary the trader are continuously at each others’ throats…

This is one in a series of posts on all that "messy" stuff: What do you do after you’ve made your picks I would emphasize that there is no one size fits all answer. Your mileage will vary.


Portfolio Construction: how much to buy and sell
If the selection process is about deciding on what to buy and sell, portfolio construction is about deciding on how much to buy and sell. I would break down this process into the following steps:

- Deciding on your benchmark
- Deciding on what your bets are: minimizing your un-intended bets and properly sizing your intended bets


Reading your client, or What's the Real benchmark?
Benchmarks can vary greatly from one client to another. Here are some sample answers of what you might get when you ask the client “what is the benchmark” (with translations in parentheses):

(1) We’ve given this question a lot of thought and have done very careful studies, your benchmark is ___. (The benchmark is the stated benchmark).

(2) Make me money. Just don’t lose any. (The benchmark is the better of cash or the market)

(3) We selected you/your firm because of its history of adding value; or we are committing funds to this asset class by diversifying our exposure between three managers. (The benchmark is some combination of the returns of your competitors and the stated benchmark.)

These are just some common examples. In my experience (1) is rare. One simple example of this would be an index fund. If it's an active mandate and the client has already done a lot of work, this may be a highly customized benchmark.

Individual investors give (2) as an answer a lot. It might also be the pension plan or deferred compensation plan of a small group of executives in a company. Ideally, you should build some sort of timing model to understand when the asset class or your selection process gets into trouble and minimize risk during those environments. If you don’t have a timing model, figure out how much tolerance for loss the client has and then position your benchmark between cash and the market. Translate your risk tolerance estimate into weights of the relative importance of these two components.

As an aside, my formulation of a benchmark as being the better return of X and Y is not exactly fair, but whoever said that life was fair?

The answer (3) is very typical of an institutional mandate. It is a sad truth in life but in general, only top-quartile managers get new assets and bottom-quartile get dropped. As an example of the importance of the competitor positions, during the 1990s most international equity managers were vastly underweight Japan compared to the EAFE index. As a result most managers handily outperformed the stated benchmark of EAFE as Japan had been a laggard during that period. It was therefore important to know the median manager weight in Japan was during that period for EAFE-mandate managers.

I also knew of one manager who picked two “smart” competitors, top performing managers in his asset class, and estimated these competitors’ exposures. He then pegged the benchmark and portfolio to the average macro exposure of these two competitors (see the sidebar entitled Reverse Engineering a Manager's Macro Exposure for an example of how to estimate competitor position weights).


In future posts I will address other issues such as risk models, portfolio optimization, minimizing trading costs, etc.