Monday, May 12, 2014

It`s the risk appetite, stupid!

There has been much written lately about market divergences. Jeff Miller, who I depend on for a level-headed view of macro and fundamental insights, this week rhetorically asked the following question:
Here is a simple test:

When these more speculative stocks were surging last year, did analysts now warning about "divergences" celebrate the "confirmation" of the strength of the market? Or did they warn that the market was in a "bubble?"

If the latter, isn't it healthy to restore more normal valuations?
Brett Steenbarger at TraderFeed looked back past instances of negative breadth divergencess when the broad market averages were making new highs. What he found surprised him:
Specifically, I went back to the start of 1990 and looked at all occasions in which the SP 500 Index closed within 2% of its 200-day high under the following conditions: a) VIX less than 15; b) new 52-week highs under 100; and c) new 52-week lows over 50...

Indeed, looking across the 38 occasions, the next 20 trading sessions averaged a gain of 1.9% and the next 50 sessions averaged a gain of 3.51%, with only a handful of losing instances in each case.
He concluded:
Now, my conclusion is not to jump in with both hands and buy this market. Rather, the data exercise has accomplished two things: 1) tempered my bearish leaning; and 2) illuminated the kind of market we are in.

I find this to be true of data exercises in general. They offer a kind of perspective that checks assumptions and biases and can trigger new ideas as well. The historical perspective is not always the correct perspective, but it often is a fresh one--and there is value in examining one's assumptions critically.

A risk-off environment
I would agree with Steenbarger. My own view of breadth indicators is that while they can provide warnings of negative environments for stocks, they are not precise timing indicators. I showed that the corrections of 2011 and 2012 were not accompanied by breadth deterioration in the Advance-Decline Line (see Should you sell in May?).

My cautiousness about the stock market is related to broad based indications of the loss of risk appetite across the board (see The bearish verdict from market cycle analysis). However, I do agree with the evidence based approach used by Steenbarger to test his conjectures about markets.

In that spirit, I have constructed a Risk Appetite Index, consisting of an equal weighted long position in the high-beta segments of the market, namely the Russell 2000 (IWM) and NASDAQ 100 (QQQ), coupled with an equal weighted short position in defensive sectors of Consumer Staples (XLP), Utilities (XLU) and Telecom (IYZ). The chart below shows the Risk Appetite Index (in black) and SP 500 (in red).



There were four past instances of trend breaks in the Risk Appetite Index, where the breaks were marked by the dotted purple lines. In three of those instances (2008, 2011 and 2012), stock prices either entered a bear market (2008) or corrected (2011 and 2012). On one occasion (2010), stocks failed to decline, but that can be partly explained by the fact that they had already corrected.

Now we have a trend break in the Risk Appetite Index, not just in US equities, but marked by the underperformance of European small caps against large caps and a loss of appetite in credit markets. Despite the new highs achieved by the major US large cap equity averages today, which I believe was a short-term sentiment-driven rally (see my previous post Watch for the sentimental rally), I continue to find it difficult to get overly bullish on US equities over the summer months.





Cam Hui is a portfolio manager at Qwest Investment Fund Management Ltd. (“Qwest”). The opinions and any recommendations expressed in the blog are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions and recommendations of Qwest. Qwest reviews Mr. Hui’s blog to ensure it is connected with Mr. Hui’s obligation to deal fairly, honestly and in good faith with the blog’s readers.”

None of the information or opinions expressed in this blog constitutes a solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security or other instrument. Nothing in this blog constitutes investment advice and any recommendations that may be contained herein have not been based upon a consideration of the investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any specific recipient. Any purchase or sale activity in any securities or other instrument should be based upon your own analysis and conclusions. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Either Qwest or I may hold or control long or short positions in the securities or instruments mentioned.

Sunday, May 11, 2014

Watch for the sentimental rally

Regular readers will know that I have been fairly cautious on the stock market for the past several weeks (see A case of risk exhaustion?, Interpreting a possible volatility regime change,  Should you sell in May? and The bearish verdict from market cycle analysis). However, investor sentiment have moved to an overly bearish reading indicating a crowded short. While I remain convinced that the intermediate term path of least resistance is down for equities, we are likely to see a rally that takes the major large cap stock averages to marginal new highs in the next week or so.


Hulbert: Too much bearishness
The signs of excessive bearishness are emerging. Mark Hulbert wrote last week that his NASDAQ newletter writer sentiment index was at a bearish extreme:


Even though the market is more or less at the same level today than it was a month ago, if not slightly higher, the average market timer is more bearish today than then. That’s positive from a contrarian perspective, since it means that the wall of worry is that much stronger.

Notice also from the accompanying chart that, at the NASDAQ Composite’s mid-April low, the HNNSI dipped to minus 20% — meaning that the average NASDAQ-oriented timer was allocating 20% of his equity portfolio to going short. That is a significantly bearish posture to take. It’s the greatest amount of bearishness, in fact, in well more than a year.

Notice also that, even though the average timer is not as bearish today as he was in mid-April, he is still just as bearish as he was at the market’s lows last June. That is particularly noteworthy, since the NASDAQ Composite today is 24% higher today than then. Because the usual pattern is for bullishness to rise and fall more or less in lockstep with the market itself, it’s remarkable that there is not a lot more bullishness.

All of this suggests that there is a strong wall of worry out there for the market to climb. That doesn’t guarantee that the market will rise, of course. But it does mean that, if it does, it will have the sentiment winds blowing in its sails.

More AAII bears than bulls
In addition, Bespoke reported that the latest AAII survey showed more bears than bulls.


My own interpretation of this chart is that the low level of bulls and bears indicate a lack of conviction and a highly jittery market, where sentiment survey readings will be volatile and be subject to wild swings. (Remember that sentiment surveys ask people about their opinions, not what they have done.)


Put-call ratio indicate a crowded short
The chart below shows the equity only put-call ratio, with a 5 day exponential moving average (in blue) and a 21 day moving average (in red). A rising put-call ratio indicates a heightened levels of fear as investors buy more put options for downside protection.



With the equity only put-call ratio at an elevated level relative to recent history, I would watch for the SPX to rally and test and perhaps overcome the resistance zone (top panel, shown in grey) and possibly a test of the 12 support level on the VIX Index (bottom panel) in the upcoming week.


A small cap rally?
One of the likely beneficiaries of any stock market rally would be the beleaguered small cap sector. The chart of the Russell 2000 below (top panel) shows that the RUT has descended to test an important support zone. As well, the RUT to SPX ratio (bottom panel) shows that the small cap to large cap ratio is also testing an important zone of relative support.


With sentiment overly bearish, one likely rally candidate would be the RUT. I would watch for either a test of the pictured downtrend lines, shown on the top panel, or the relative downtrend line, shown on the bottom channel. If I am correct about the sentiment-based rally, then the ability of the bulls to overcome either downtrend would be an important test of the intermediate term outlook.

My inner investor remains cautious and he is taking this bout of strength to raise some cash. My inner trader has abandoned his bearish stance and cautiously taken on a small long position in stocks.





Cam Hui is a portfolio manager at Qwest Investment Fund Management Ltd. (“Qwest”). The opinions and any recommendations expressed in the blog are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions and recommendations of Qwest. Qwest reviews Mr. Hui’s blog to ensure it is connected with Mr. Hui’s obligation to deal fairly, honestly and in good faith with the blog’s readers.”

None of the information or opinions expressed in this blog constitutes a solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security or other instrument. Nothing in this blog constitutes investment advice and any recommendations that may be contained herein have not been based upon a consideration of the investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any specific recipient. Any purchase or sale activity in any securities or other instrument should be based upon your own analysis and conclusions. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Either Qwest or I may hold or control long or short positions in the securities or instruments mentioned.

Thursday, May 8, 2014

A funds-flow reason for equity market weakness

Regular readers will know that I have been relatively cautious on the US equity market. The reasoning has been mainly technical (see The bearish verdict from market cycle analysis) and I have struggled to find a fundamental trigger for a market correction (see A market correction trigger?).

I recently came upon an argument for equity market weakness based on institutional asset allocation flows from this unknown analyst:
Public corporate pension funds thanks to the over 30% gain in SP500 last year and the rise in rates which lowered the net present value of the liabilities many are 100% to 110% funded. At the end of the first quarter a number of large pension funds were up 8% on the year because of there holdings in the MOMO stocks

( Amozon , Facebook, Netflix ect ) and with the Net present value of their liabilities lower it became attractive to reduce growth assets and increase hedge assets. I think this explains the decline in Momentum stocks in April and the strong bid for long dated fixed income.
In other words, the defined benefit pension funds that became fully funded because of last year's stock market gains are selling to lock in their profits. They do this by selling the risky asset, stocks, and buying the risk-less asset relative to their liabilities, which are long duration bonds. The writer believes that this asset allocation shift has a long way to go because of the scarcity of long-dated Treasuries (emphasis added):
The question is this asset reallocation over. The answer is no! Big picture there are 16T in Private pension fund assets and 12T in US treasuries so this story will continue to play out as our population ages and preference for fixed income increases. 
I don't know how valid the analysis is because I have not looked at the scale of the effect. What is the number of defined benefit plans that have moved into actuarial surplus because of stock market gains? If anyone has any data that bears light on this issue, please speak up!

The funds flow and asset allocation thesis is consistent with the BoAML report that I highlighted (see A warning from the retail investor?) indicating that institutions were large sellers of equities while the individual investor had been piling in and hedge funds had turned from sellers to mild buyers:


If the funds flow is correct, then we could well be seeing stock prices deflate and long-dated Treasury prices rally while the world scratches their heads. In that case, there may not be a fundamental or valuation driven reason for equity weakness in the days and weeks ahead.



Addendum: An astute reader wrote that institutions generally do not have a large weighting in momentum stocks and therefore I am exaggerating the momentum stock sell-off effect. I would tend to agree. However, I was quoting the analyst in his entirety. The re-balancing thesis from stocks to long duration bonds remains valid and would put downward pressure on equity prices and upward pressure on long Treasury bond prices.



Cam Hui is a portfolio manager at Qwest Investment Fund Management Ltd. (“Qwest”). The opinions and any recommendations expressed in the blog are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions and recommendations of Qwest. Qwest reviews Mr. Hui’s blog to ensure it is connected with Mr. Hui’s obligation to deal fairly, honestly and in good faith with the blog’s readers.”

None of the information or opinions expressed in this blog constitutes a solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security or other instrument. Nothing in this blog constitutes investment advice and any recommendations that may be contained herein have not been based upon a consideration of the investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any specific recipient. Any purchase or sale activity in any securities or other instrument should be based upon your own analysis and conclusions. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Either Qwest or I may hold or control long or short positions in the securities or instruments mentioned.

Tuesday, May 6, 2014

A market correction trigger?

In a recent post, I wrote that I was watching the relative performance of cyclical stocks against the market for rising expectations that economic growth was about to accelerate (see The bearish verdict from market cycle analysis). I stated that cyclical stocks looked a little wobbly but the relative uptrend was (sort of) still intact. Under those circumstances, the reasonable thing to do is to give the bull case the benefit of the doubt.

After the close on Tuesday, I reviewed the chart of the relative performance of the Morgan Stanley Cyclical Index (CYC) against the SPX and found that CYC had broken down out of its relative uptrend that stretches back almost two years (solid line). Any way you look at it, it had also broken down out of a short-term relative uptrend (dotted line).


Recently, Business Insider highlighted analysis from Citi credit analyst Matt King showing the negative divergence between stock prices and estimate revisions, or the momentum of changes in fundamentals.


Sometimes these kinds of disconnects have a way of not mattering to the market until it matters. Could the technical relative breakdown in cyclical stocks that it's starting to matter? If so, could such a change in market psychology be one of the triggers for a market correction?





Cam Hui is a portfolio manager at Qwest Investment Fund Management Ltd. (“Qwest”). The opinions and any recommendations expressed in the blog are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions and recommendations of Qwest. Qwest reviews Mr. Hui’s blog to ensure it is connected with Mr. Hui’s obligation to deal fairly, honestly and in good faith with the blog’s readers.”

None of the information or opinions expressed in this blog constitutes a solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security or other instrument. Nothing in this blog constitutes investment advice and any recommendations that may be contained herein have not been based upon a consideration of the investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any specific recipient. Any purchase or sale activity in any securities or other instrument should be based upon your own analysis and conclusions. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Either Qwest or I may hold or control long or short positions in the securities or instruments mentioned.

Monday, May 5, 2014

Financial engineering as a CapEx substitute?

In my last post (see The bearish verdict from market cycle analysis), I pointed out that the relative performance of capital equipment sensitive sectors like Technology and Industrials were not behaving well. I further lamented the lack of sales growth visibility of capital equipment companies during the latest Earnings Season  (see What the equity bulls need for the next phase and CapEx: Still waiting for Godot).

As per Business Insider points out, loan standards are being relaxed and loan demand is rising, so these conditions "should" be conducive to higher business investment. But higher capex has yet to appear.


Zero Hedge confirmed the long awaited capital expenditure acceleration has yet to arrive, though I always read their analysis with a grain of salt:


One explanation for the lack of capital expenditures this cycle came from Drew Matus and Julian Emanuel of UBS. Matus and Emanuel postulated that companies are engaged in so-called "corporate QE" (via Bloomberg).


Companies that engage in corporate QE are characterized by a reasonable dividend yield, a history of dividend growth and share buybacks. The UBS analysts went on to explain that companies feel pressured to engage in this form of financial engineering in the current low return environment (emphasis added):
The strategy is understandable in an environment where gross domestic product is expanding at an anemic rate of 0.1 percent. Companies hard-pressed to grow their businesses organically are paying dividends and reducing share count in order to maintain 5 percent to 7 percent cash-on-cash returns for investors.

The concern, as Mssrs. Matus and Emanuel indicate, is the substitution effect where companies "give away" money rather than reinvest in the form of capital expenditures. Ultimately, top-line growth will justify investment and companies will generate higher returns. Until then, investors must acknowledge the slow-growth reality of PIMCO's "new normal" and take growth where they can find it... even if that means settling for corporate QE.
Is this what happened in this cycle? Are ROIs so low that companies turning to financial engineering instead of investing the money back in their own businesses?





Cam Hui is a portfolio manager at Qwest Investment Fund Management Ltd. (“Qwest”). The opinions and any recommendations expressed in the blog are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions and recommendations of Qwest. Qwest reviews Mr. Hui’s blog to ensure it is connected with Mr. Hui’s obligation to deal fairly, honestly and in good faith with the blog’s readers.”

None of the information or opinions expressed in this blog constitutes a solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security or other instrument. Nothing in this blog constitutes investment advice and any recommendations that may be contained herein have not been based upon a consideration of the investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any specific recipient. Any purchase or sale activity in any securities or other instrument should be based upon your own analysis and conclusions. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Either Qwest or I may hold or control long or short positions in the securities or instruments mentioned.

Sunday, May 4, 2014

The bearish verdict from market cycle analysis

I received a ton of feedback from my post last week (see Should you sell in May?) and a lot of readers seemed to have misunderstood my views. Yes, I was calling for a 10-20% correction this summer, but, no, the reasons are not just based on midterm election year seasonality. It appeared that many people had read the headline and concluded that I was tilting bearishly because of the so-called Sell-in-May seasonality. Not true. While seasonality arguments created a tailwind for my call, my cautious stance was based on other factors, such as the change in market leadership and volatility regime (see Interpreting a possible volatility regime change and A case of risk exhaustion).


The market cycle analytical framework
Let me start again, but in the context of a market cycle framework to analyze the stock market. One key advantage of market cycle analysis over economic analysis is that market cycle analysis uses real-time data, which is more forward looking than economic statistics, which is by definition backward looking. In effect, market cycle analysis gives us a continuous real-time read of what Mr. Market thinks where we are in the cycle. While its views may not be necessarily right, it does measure market expectations.

Here is an idealized version of a market cycle and how market leadership evolves over the course of that cycle:

Early cycle: The economy is in recession or on the edge of a recession. In response, the central bank stimulates the economy with low interest rates (or unconventional policy). As a result, stock begin to rise, led by interest sensitive sectors, such as Financial and housing related stocks.

Mid cycle: Some analysts split this part of the cycle into several pieces, but here is roughly how market expectations change. The economy gets better, or is perceived to get better. More jobs are created and consumers have more money to spend. Corporations find that they start to get capacity constrained. They respond by hiring more people, which leads to a virtuous cycle of more consumer spending, and buy more capital equipment. During this part of the market cycle, Consumer Discretionary, capital equipment sensitive sectors like Technology and Industrial stocks lead the market higher.

Late cycle: The economy starts to overheat and inflation starts to tick up. At this point, inflation sensitive commodity related sectors like Energy and Materials start to outperform. The central bank responds to rising inflationary pressures by raising interest rates, which leads to...

Bear phase: The stock market falls because of the expectations of higher interest rates and falling growth. Defensive sectors such as Consumer Staples, Utilities and Healthcare outperform during this phase.

There are a number of important caveats to this analytical framework. First, this is an idealized cycle which ends with either an inventory recession or the expectations of slowdown caused by an inventory recession. What we went through was not a typical inventory recession but a balance sheet recession, which recovered very slowly.

More importantly, I am describing a market cycle and not an economic cycle. Realize that this framework is based on technical analysis and not economic analysis. A market cycle behaves like an economic cycle, but it only describes the market response to expectations, not the actual economic result. As an example, the economic cycle started at the trough of the Lehman Crisis in 2008-09, but I believe that the market cycle actually began in late 2011, when the markets got over the trauma of the debt ceiling impasse in Washington and the ECB acted to relieve the pressures of the eurozone crisis with its LTRO program.


A market cycle map
With that in mind, let us consider what has happened in the past few years in the context of the market cycle framework. I will be showing a series of charts below. They are all market relative charts - charts of the performance of sectors and industries relative to the market as measured by the SP500. You will see relative uptrends, where the sector or industry outperformed and downtrends, where they underperformed. Keep that in mind when you look at these charts. Moreover, you will see that the time frames for these charts is all three years, in order to maintain an easy apples-to-apples visual comparison of where each group is in the market cycle.

What happened?

As expected, interest sensitive stocks led the market upward in late 2011. As the relative chart of Financial stocks show, they led the market upward, but their relative performance has stalled in the last year or so and they have been consolidating sideways relative to the SP 500.


The homebuilders is another interest sensitive group that displayed a similar pattern as the financials. They initially led the market upward, but their relative performance has been rolling over. In fact, homebuilders have recently suffered a relative breakdown through a critical level of relative support.


Notwithstanding the debate between New Deal Democrat and Calculated Risk on the tactical outlook for housing, Barry Ritholz wrote about the secular headwinds faced by the homebuilding industry in the wake of the Great Recession:
When you consider the chain of purchasers that typically occurs in a residential real estate market, you will understand why homeowner equity is so important. Any home sale is usually part of a series of interdependent transactions. The newlyweds who buy a starter home are usually doing so from a married couple, who have a 3-year-old and another on the way. They want to buy a larger home with more bedrooms for the kids, and purchase that from the couple who are trading up to a nicer home in a better school district. Those sellers purchase their new home on more land, or with a better view or some other factor. The long chain of buyers and sellers, beginning with the first-time buyers, explains why household formation is so crucial.

But beyond the first-time buyers, there are other problems with the links in the home-selling chain. Jonathan Miller of Miller Samuel Inc. noted the down-payment issue was directly related to the low-equity problem...

This also creates a problem with decreased inventory, which drives prices higher and paradoxically hurts first-time buyers.

As households have been deleveraging from the mid-2000s credit binge, they also have maintained a low savings rate. Combine that with relatively low household equity -- as well as no-equity and underwater households -- and you end up with a housing market that lacks a crucial ingredient for a robust recovery.
Ritholz's observations were confirmed by a study by the St. Louis Fed, entitled "Housing Crash Continues to Overshadow Young Families' Balance Sheets", which came to a similar conclusion.


Mid-cycle sectors faltering
After the interest sensitive stocks, the leadership baton was passed on to the mid-cycle groups. As this chart shows, Consumer Discretionary stocks have been on a tear since the market bottom, but they have start to roll over on a relative basis. Note, however, that the date of the relative peak is later than that of the interest sensitive groups.


Macro Man recently weighed in on the US consumer and stated that his model of consumption is weak, largely because the restraints put on consumption from the tepid pace of the rise in housing prices (see analysis above about housing).


One characteristic of a mid-cycle expansion is rising employment and I nearly fell off my chair when I saw this chart. Despite the blowout Non-Farm Payroll release last Friday, the relative performance of the business training and staffing agency stocks is highly disappointing. This group broke down through a relative uptrend that began in late 2012 and they are now in an accelerating relative downtrend. You have to ask what Mr. Market is trying to tell us about expectations of the employment outlook when these stocks display this kind of performance.


In addition to rising employment, mid-cycle expansions are accompanied by increasing investments in technology and capital equipment. Technology, another mid-cycle sector, never got the chance to assume the leadership mantle very much until about a year ago. Their leadership soon faltered by early 2014.


The capital equipment sensitive Industrial sector bottomed out on a relative basis in October 2012. They began to lead the market in earnest starting May 2013. Like the Technology sector, they peaked out on a relative in early 2014 and they are now consolidating sideways. This is a critical sector for the health of the bull as the US economy is mid-economic cycle where capex should begin to accelerate (see What the equity bulls need for the next phase). The reports for this group this Earnings Season contained good news and bad news. The good news is that earnings and the earnings outlook were generally positive. The bad news is that these companies continued to lack visibility in sales growth, either in their Q1 reports or their forward guidance (see CapEx: Still waiting for Godot).


Another test of Mr. Market`s views about mid-cycle strength has been the relative performance of cyclical stocks. This relative performance chart of the Morgan Stanley Cyclical Index looks a little iffy. Cyclical stocks bottomed out on a relative basis at about the same time as Industrial stocks and they have been on a relative uptrend ever since. Depending on how you draw the trend-line, these stocks are either testing the relative uptrend, or they are faltering and doing the dance between the downside and the upside of the relative uptrend line.


To be sure, the cyclical picture is not out-and-out bearish. The relative performance of the cyclically sensitive Transportation stocks show that they remain in a step-wise uptrend, which leads to a bullish interpretation. Note the timing of of the bottom of these mid-cycle groups, which all occurred at about the same time.



Late cycle sectors revive
What I do find disturbing, however, is that late cycle stocks are starting to bottom and outperform. This relative chart of the Material sector is that they rallied out of a relative downtrend about a year ago, consolidated sideways and they have staged an upside relative breakout indicating a possible leadership change.


As well, Energy stocks have also rallied out of a relative downtrend and started to move up on a relative basis.



Indeed, several alternative measures of inflation are ticking up. The Dallas Fed`s measure of Trimmed Mean PCE rose to 1.9% in March on the annualized headline figure and 2.1% on an ex-food and energy basis. While these figures only represent a single month of data, they are very close to the Fed`s inflation target of 2% and should bear watching carefully.

As well, the crowd-sourced inflation measure from the Billion Prices Project shows that their measure of inflation is significantly higher than CPI.


In addition to worries about rising inflation and inflationary expectations, inter-market analysis of the US Dollar, commodities and stock prices raise another level of concern. The chart below shows the USD Index, commodity prices as measured by the CRB Index in green and the correlation of the USD with the SPX in the bottom panel. As the chart shows, USD levels are roughly inversely correlated with commodity prices, which have been rallying recently. The USD is now testing a critical level of technical support that stretches back several years. If the greenback were to rise, it would create a headwind for stock prices. The bottom panel shows the rolling 20-week correlation of the USD with the SPX, which has tended to be negative.




Defensive sectors take the lead
In conjunction with relative rallies of the late cycle sectors, defensive sectors have also begun to take a leadership position. These developments are all suggestive of a bearish overtone to the stock market outlook. This chart of shows the relative performance of Utilities is turning up:


Consumer Staples have also started to turn around on a relative basis:


As an aside, astute readers may have noticed that I excluded the chart of Healthcare stocks in my analysis, as that sector has been thought to have defensive characteristics. I decided to exclude that sector because of the recent rise and fall of the biotech stocks, which is part of the sector, because their returns only serve to confuse the issue.


Market weakness ahead
So far, I have described what I consider to be the idealized market cycle (remember, it`s not an economic cycle but a market cycle). Every cycle is different, but the market leadership pattern of the current market cycle conforms to the template of many other cycles.

There are two obvious differences. First, we came out of a balance sheet recession and not an inventory recession, so the magnitude of the responses were different with past cycles. As well, the performance of commodity sensitive sectors have been much affected by the economic cycle in China, which can distort the interpretation of cycle work.

When I put it all together, the mosaic that I see is a market all have bearish overtones because of the nature of the change in market leadership. Add in the news about growing individual investor participation (see A warning from the retail investor), rising volatility (see Interpreting a possible volatility regime change) and the seasonal effects of the mid-term election and the Sell-in-May effects, my conclusion is there is equity market weakness ahead.

Would this weakness be a correction or a full-blown bear market? The most likely proximate cause of a bear market would be the anticipation of an economic recession. Since most recessionary indicators show a low probability of a recession in the near-term, my conclusion is that we are likely to see a mid-cycle correction of 10-20%.


Bearish seasonality
Indeed, analysis from Steve Suttmeier of BoAML indicates that the most likely outcome is a 10-20% correction during the May-October period during a mid-term election year. In fact, the combined probability of a correction of 10% or more during this period is 57%.
As well, Christopher Mistal updated his mid-term election year analysis of the major US averages. I have no strong opinions about the daily twists and turns of the stock market, but given my previous analysis this looks about right to me:


The NASDAQ, which recently cratered, is projected to get clobbered even more:


In conclusion, this is the whole story of how I came to my scenario of a 10-20% correction in the stock market this summer, not just a simple Sell-in-May seasonal analysis.






Cam Hui is a portfolio manager at Qwest Investment Fund Management Ltd. (“Qwest”). The opinions and any recommendations expressed in the blog are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions and recommendations of Qwest. Qwest reviews Mr. Hui’s blog to ensure it is connected with Mr. Hui’s obligation to deal fairly, honestly and in good faith with the blog’s readers.”

None of the information or opinions expressed in this blog constitutes a solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security or other instrument. Nothing in this blog constitutes investment advice and any recommendations that may be contained herein have not been based upon a consideration of the investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any specific recipient. Any purchase or sale activity in any securities or other instrument should be based upon your own analysis and conclusions. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Either Qwest or I may hold or control long or short positions in the securities or instruments mentioned.

Thursday, May 1, 2014

A warning from the retail investor?

Macronomics highlighted some interesting fund flow statistics from the BoAML's client flows. It seems that institutional investors have been consistent size sellers of equities; while hedge funds had been sellers since late last year but recently started to buy; and individual investors have been buying stocks like they were Black Friday door-crasher specials. Bear in mind that when institutions change direction, they move glacially but move tends to be long lasting, while hedge fund and retail investor money tends to be much more nimble.



Other data sources have confirmed the individual investor stampede. TD Ameritrade maintains an Investor Movement Index (IMX) which measures individual investor activity. While the latest numbers are only to the end of March and the April figures will not be updated for another week or so, the readings from IMX also confirms substantial net individual investor buying. March 2014 IMX levels are now at all-time highs since the inception of the index and, if the BoAML data is accurate, April will show further highs indicating more buying.


Ryan Detrick made one observation about the progression of margin debt as how it relates to the net speculative activity of individual investors:
High margin debt by itself isn’t bearish.  In fact, new highs in margin debt usually have marked very strong stock markets (think the past 12 months).  The catch is once margin debt is high and it ROLLS OVER, then you better start to worry.
The latest observation shows that margin debt has started to roll over:


I am not going to make trite comments about who the smart money or the dumb money is. but when you add it all up, does this sound like a warning about the level of risk in equities?




Cam Hui is a portfolio manager at Qwest Investment Fund Management Ltd. (“Qwest”). The opinions and any recommendations expressed in the blog are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions and recommendations of Qwest. Qwest reviews Mr. Hui’s blog to ensure it is connected with Mr. Hui’s obligation to deal fairly, honestly and in good faith with the blog’s readers.”

None of the information or opinions expressed in this blog constitutes a solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security or other instrument. Nothing in this blog constitutes investment advice and any recommendations that may be contained herein have not been based upon a consideration of the investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any specific recipient. Any purchase or sale activity in any securities or other instrument should be based upon your own analysis and conclusions. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Either Qwest or I may hold or control long or short positions in the securities or instruments mentioned.

Wednesday, April 30, 2014

More evidence of a low-return equity outlook

When I was a young pup (in the era when we used to program computers with punched cards), the three most commonly used valuation ratios for stocks were the P/E ratio, the P/B ratio and dividend yield. Now all three of these metrics are pointing a long-term low return environment for equity prices.

In a recent post, I showed that the trailing P/E ratio for the SP 500 was elevated relative to its own history, even adjusted for the current low level of interest rates (see A secular steer?).


Jack Bogle of the Vanguard Group provided further evidence that equity valuations are high relative to their own history based on the P/B ratio. Like the chart above, the P/B chart goes back to the early 1900s.


Using a time frame of over 100 years for analysis,Scott Krisiloff of Avondale Asset Management showed that dividend yields are historically low as well:


Krisiloff commented (emphasis added):
The SP 500′s current dividend yield is 1.94%, which echoes the interpretation of most other valuation metrics.  Stocks are not necessarily expensive relative to their average value over the last 15 years, but are very expensive relative to long term history.  In past posts, I’ve toyed with the idea that this might be justified–maybe we’re in a new paradigm for value.  But if we are in a new era of structurally higher values, then we have to consider an important result that comes with that.  If stocks are structurally more expensive than they were in the 20th century, can we expect to receive the same rates of return that we did in that era?  If we are leaving the 20th century behind, then maybe we have to leave behind our concept of fair returns on investment.  Dividends are one signal telling us to lower our expectations.
I would tend to agree. Equity valuations appear to be elevated but they are not stupidly high. None of these metrics are pointing to a market crash around the corner. However, as the major US equity averages have broken out to new all-time highs, I have seen technicians calling for a new secular bull market, with the expectation that returns would be similar to the 1982-2000 era, or the 1947-1966 era.

Long term Dow Jones Industrials chart

Historically, secular bulls start at compressed valuations, not elevated ones. If this is indeed a secular bull, then investors should expect long-term returns to be far more muted than the last two secular bull markets.


Effects of a 25% rally and 15% correction
This valuation analysis puts some context into my most recent call for a midterm election year correction (see Should you sell in May?). Let's do some simple math and assume that 10 year return expectations is 5.0% (an arbitrary assumption, but roughly in the right ballpark).

Supposing that instead of correcting, stocks were to rise 25% in a single year, but 10 year returns stay at 5%. Simple math tells us that the return for the remaining 9 years comes to 3%, which would make equity prices highly stretched as they would be unattractive relative to 10-year Treasury yields.

On the other hand, a 15% pullback in a year would raise 9 year expected returns to 7.5%, which is a level that is far more interesting for investors. You can play around with some of the assumptions, but the bottom line is that equities do not have room for the kinds of rallies that we saw in the 1980's and 1990's.

The moral of this story: Lower your return expectations.




Cam Hui is a portfolio manager at Qwest Investment Fund Management Ltd. (“Qwest”). The opinions and any recommendations expressed in the blog are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions and recommendations of Qwest. Qwest reviews Mr. Hui’s blog to ensure it is connected with Mr. Hui’s obligation to deal fairly, honestly and in good faith with the blog’s readers.”

None of the information or opinions expressed in this blog constitutes a solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security or other instrument. Nothing in this blog constitutes investment advice and any recommendations that may be contained herein have not been based upon a consideration of the investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any specific recipient. Any purchase or sale activity in any securities or other instrument should be based upon your own analysis and conclusions. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Either Qwest or I may hold or control long or short positions in the securities or instruments mentioned.

Monday, April 28, 2014

What risk unwind?

In a recent post, I postulated that the carnage in momentum stocks was a case of risk exhaustion (see A case of risk exhaustion?). Fast and institutional money had gotten overly long risk across the board (e.g. high yield, momentum stocks, etc.) and they were in the process of unwinding the trade.

I then came upon the Barron's Big Money Poll from the weekend, which had a number of eye popping results.



First of all, money managers were more bullish on stocks than their clients (55% manager bulls vs. 31% client bulls). More notably, the most favored sector was Technology, which has gotten creamed lately, while the least loved was Utilities, which has become the new sector leadership as stocks have wobbled.

What risk unwind? If institutions are indeed de-risking, then we have a long, long way to go.





Cam Hui is a portfolio manager at Qwest Investment Fund Management Ltd. (“Qwest”). The opinions and any recommendations expressed in the blog are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions and recommendations of Qwest. Qwest reviews Mr. Hui’s blog to ensure it is connected with Mr. Hui’s obligation to deal fairly, honestly and in good faith with the blog’s readers.”

None of the information or opinions expressed in this blog constitutes a solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security or other instrument. Nothing in this blog constitutes investment advice and any recommendations that may be contained herein have not been based upon a consideration of the investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any specific recipient. Any purchase or sale activity in any securities or other instrument should be based upon your own analysis and conclusions. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Either Qwest or I may hold or control long or short positions in the securities or instruments mentioned.

Sunday, April 27, 2014

Should you sell in May?

The technical warning signs of equity weakness are clear to see. For the past several weeks, I have been voicing technical concerns about the stock market. This year seems to be a market where the adage of ”Sell in May and go away” is applicable. What puzzles me is the lack of a fundamental trigger for the decline.


Risk appetite is falling
In early April, I wrote about risk appetite rolling over (see Bears 2 Bulls 1 and A case of risk exhaustion?). My Risk Appetite Index, which consists of an equally-weighted long position in the NASDAQ 100 and Russell 2000 (high beta risk-on index) minus an equally weighted short position in the defensive sectors of Consumer Staples, Telecom and Utilities (low beta risk-off index), continues to decline. The chart below shows that the index also displayed similar behavior (trend line breaches and general weakness) ahead of the market corrections in 2011 and 2012.



Rising volatility
Underlying the weakness of the risk appetite index is a change in sector leadership from the high-beta sectors like Tech, Consumer Discretionary and Financials to defensive sectors like Utilities and Consumer Staples (see Interpreting a possible volatility regime shift). As well, I highlighted a possible regime shift where equity volatility appears to be headed higher. As knowledgeable readers know, volatility is inversely correlated with stock prices.



Deteriorating internals
What has puzzled me is the robustness of the Advance-Decline Line, which has continued to make new highs as these signs of market weaknesses appeared. While the weakness in the A-D Line can warn of major bear markets, it is less effective in spotting corrective action as it failed to flash warning signs in the market declines of 2011 and 2012.

The chart below tells the story. The top panel is the SP 1500 A-D Line, the second the % of stocks in the SPX above their 50 day moving averages, the third % of stocks in the SPX with point and figure buy signals and the four panel the SPX. In the decline of 2011, which was sparked by the combination of worries over a eurozone debt crisis and political impasse in Washington, the A-D Line did breach an uptrend line, but rallied to make a new high shortly after. The shallow correction of 2012 was also accompanied by a breach in the A-D Line uptrend, but the breach did not provide any advance warning of the decline, which was similar to the 2011 experience.


The combination of the % of stocks above their 50 dma and % of stocks with point and figure buy signals can provide some warnings of weakness, but these indicators are somewhat iffy as well. The condition of the % of stocks above their 50 dma is less than 60% (currently 54%) and % of stocks with point and figure buy signals is less than 70% (currently 68%) has been present in past corrective periods. These two indicators flashed a warning sign when the market weakened in February, but that was a false signal as a major correction did not follow.


Todd Harrison: Smart money is selling
In addition, Todd Harrison pointed out that the so-called Smart Money Flow Index is ominously bearish. The SMFI is defined in the following way:
The Smart Money Flow Index (SMFI) is calculated by taking the price of the Dow Jones Industrial Average at 10 a.m. on any given day, subtracting it from the previous day’s close, and adding it to the next day’s closing price. The first 30 minutes represent “emotional buying,” driven by greed and fear of the crowd; smart money typically waits until the end of the day. If/when the DJIA makes a new high that is not confirmed by the SMFI, there is usually trouble ahead.
In other words, SMFI measures money flow by ignoring the movement in the Dow in the first half hour. While I would not necessarily characterize the first half hour of trading as dominated by dumb money, it is certainly emotional money. The chart below of the SMFI tells the story. While the Dow (in orange) has been holding up relatively well, SMFI has been dropping precipitously since mid March:


This second chart shows a longer term perspective. The top panel shows the Dow and SMFI, as above, back to 2005. The green line on the bottom panel shows the spread between the Dow and SMFI - and the spread is as negative as it was in 2007.


Harrison followed up with a caveat to his analysis:
You will notice that we are still at levels last seen in 2007, which may prove to be a false “tell” but should, at the very least, be considered when making financial decisions. 

Following the midterm election year pattern
When I put these technical patterns together, the stock market seems to be following the historical pattern of a midterm election year. Ryan Detrick showed the typical pattern of such years, where the market peaks out in late April and bottoms out in September.


The good news is that the bottom in the Fall has historically been a durable bottom and a superb buying opportunity for stocks, as per this analysis from J.C. Parets:



Bullish fundamentals
While the technical picture is warning of a major correction, what puzzles me is the lack of a fundamental trigger for a decline. The US economy is behaving relatively well and seeing signs of a snap-back of winter related weakness. So far, Earnings Season has not proved to be a major disappointment. As per Bespoke, the EPS beat rate is 62%, which is in line with historical average. On the other hand, the sales beat rate is a bit low at the 50% mark. Across the Atlantic, the ECB looks like it may finally edge towards QE, which should be supportive of European equities.

Jeff Miller summed up the "Sell in May" hysteria perfectly here:
The seasonal slogans often substitute for thinking and analysis. The powerful-looking chart that leads today's post actually translates into a 1% monthly difference in performance. The "good months" gain 1.3% on average while the "bad months" gain about 0.3%.
The bear case then rests on a case of risk exhaustion and unwind (see A case of risk exhaustion), which is a funds flow driven bearish trigger. Any resulting correction would likely be a brief and possibly sharp which would be a good buying opportunity.


The 2011 parallel?
Nevertheless, the technical picture is a stock market that is poised to decline, but needs a bearish trigger. One historical parallel would be the events of 2011. In 2011, market internals started to deteriorate before the bearish triggers manifested themselves. The proximate cause was rising tail-risk of a eurozone crisis and debt ceiling fight in Washington. Rising bear of the dire consequences of these events served to crater stocks, but neither of these Apocalyptic scenarios ever materialized.

If 2011 is a parallel, then perhaps the answer is to consider the possibility of the markets pricing in rising tail-risk, namely Russia-Ukraine and a China meltdown.


Russian tail-risk
I have discussed the tail-risk from the Russia-Ukraine situation before. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard wrote that the US is preparing sanctions that could bring the Russian economy to a screeching halt by freezing the external financial transactions of Russia and Russian companies:
An elite cell at the US Treasury has developed an arsenal of financial weapons that can in theory bring even large countries to their knees through use of “scarlet letters” that cause global banks and insurers to pull back. Japanese banks are already retreating from Moscow to pre-empt problems with US regulators. 
In a separate article, Evans-Pritchard indicated that western energy companies like BP and Shell may have trouble operating in the US should the next stage of sanctions be imposed. It would be measures like these that would spook the markets and force a re-pricing of Russian related tail-risk.
Sources in Washington say the US Treasury may soon extend the black list to Igor Sechin, president of the oil giant Rosneft, the biggest traded oil company in the world. Any such move would be a costly headache for BP, which owns 19.75pc of Rosneft’s shares under a deal reached in 2012 ending its stormy misadventures in TNK-BP.

It is unclear whether BP could continue to operate in the United States or even carry out its global business smoothly if it continued to be a Rosneft shareholder with Mr Sechin still in charge, yet it would be difficult to find buyers for a holding worth $12.5bn in the midst of a crisis. America's Exxon Mobile would have to reconsider its drilling plans with Rosneft in the Arctic `High North'.

The US Treasury is also eyeing some form of sanction against Gazprombank, the financial arm of the gas monopoly Gazprom. This would greatly complicate Shell’s joint operations with Gazprom at Sakhalin Island and in the Arctic, though this would depend on the exact wording and how the US Securities and Exchange Committee chose to enforce it.
Zero Hedge has also speculated that the US may target Putin's personal $40 billion stash. The ZH postulated Russian response would be to retaliate in kind, regardless of whether Putin's personal funds are involved in the sanctions:
Russian presidential adviser Sergei Glazyev proposed plan of 15 measures to protect country’s economy if sanctions applied, Vedomosti newspaper reports, citing Glazyev’s letter to Finance Ministry. According to Vedomosti as Bloomberg reported, Glazyev proposed:
  • Russia should withdraw all assets, accounts in dollars, euros from NATO countries to neutral ones
  • Russia should start selling NATO member sovereign bonds before Russia’s foreign-currency accounts are frozen
  • Central bank should reduce dollar assets, sell sovereign bonds of countries that support sanctions
  • Russia should limit commercial banks’ FX assets to prevent speculation on ruble, capital outflows
  • Central bank should increase money supply so that state cos., banks may refinance foreign loans
  • Russia should use national currencies in trade with customs Union members, other non-dollar, non-euro partners
In other words, a full-blown scorched earth campaign by Russia.
While I tend to take anything published at ZH with a grain of salt, they may not be that far off this time. Oleg Babinov of The Risk Advisory Group wrote the following in March about the Crimean crisis and the likely response from the Kremlin is roughly in line with the proposals outlined in ZH (via Moscow Times):
If Russia does not rush in to incorporate Crimea as its "administrative unit" and the sanctions are limited to its dropping from Group of Eight and some limited visa sanctions and asset freezes for politicians and businessmen who are directly involved in separatist activities, Russia's response would be relatively small-scale. If this is the case, there will be little effect on investors, except those who may be involved in cooperation with Russian companies in the field of military technology — but this is possible only if the U.S. and the European Union do not decide to freeze cooperation with Russia in this field.

But if sanctions are applied to Russian state-owned companies and banks, Russia might want to retaliate by freezing foreign companies' accounts here. There was an announcement that the constitutional law committee of the Federation Council has invited legal experts to study whether such sanctions would be legal, but no draft law has been produced yet.
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard has also speculated that Russia may escalate the conflict to cyber-warfare:
The greatest risk is surely an "asymmetric" riposte by the Kremlin. Russia's cyber-warfare experts are among the best, and they had their own trial run on Estonia in 2007. A cyber shutdown of an Illinois water system was tracked to Russian sources in 2011. We don't know whether US Homeland Security can counter a full-blown "denial-of-service" attack on electricity grids, water systems, air traffic control, or indeed the New York Stock Exchange, and nor does Washington.

"If we were in a cyberwar today, the US would lose. We're simply the most dependent and most vulnerable," said US spy chief Mike McConnell in 2010.

The US defence secretary Leon Panetta warned of a cyber-Pearl Harbour in 2012. "They could shut down the power grid across large parts of the country. They could derail passenger trains or, even more dangerous, derail passenger trains loaded with lethal chemicals. They could contaminate the water supply in major cities, or shut down the power grid across large parts of the country,” he said. Slapstick exaggeration to extract more funds from Congress? We may find out.
For now, these scenarios are all speculative and remain tail-risks. However, should the events in eastern Ukraine spiral out of control, watch for the markets to start pricing in the possibilities of these risks - and they could be the trigger for a significant sell-off in the equity markets.


China: Whistling past the graveyard
The tail-risks in China are also rising. It all starts with problems in the overbuilt property market. Nomura estimates that in 2013 alone, China added roughly 400 square feet of new construction per urban resident:
Zhang Zhiwei, chief China economist at Japanese investment bank Nomura, said in a report last month that after building around 13.4 percent more floor space every year for the past several years, the country finally has too much housing. Zhang estimates about 2.6 billion square meters (about 28 billion square feet) were added in 2013, or 400 square feet of new residential floor space per urban resident.
These charts from Nomura show the scale of the overbuilding, even by developed market standards:


Despite the apparent overbuilding, expansion is continuing, especially in the smaller cities:



The overbuilding was not a problem until property prices started to cool of this year. The price decline is particularly acute in the Tier 3 and 4 cities (via Xinhua):
The slowdown of the property market that was mainly seen in China's third- and fourth-tier cities last year has spread to more areas, and analysts warn of a tough 2014 for developers.

Figures released by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) last Friday showed that 178.25 million square meters of residential property were sold in the first quarter, down 5.7 percent year on year.
Falling prices in the real estate market feeds into problems in the financial system:
Added to the property market woes is the credit crunch for both developers and buyers.

Stringent bank loans since the end of last year have dealt real estate firms, medium- and small-sized ones in particular, a blow in securing their fund chain, said Hu Baosen, board chairman of Central China Real Estate Ltd.
A credit crunch is developing:
Meanwhile, banks have not loosened their control over personal housing loans, making it more difficult to purchase property on mortgage.

Among the 35 major cities surveyed by Centaline Property Agency Ltd., 25 have seen their banks suspend housing loans.
While I have heard China bulls say that a cooling property market does not present that much of a problem because most real estate is not purchased with debt, there are secondary financial effects from suppliers such as the steel industry, which is suffering from over-capacity, and other producers of construction materials. The balance sheet of these companies are not pristine and have substantial debt. These credit risks are now manifesting themselves in the form of defaults in the shadow banking system, which leads to a credit crunch, which can result in cascading defaults and...you get the idea.

Patrick Chovanec believes that the Achilles heel of the Chinese financial system is declining property prices. That`s because Chinese lenders lend based on collateral value, which is mostly property based, rather than cash flow because financial statements are unreliable:
If China’s housing market crashes, the ripple effect could be even more cataclysmic for its economy than the recent housing market collapses in the US and Europe were for their economies. A fifth of outstanding loans and a quarter of new loans are to property developers, says Nomura; untold billions more have been lent out off bank balance sheets. As falling prices crimp margins, small developers—like the one in the news this week—will start defaulting.

But the fallout will be bigger still, says Patrick Chovanec of Silvercrest Asset Management. “Not only is property important because it’s a key component of that investment boom, but it’s essentially the asset that underwrites all credit in the Chinese economy, whether it’s local government loans, whether it’s business loans,” Chovanec says, explaining that lenders require “hard” assets as collateral because financial accounts can easily be doctored.
Western bank are not immune to a financial crisis in China. Aggregate foreign currency denominated debt totals about USD 1 trillion (see EM tail-risks are rising). Should events spiral out of control, the financial damage may not be limited to the Chinese banking system and financial contagion could very well spread throughout the global banking system.

Even as the economy slows and cracks appear in the financial system, Premier Li Keqiang has stated that the government is not consider any large scale stimulus programs but rely on targeted mini-stimulus instead:
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said his government is not considering any strong stimulus measures or policies which would risk enlarging the fiscal deficit but will push through reform in order to support economic growth.

"There is no consideration about expanding the deficit or using 'strong stimulus,'" Li said, adding that China's official "proactive" fiscal and "prudent" monetary policy biases won't change.

"But the government won't do nothing. It will rely on reforms, structural adjustments, to increase effective supply and meet new demand," he said.

His comments, which were published late Wednesday, were delivered at a State Council meeting at which the executive decision-making body decided to lower the reserve requirement for some rural financial institutions.

That move, which analysts expect to pump a miniscule CNY15 billion into the market, may bring relief to a struggling corner of the financial system but isn't expected to do much to shore up the broader economy.
In the meantime, the markets are relatively relaxed about looming financial tail-risk. My so-called Chinese canaries, the prices of HK-listed Chinese banks, are not showing signs of extreme stress:


In addition, Reuters reports that there are few takers for tail-risk insurance on China (emphasis added):
Selling insurance against a financial crisis should not be difficult, five years after the last one nearly wrecked the global economy.

But when it comes to China, the world's second-largest economy, the probability of a full-blown crisis is apparently so remote that hardly anyone will buy an insurance policy against it, no matter how cheap.

Financial wizards have been trying to sell peace of mind to investors in China for years, but fewer and fewer of those investors are interested, despite some worrying headlines.

In the past few months alone, China has seen its first domestic bond default, a small bank run, its weakest export performance since the global financial crisis, a marked slowdown in its property market and a rise in labor unrest.

Steve Diggle, a Singapore-based hedge fund manager who crafts strategies to protect investors against financial catastrophes, says investors have faith that the Chinese government, armed with almost $4 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, will simply not allow things to get out of hand.

He had to close down a fund that used to bet on doomsday outcomes in Asia last year.
While I am not saying that catastrophe in China is my base case scenario, but it seems that the markets are whistling past the graveyard of a Chinese hard landing. Should the Chinese situation deteriorate, the possibility of a stampede for the exit is very real - and could be the trigger for a sudden downdraft in the price of risky assets.


Something's not right...
As I mentioned, market internals started to deteriorate before the eurozone crisis fully developed in 2011. Then, the trigger were worries about a Greek default and the possible repercussions on the euro, as well as a political impasse over the debt ceiling in Washington.

One possibility for 2014 is that the markets would follow the midterm election year pattern of a 10-20% summer correction into September or October. Already, the market technical picture is flashing warning signs. The trigger might be a combination of risk exhaustion by fast money accounts and rising tail-risk from one of these aforementioned events.

Despite the positive fundamental backdrop, my inner investor is siding with the technicians and he is becoming increasingly cautious. The technical message from Mr. Market is, "Something is not right about this bull." If the fundamentals were to hold up equity prices, then the technical outlook would improve and he would re-adjust his portfolio accordingly. Jeff Miller's prescription of what to do sounds about right to him:
To make a wise decision you need to make an objective quantitative comparison between the economic trends and the small seasonal impact. The Great Recession has been followed by a slow and plodding recovery. We have an extended business cycle with plenty of central bank support. Since I am expecting the current cycle to feature (eventually) a period of robust growth, I do not want to miss it. The 1% seasonal effect will be minor in a month where we get a real economic surge.

If instead we get the typical sideways market with some volatility, it is a perfect environment for selling short-term calls against attractive, dividend-paying stocks.
My inner trader, who is more aggressive,  is watching the developing head and shoulders pattern and waiting to the break to put on a leveraged short position on the market.


Just be aware that developing head and shoulders patterns often fail`and they do not become bona fide patterns until they are triggered. The bearish trigger is a breach of neckline support, which is at about the 4000 level. Should that occur, the downside target would be in the 3600-3650 region.




Cam Hui is a portfolio manager at Qwest Investment Fund Management Ltd. (“Qwest”). The opinions and any recommendations expressed in the blog are those of the author and do not reflect the opinions and recommendations of Qwest. Qwest reviews Mr. Hui’s blog to ensure it is connected with Mr. Hui’s obligation to deal fairly, honestly and in good faith with the blog’s readers.”

None of the information or opinions expressed in this blog constitutes a solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security or other instrument. Nothing in this blog constitutes investment advice and any recommendations that may be contained herein have not been based upon a consideration of the investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any specific recipient. Any purchase or sale activity in any securities or other instrument should be based upon your own analysis and conclusions. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Either Qwest or I may hold or control long or short positions in the securities or instruments mentioned.