Tuesday, May 12, 2015

Bulls shouldn't expect help from the Fed

I received more than the usual amount of comments in response to my weekend post about unemployment claims (see A scary thought about US employment). With unemployment claims falling to multi-decade lows, I rhetorically asked if this is as good as it gets.


Not mentioned in my post is the close correlation between weekly claims (blue, inverted scale) and stock prices (red).


The real subtext is how the Fed interprets the employment numbers. At what point does the employment picture compel the Fed to act and start tightening?


A steady tightening path
I am seeing more and more Fedspeak and other signals indicating that the stock market should not expect any help from the Fed. On Monday, the WSJ reported that San Francisco Fed President Williams stated that the markets can't count on any further Fed signals about an interest rate hike, as it could happen at any time:
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco President John Williams told a television channel Monday that the U.S. central bank is unlikely to provide much warning ahead of an increase in short-term interest rates.

Instead, the official told CNBC that officials will need to go into every policy meetings with an open mind. “We should be coming together every six weeks, discussing what the outlook looks like, and what the right appropriate policy decisions at that meeting are, and adjusting policy” accordingly, Mr. Williams said. The Fed needs “to get out of this business of telegraphing our decisions in advance” and make sure that monetary policy is truly driven by and responsive to incoming economic data.

Mr. Williams said rate rises are “on the table at every meeting” but he would not suggest action is likely to happen at any particular point, although he did say a year from now he believes short-term rates will have moved up off of their current near zero levels.
Telegraphing intentions, especially when the decisions are "data dependent", would create excess volatility:
“You don’t want to make a decision three months in advance and announce that decision when you really have more time to collect data and make the most informed decision you can,” Mr. Williams said.

The official also noted that he accepts that a lack of firm guidance from central bankers could generate more volatility in financial markets.

“We don’t want to be adding noise,” but at the same time, “we don’t want to be absolutely eliminating all uncertainty about our future actions. It’s healthy for the future actions to be uncertain because future conditions can change,” Mr. Williams said.
In a subsequent CNBC interview, Williams argued for an earlier preemptive rate hike to fight inflation, so that further hikes are either not necessary or delayed:
The Federal Reserve hiking interest rates "a bit earlier" allows the U.S. central bank to increase rates more gradually, a top Federal Reserve official said Tuesday.

Inflation shooting above the Fed's 2 percent target would force a more "dramatic" rate hike, San Francisco Federal Reserve President John Williams said Tuesday in prepared remarks before the Harvard Club of New York. Market watchers have eyed indications of when the Fed may abandon its near-zero interest rate policy.

Preparing the market
In addition, Janet Yellen's remarks last week were generally interpreted as preparing the markets for a rate hike (via Reuters):
I would highlight that equity market valuations at this point generally are quite high. There are potential dangers there...

We’ve also seen the compression of spreads on high-yield debt, which certainly looks like a reach for yield type of behavior...

When the Fed decides it’s time to begin raising rates, these term premiums could move up and we could see a sharp jump in long-term rates. So we’re trying to ... communicate as clearly about our monetary policy so we don’t take markets by surprise.
In other words, better let the markets get a little unsettled now and adjust to the idea of higher rates now, than to have it surprised and crash later.

New York Fed President William Dudley more or less said the same thing in a speech delivered on Tuesday, which appears to be part of a coordinated Fedspeak campaign to prepare the markets for interest rate normalizaton.
To be as direct as possible: I don’t know when this will occur. The timing of lift-off will depend on how the economic outlook evolves. Since the economic outlook is uncertain, this means the timing of liftoff must also be uncertain.
In other words, the Fed isn`t going to give us any more signals because they don`t know. But then, they`ve has told us repeatedly what needs to happen for rates to rise, what happens next shouldn`t be a big surprise:
At the same time, though, I can be clear about what conditions are needed for normalization to begin. If the improvement in the U.S. labor market continues and the FOMC is “reasonably confident” that inflation will move back to our 2 percent objective over the medium-term, then it would be appropriate to begin to normalize interest rates.

Because the conditions necessary for liftoff are well-specified, market participants should be able to think right along with policymakers, adjusting their views about the prospects for normalization in response to the incoming data. This implies that liftoff should not be a big surprise when it finally occurs, which should help mitigate the degree of market turbulence engendered by lift-off.
We should be able to make an educated guess as to liftoff timing. Indeed, Matt Busigin modeled wage growth based JOLTS data and the latest release is pointing to rising wages, which is a key metric of inflationary pressure watched by the Yellen Fed.



What normalization looks like
A glance at money supply growth, which has had a relatively high level of correlation with stock prices, show that both MZM and M2 growth has been decelerating, which is indicative of the normalization process.


Here is my key takeaway from all the Fedspeak. Rates are going to rise this year. When that happens, don't expect a Yellen Put. Don't expect the Plunge Protection Team cavalry to appear at the crest of the hill should the stock market start to fall.

Is is any wonder that the bond markets are acting up?

Sunday, May 10, 2015

What I learned from Bundegeddon

Trend Model signal summary
Trend Model signal: Neutral
Trading model: Bearish

The Trend Model is an asset allocation model which applies trend following principles based on the inputs of global stock and commodity price. In essence, it seeks to answer the question, "Is the trend in the global economy expansion (bullish) or contraction (bearish)?"

My inner trader uses the trading model component of the Trend Model seeks to answer the question, "Is the trend getting better (bullish) or worse (bearish)?" The history of actual (not backtested) signals of the trading model are shown by the arrows in the chart below. In addition, I have a trading account which uses the signals of the Trend Model. The last report card of that account can be found here.


Update schedule: I generally update Trend Model readings on my blog on weekends and tweet any changes during the week at @humblestudent.


Signs of distribution
I have been warning about the signs of distribution in the US equity market for several weeks and those signs are continuing. I wrote about how the intersection of a strong long-term trend and a faltering short-term trend was a sign that complacency may be getting its comeuppance (see 3 secrets from the Book of (Trend Following) Revelations and How to make your first loss your best loss). One graphical way of illustrating this effect is to see how the MACD histogram, which is a measure of long and short term trend divergence, has gone negative on the monthly SPX chart. Every past instance of this condition in the last 20 years (marked by vertical lines) has seen the market go down, either with the MACD as a leading, coincidental or lagging indicator.


A shorter term chart of the SPX is also showing disturbing signs of distribution. The SPX has broken a key uptrend that began last October and appears to be tracing out a rounding top formation. In addition, we are seeing a negative divergence in On Balance Volume, which is a volume-based measure of accumulation and distribution.


In addition, Urban Carmel tweeted the following observation during the day on Friday:

Also see Andrew Nyquist's posts about negative breadth divergences, which is another sign of distribution.


A wobbly growth outlook
The rally on Friday was sparked by the combination of a surprise Conservative majority win in the UK election and a not-too-hot-not-too-cold Employment Report, which the market interpreted as the Fed would stay on hold for a little longer. Despite the positives seen in the Employment Report, New Deal democrat cautioned that he was still seeing signs of a mild industrial recession based on his read of the leading indicator portions of the report:
But the leading portions of the employment report are sounding an alarm. The manufacturing workweek was down. Overtime was down. Unemployment from zero to 5 weeks increased significantly. Revisions to prior months were negative. This is the third month of this negative trend in the leading indicators in the employment report. In my "Weekly Indicators" column, for the last month I have said that the US is in a shallow manufacturing recession. Today's report confirms that.
As well, rising bond yields from the mini Bundegeddon panic last week (more on that later) is a negative for housing. Bond yields directly affect mortgage rates, another component of the long leading indicators that New Deal democrat monitors on a regular basis. In his latest weekly summary of high frequency economic releases, he confirmed his assessment of the risks to the US economy:
In the last several months the theme has been poor coincident indicators with generally positive long and short leading indicators, reflecting a shallow industrial recession due to the strong dollar and oil patch weakness, but a resilient domestic, consumer economy. The big addition this week was the move in interest rates. Should interest rates spike much more, they will begin to drag down housing again, and that will leave money supply as the only positive long leading indicator, as corporate profits have already turned down.
There were other calls highlighting the dark cloud overhanging the silver lining of the Employment Report. Greg Ip of the WSJ pointed to signs of a slowing economy:
Look closer and the jobs data still sends a worrying signal about the economy’s underlying strength. Because little of the data in the payroll survey goes directly into the expenditure-based measure of GDP, it can serve as a useful “check” on that broader economy-wide number. According to Chris Varvares of Macroeconomic Advisers, total hours worked is a good predictor of output both in the current quarter and the next.

The good news, then, is that total hours worked per week in the private sector, a measure that captures both the number of people on the job and how many hours they work, rose 0.2% in April from March. The bad news is that the level of hours is still lower than in February. As the nearby chart shows, hours over the last three months rose at a tepid 1.3% annual rate compared to the prior three months. Hours showed a similar dip a year earlier but began to recover by March.

The latest update of Doug Short's Big 4 Recession Indicators are now in for March. The composite score has now been negative for two consecutive months, with two of the four component in the red for the month of March. Weakness in industrial production and real income dragged down the overall score, compared to an extremely negative Real Sales print in February, which rebounded strongly in March. These figures are arguably backward looking and the story of 1Q weakness is well known, but they nevertheless paint the picture of an economy that is near stall speed.


Gavyn Davies also warned of a global growth slowdown:

Overall, the growth rate of the global economy has therefore slowed further, according to our models. Our estimate of activity growth in the major advanced economies plus China, which we use as a proxy for global activity, has dropped to 3.0 per cent at the end of April, from 3.7 per cent a month ago. This measure of global activity has now broken below the roughly 4 per cent rate that had been established since mid 2014.
According to Davies, the odds of a strong US expansion are falling and recession risk is starting to tick up, though readings are nowhere near panic button levels.


For the stock market, it all boils to the earnings growth outlook, which remains clouded. Ed Yardeni reported that while forward EPS estimates for the large cap S+P 500 have resumed their upward climb, the mid cap S+P 400 and small cap S+P 600 are still seeing downward EPS revisions. In a separate blog post, he openly fretted about the combination of stretched valuation and downward estimate revisions:
Although the dollar might have peaked on March 13 for a while, and the price of crude oil might have bottomed on January 13 for a while, industry analysts who cover the S+P 500 are still lowering their earnings estimates for both 2015 and 2016. They now expect $119.02 and $134.18 per share for this year and next year, down 5.9% and 5.2% from their estimates at the end of last year. For this year, they’ve been lowering their Q2-Q4 estimates as earnings have beaten expectations during Q1 with a 4.7% “hook-up” move so far over the past two weeks, which is typical during earnings seasons.

It’s getting harder to find much if any GAARP (growth at a reasonable price) in the US given the latest lofty valuation ranking for the S+P 500 sectors: Energy (28.8 vs. 14.2 year ago), Consumer Staples (19.7, 17.4), Consumer Discretionary (19.0, 17.4), Health Care (17.8, 16.2), Materials (17.2, 16.7), S&P 500 (17.2, 15.3), Utilities (16.4, 16.1), IT (16.2, 14.4), Industrials (16.2, 16.3), Financials (13.9, 13.5), and Telecom Services (13.4, 13.1).
Incidentally, the latest update from John Butters of Factset on Earnings Season shows that, with 447 companies having reported and Earnings Seasons nearly over, the EPS beat rate came in at a respectable 71%, but the revenue beat rate was an abysmal 45%. Corporate management have learned over the years to play the EPS expectations game, but the revenue beat rate does not pain a picture of robust growth.


Lessons learned from "Bundegeddon"
My main takeaway from the signs of distribution is that technical analysis is telling us that stock prices are poised to fall. We just need a trigger, whose cause is unknown.

The surprise selloff in Bunds last week is instructive as to how a bearish trigger can come out of nowhere (a longer summary here). In hindsight, all the signs were there. European bond yields had gone negative in a substantial portion of the front end of the yield curve. While those conditions left many people scratching their heads, fast money was pouring into eurozone sovereign bonds, and Bunds in particular, as a way to front-run the ECB QE program. We then saw a disorderly unwind sparked by the inflationary fears and exacerbated by the lack of liquidity in the bond market. Joseph Cotterill of FT Alphaville made an apt analogy to NYC rooftop bars at closing time to describe to situation:
New York rooftop bars are rather fine things. They especially seem so after one or two (or three) martinis. The trouble comes at closing time. A small elevator has gradually taken sober patrons up 40 or so floors throughout the evening. Suddenly everyone is three sheets to the wind, and they all want to leave at once.
The Bund selloff induced comparisons with the 2003 spike in JGB yields.

The risks lurking in the bond market
By the end of last week, the mini-panic appeared to be over and Bund yields had retraced part of their move. Will they continue to fall next week or is this just a pause? I have no idea, but this rush for the exits in "risk-free" bonds is a lesson for stock market bulls. Thing can turn south a lot faster than you think.

What I do know is that bond yields are extraordinarily low compared to its 600 year history (via Business Insider):


Fed Chair Janet Yellen warned last week about the risks to stock prices should long bond yields start to tick up:
I would highlight that equity market valuations at this point generally are quite high. There are potential dangers there...

We’ve also seen the compression of spreads on high-yield debt, which certainly looks like a reach for yield type of behavior...

When the Fed decides it’s time to begin raising rates, these term premiums could move up and we could see a sharp jump in long-term rates. So we’re trying to ... communicate as clearly about our monetary policy so we don’t take markets by surprise.
Incidentally, there are plenty of other warnings about valuation and interest rates. Warren Buffett indicated that stocks look cheap compared to bonds today, they won't look so cheap should interest rates normalize. Recently, longtime market bull Abby Joseph Cohen conceded that stocks are no longer as attractive.

In a recent presentation, Jeff Gundlach also warned about the crowded long in the fixed income market. Investors have been lengthening their duration in reaching for yield and that increases the price sensitivity to interest rate changes in their portfolios.
Credit quality is also falling as another sign of stretching for yield.
Despite the rhetoric about data dependency, the Fed has shown a historical tendency to keep hiking once it first starts to raise rates. When it all unwinds, watch out!
HY spreads also tend to widen dramatically when interest rates rise.
Could the recent Bundegeddon episode be a dress rehearsal for the real event later this year? What happens if we get one or more data points, or Fedspeak, pointing to an imminent rate hike? What if we were to see a Greek default without a Grexit, how would the fixed income markets react?

So far, credit market risk appetite remains healthy, but the behavior of HY bonds will be an important canary in the credit market coalmine.


The stage for a risk-off induced downturn is set, both from a technical and macro viewpoint. None of this means that a bear phase will start tomorrow, or ever. It just means that risks are elevated and we need a catalyst, which can come out of nowhere as the Bund selloff did.


No sentiment support for stock prices
If a market downturn were to occur, current investor sentiment models readings are not supportive of stock prices. The chart below shows the AAII Bear-Bull spread (black) and Rydex bear-bull ratio (green). Readings had moved off a crowded long reading and into neutral. However, they are nowhere near the panic levels seen at major market bottoms.


The NAAIM exposure index show managers to be slightly bullish, but remain in neutral territory.


Market based sentiment metrics, such as the VIX term structure, are still showing a fair degree of complacency (a ratio above 1 shows rising fear). We did see a brief bout of fear last week when the VIX Index rode the its upper Bollinger Band, which was a sign of a "bad oversold" reading where the markets gets oversold and stays oversold.


It would be instructive to observe what happened with these indicators during the market selloff in 2011.


Similarly, the CNN Money Fear and Greed Index is meandering in neutral territory. It has yet to break out either upwards or downwards, reflecting uncertainty about direction.



The week ahead: Top of the range?
Last week, we saw a Bundegeddon induced downleg in stock prices. The market had stabilized on Thursday when I began to short the market. Friday morning saw a rally sparked by the surprise David Cameron majority win in the UK election and the favorable Employment Report, though the GBP rally was cut short by the prospect of a UK-referendum on EU membership under a Tory government.

What`s next? My interpretation is that the stock market is back to the choppy back-and-fill pattern. Upside potential is limited and the risk-reward ratio is tilted to the downside.

As the chart below shows, the SPX had moved to a near overbought reading in the space of two days where it has topped out in the past few weeks (see RSI(5), top panel). The more standard RSI(14) indicator remains tightly range bound and refuses to get either overbought or oversold, but readings are at the top of the current range where the market has staged a retreat. In addition, the SPX is displaying a pattern of lower highs, indicating a loss of momentum.


As well, this chart from IndexIndicators is just one of many examples of the swift reversal seen in breadth and momentum indicators. Upside potential is limited given the recent wimpy-bull and wimpy-bear pattern.


If we were to zoom into an hourly chart of the SPX for a more tactical view, we see a familiar pattern of an overbought reading on RSI(5), where it has struggled to see much upside action in the recent past. We also see the short-term downtrend that I identified early of lower highs. If the market were to rally further, it will have to contend with first resistance at the 2120 level and then further resistance at the all-time highs.


My inner investor remains cautious, but not overly panicked. Markets are vulnerable to a downturn of unknown magnitude, sparked by an unknown catalyst. The Bundegeddon episode taught him that possible bearish triggers could come from anywhere, as a backup in German bond yields was not exactly on his top 5 market risks.

My inner trader has a slight bearish bias. Despite going short a little early on Thursday,he recognizes that this has been a forgiving market - as long as you don`t get panicked out of your long or short position. He remains short and he is waiting for a bearish trigger to signal the start of a downleg in the major equity averages.


Disclosure: Long SPXU, SQQQ

Saturday, May 9, 2015

A scary thought about US employment

The markets staged a risk-on rally on Friday, sparked mainly by the Goldilocks not-too-hot-not-too-cold Jobs Report. I was reviewing some figures and charts on the weekend and saw this chart on Doug Short's weekly unemployment claims page. I couldn't help but ask, "Is this as good as employment can get in this economic cycle?"


To be sure, unemployment claims were lower in the late 1960's and early 1970's, but if you were to normalize claims by the size of the labor force, a difference picture appears. The unemployment claims to civilian labor ratio is at all-time-lows!


The record low could be attributable to problems with the participation rate, which has shrunk the size of the labor force. Nevertheless, these charts are highly suggestive that there isn't a lot of labor slack, which could prompt the Fed to be more aggressive in normalizing interest rates.

When viewing the US economy through the weekly claims prism, this analysis presents a scary thought for the prices of risky assets.

Thursday, May 7, 2015

Hidden gems in this market cycle's leading theme

Philosophical Economics wrote a terrific post yesterday about how the "Winner take all" economy is affecting companies and the competitive environment. He observed that net margins have been elevated in the last few years. Generally, when margins are high, an industry attracts new entrants who come in and eventually drive down margins. One explanation advanced is that in a "winner take all" economy, there are substantial barriers to entry:
The possibility that increased barriers to entry represent the primary causal factor behind the observed profit margin increase is supported by the fact that the increase has not been broad-based, as would be expected if it were a simple consequence of weak labor bargaining power, low interest rates, or some other generic factor associated with the corporate cost structure. Rather, it is concentrated in specific sectors–especially the technology sector–and in specifically dominant individual large cap, blue-chip names.

Now, there is a clever way to test the hypothesis, which brings us to the theme of this piece. If a “Winner Take All” economy, where increased barriers to entry–first-mover barriers, network barriers, patent barriers, size barriers, tax-advantage barriers, regulatory barriers, and so on–have allowed an increasingly concentrated group of dominant companies to earn substantially higher profit margins and push up on the aggregate profit margin, is the main driver of the aggregate profit margin increase, then we should expect the following. If we separate the market into different tiers of profitability, we should expect the higher-tier companies to have seen larger increases in their profitability than the lower-tier companies. Increases in their profitability–at the expense of the lower tiers–would represent the “Winner” gradually “Taking All.”
He found an interesting way to test this hypothesis:
I recently asked my favorite blogger, the brilliant Patrick O’Shaughnessy of O’Shaugnessy Asset Management (Twitter: @millennial_inv, Blog: http://www.investorfieldguide.com), to put the hypothesis to the test. So he separated the market into five different bins by profit margin, and then charted the profit margins of each bin from 1963 to 2015. Lo and behold, the results ended up fitting perfectly with the prediction. The profit margin increase of the last 20 years has not been broad-based, shared by all bins, but rather has been concentrated in the highest profit-margin bins. The dominant companies in those bins have seen their profit margins explode, while the companies in the lower-tier bins have seen little if any increase–and for some bins, an outright reduction.

The following chart, taken from Patrick’s recent blog post, “The Rich Get Richer”, beautifully illustrates the point:


Notice that the profit margins of the various bins moved roughly commensurately up until the late 1980s and early 1990s. At that point, something happened. The profit margins of the top bin proceeded to explode, rising by over 1000 basis points. The profit margins of the next two highest bins stayed roughly flat. And the profit margins of the two lowest bins actually fell–even as their labor and interest costs were supposedly reduced. Overall, the dispersion of profit margins grew dramatically–which is the hallmark sign of a “Winner Take All” economy.
The analysis went on to show that much of the bifurcation in margins occurred in "new economy" sectors like Technology and Financials, but not in commodity-related price-taking sectors like Energy and Materials, or regulated sectors like Utilities.

In the past, I had openly wondered about the effects of Knowledge Based Capital (KBC) on the economy and the operating environment of US companies (see How I learned to stop worrying and love the missing CapEx). In my post, I postulated that the reason CapEx had not come back strongly during the current recovery was because of the dominant effect of KBC in the economy. The latest post from Philosophical Economics more or less confirms that hypothesis.

It seems that every market cycle has its own leadership theme. The last cycle featured the asset-rich commodity producers, before that, Technology-Media-Telecom (TMT) was the dominant them. This cycle may feature the KBC, or intellectual property, companies.

When we think about companies whose assets are mainly intellectual property, companies like Facebook and Apple normally come to mind. However, there is one hidden gem in the KBC investment theme that many may have missed - that's the biotechnology stocks. As the chart below shows, the biotechs have been in a multi-year relative uptrend against the market.


I have no idea how long this market cycle will last, but should my KBC thesis be correct, then the biotech stocks may have a lot further to run than anyone expects.

Tuesday, May 5, 2015

The trouble with factors

Factor investing is hot these days. Invesco recently documented the rise of "smart beta" ETFs at ETF.com:
Overall, smart-beta ETFs accounted for over 17% of U.S. ETF net inflows in 2014, despite representing less than 11% of the total assets. Today there are more than 350 smart-beta ETFs available in the U.S. comprising over $230 billion in AUM, up from just 212 products and $64.8 billion in 2010.1 Over the past year, institutional decision-makers—including public and private pensions, endowments and foundations, and registered investment advisors who manage institutional assets—have become more familiar with the smart-beta category.
The article explained that "smart beta" funds really represent a form of factor investing, with factors in use such as low vol, dividend yield, fundamental weight, which is a form of value tilt:
In the simplest terms, smart-beta ETFs follow indexes based on alternative weighting methodologies. Many of these alternative weighting methodologies (such as low volatility, high dividend and fundamentally weighted) have historically delivered favorable risk-adjusted returns and varying returns across different market regimes. As a result, institutions are increasingly looking to smart-beta ETFs as a complement to and a replacement for both their traditional market-cap-weighted ETFs and their actively managed positions.

Portfolio construction with factors
In addition to using factors at the stock portfolio level, factor investing has migrated to portfolio construction. A participant at the recent Sixth Annual Southeast Asia Institutional Investment Forum revealed how some institutions had adopted the risk factor allocation as a substitute for asset allocation in their portfolios:
What’s the secret sauce for making a multi-asset strategy successful? This past December, in Singapore, I asked the speakers on my panel at the Sixth Annual Southeast Asia Institutional Investment Forum and their answers all shared one thing in common: risk factor allocation.
Some examples of techniques used by some very large institutions:
Chiew Kit Tham, managing director at GIC, told the conference participants that they have pared back the number of asset classes in their program from 39 to six for this reason. GIC is a sovereign wealth fund set up by the Singapore government and manages hundreds of billions of the country’s foreign reserves. Instead of asset classes, GIC now focuses on a set of factors that they want to be exposed to: equity risk with a bias towards emerging markets growth equities, real estate, and private equity. They consider these the main drivers of their portfolio risk and return. Secondary drivers include factors such as momentum, size, value, credit, and carry.

Richard Brandweiner, CFA, CIO of First State Super, added that they have also shifted attention away from asset classes. “Benchmarks asset classes are quite arbitrary and are increasingly less relevant. We focus on what systemic exposures we try to capture with a certain asset class and target a portfolio with the desired mix of exposures,” said Brandweiner.

In a similar vein, Nachcha Protpakorn, deputy secretary general of the US$20 billion Thai Government Pension Fund (GPF) discussed their focus on long-term macroeconomic drivers. She believes the practice allows them to take advantage of shorter-term opportunities without wandering too far away from the long-term policy portfolio.
In effect, these institutions are moving towards the Norway model, which is an approach pioneered by Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM). Such an approach requires a shift in thinking about overall portfolio construction. Instead of thinking about assets and their characteristics, these investors now focus on the factor characteristics and factor risk premiums.
The shift from asset classes to factors requires changes in the portfolio construction process.

For example, target allocations to specific asset classes become an afterthought. Brandweiner’s advice: “Avoid silos in thinking. Think of portfolio construction from a factor perspective, such as duration, credit, and currency. There is no bucket for a particular private equity or infrastructure fund but think of their contribution as a group.”

Tham gave a similar example: To add high yield to a portfolio, an investor will need to reduce exposures to the equity and credit factors. Similarly, there will be no target allocation to active and passive components of the portfolio.

These components are switchable in terms of exposures to factors. Once appropriate funds are identified based on their risk-return trade-offs, etc., allocations can then be set in line with their factor exposures. Tham highlighted a case where they would sell the “policy portfolio” to make room for the new active funds added.

The trouble with factors
While I appreciate the different perspective that factor investing contributes, it doesn't represent the Holy Grail of Investing. Replacing asset exposures with factor exposures at a portfolio level has the benefit of changing the way of thinking to a macro mindset, which can be helpful for the right kind of organization, it is unclear to me whether such a shift actually raises returns or reduces risk.

I recently encountered MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 5128-15, entitled Facts About Factors, by Paula Cocoma, Megan Czasonis, Mark Kritzman and David Turkington. Here is the abstract:
It has become fashionable to allocate portfolios to factors rather than to assets. The often stated motivation for this approach is that factors are less correlated with each other than assets; therefore, factors afford greater opportunity for diversification. This argument is specious, of course, because ultimately the portfolio must be invested in assets. It is, therefore, impossible to produce a better in-sample portfolio by describing the portfolio as a set of factors than assets. There are several potentially legitimate arguments, though, for favoring factor stratification over asset stratification. It could be that factors are easier to forecast than assets, because investors are better able to relate current information to future factor behavior than to future asset behavior. Unfortunately, we have no way of testing this conjecture generically. But there are several testable conjectures. Perhaps risk estimated from high-frequency returns predicts risk over longer horizons more reliably for factors than for assets. Or the statistical properties of large samples may predict the statistical properties of small samples more reliably for factors than for assets. Or, for the same sample size, the statistical properties of factors may be more stationary from one sample to the next than they are for assets. Finally, it may be that reducing the dimensionality of a large set of assets to a smaller set of factors reduces noise more effectively than reducing dimensionality to a smaller set of assets. We offer empirical evidence of the validity, or lack thereof, of these testable conjectures.
The main conclusions of the research says that it's hard to prove that there is an added benefit of factor based portfolio construction:
Some investors propose using factors instead of assets as the building blocks for forming portfolios, because factors appear to be less correlated with each other than assets
and thus seem to afford greater potential for diversification. These ostensibly low correlations, however, reflect the fact that the asset combinations used to mimic factors include short positions in some of the assets and not superior diversification opportunities. We have shown that it is impossible to generate a superior in‐sample portfolio, given the same constraints, by regrouping assets into factors if the investable units are assets from which the factors are formed.

We also considered the possibility that investors are more skilled at relating current information to future factor behavior than to future asset behavior. However, we conceded that we could not test this conjecture generically, because skill is investor‐specific.

However, we did test whether the statistical properties of factors are more stationary than the statistical properties of assets. We found no evidence that factors produce more stable results across varying frequencies, nor from large samples to small samples, nor across independent samples. On the contrary, we found evidence of the opposite, on average.

Finally, we tested whether reducing the dimensionality of a larger set of assets to a smaller set of factors reduces noise more effectively than reducing the dimensionality to a smaller set of assets. Again, we found no evidence that factors are meaningfully more effective than assets at noise reduction.
Bottom line, it's a useful approach but it's not the Holy Grail:
Where does this leave us? In our view, the case is yet to be made that investors should use factors as building blocks for forming portfolios rather than assets. We do believe,
however, that investors may be able to gather useful insights about the performance of their portfolios by attributing performance to factor exposures in addition to asset exposures. And we believe as well that investors may be able to manage risk more effectively by considering a portfolio’s factor exposures in combination with its asset exposures. Beyond these applications, investors must decide for themselves whether they have greater conviction about future factor behavior or future asset behavior.

The challenges of stock based factor investing
When I think about factor based stock investing, or "smart beta" funds, a number of issues come up. Before I do, let me explain the typical steps taken to calculate factor exposures and returns:
  1. Condition the factor, or scrub the data: Supposing that your "factor" is E/P, or the inverse of the P/E ratio (as sorting on E/P deals with negative earnings properly). You might want to throw out any companies with an E/P of more than 50% (or P/E less than 2) as bad data. If your factor is Size, quants often condition on log(market cap) in order to build a better linear relationship.
  2. Calculate the Z-score: Z = (Conditioned factor - Sample average) / Sample standard deviation
  3. Calculate the factor return for a single period: Regress the excess return of a group of stocks to the Z-score exposure of those stocks.
  4. Repeat steps 1 to 3 for factor returns for other periods.
Having done the messy part of performing factor analysis myself, a number of problems arise with using factors to generate stock level alpha.
  • "Smart beta" single factor portfolios are so 1970s. The idea of factor exposures came from academic research done in the 1970s as a way of investigating the Efficient Market Hypothesis. If the market is efficient, as the theory goes, then you shouldn't be able to construction portfolios with market betas equal to the market with better than market returns. Thus, a number of academics found a whole slew of "anomalies", such as the small cap anomaly (or factor), the low P/E anomaly, the low P/B anomaly and so on. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a number of institutions created mandates for quantitative money managers to invest based on these factors, which we mostly know as value factors today. Sophisticated quant managers have moved on from single factor portfolios and I explain some of the other techniques used by quants today below. Somehow, what was a very old single factor idea has become new again, largely because of marketing hype.
  • How stable are factor returns and "anomalies"? That's a good question. Cullen Roche recently wondered out loud if there are any reliable factors. That is a problem that all quants face. A 2003 paper by Motohiro Yogo entitled "A consumption based explanation of expected stock returns" found that value and size factors were highly pro-cyclical. Value and small caps tended to perform well in economic expansions and underperformed during recessions. Since the economy spent more time in expansion, it could account for the value and size effect found in the anomalies literature. I would also note that one of the results from the MIT paper was:
We found no evidence that factors produce more stable results across varying frequencies, nor from large samples to small samples, nor across independent samples. On the contrary, we found evidence of the opposite, on average.
  • Do you use naive or pure factors? Supposing that you were using E/P as a factor. Would you rank E/P across all stocks in the market (naive), or would you rank them on a sector or industry neutral basis, which is a "pure" factor return? In my experience, using the "pure" factor approach creates a number of problems. First, the magnitude of the factor alpha falls as the number of sectors and industry rise, indicating that the factor is capturing a sector or industry alpha rather than a stock alpha. Second, slicing and dicing by too many industries creates a problem of some industries with a sample size problem. How confident can you be of a statistical and quantitative approach to factor investing if there are only 3 or 5 stocks in your industry sample?
  • Should you customize factor exposure by sector or industry? A typical "smart beta" fund will apply a single factor across all sectors of the market. For example, a fundamentally weighted fund using sales as a weighting factor would weight positions by sales instead of market cap. Such an approach is equivalent to using Price to Sales as a factor to derive alpha and control risk. But fundamental sector analysts will tell you that Price to Sales may not make sense for certain sectors. For example, what bank analyst uses "sales" as a metric? On the other hand, growth stocks trade on momentum factors and applying a value measures like Price to Sales to a growth stock universe will give you a portfolio concentrated on failed growth stories. Intelligent investors know that certain metrics are appropriate for certain sectors and industries and inappropriate for others. 
  • Factor returns are not linear. Recall how factor returns are calculated. You regress the excess return of a group of stocks to the Z-score of factor exposure for those stocks. The underlying assumption is that, on average, the returns to a factor are roughly linear and are well behaved and there are no severe twists in the return distribution. Imagine an example where the factor is Size, or market cap. During a single period, large caps returns are roughly zero, medium caps returns are very high and small caps are negative. A linear regression will its best try fit a straight line to that relationship. In our example, the returns to Size (market cap) is then positive because of the large outperformance of medium cap stocks. In real-life, these kinds of U-shaped distributions in factor returns happen all the time. On the other hand, if a portfolio is weighted in mainly large cap stocks, its performance will be very different to the Size factor return because of the skew in the data. Now try explaining that to your client.
Now that I have thoroughly trashed factor analysis, it doesn't mean that it doesn't have its place in quantitative investing. Investors need to go beyond the marketing hype and understand how factors are constructed, how a portfolio is formed using factor analysis and the limitations of that approach.

Don't just believe the backtests. Your own mileage will vary.

Monday, May 4, 2015

Trend Model April report card: Playing defense

This is the latest performance update on my long-short account based on my Trend Model signals (see An intriguing Trend Model interim report card). The Trend Model account fell -4.4% in April; the one-year return was 28.8%; and the return from inception of September 30, 2013 was 27.9%. Peak-to-trough drawdown was -8.1%, which is the worse experience so far since inception.


I reiterate my disclaimer that I have nothing to sell anyone right now. I am not currently in a position to manage anyone`s money based on the investment strategy that I am describing.


Trend Model description
For readers who are unfamiliar with my Trend Model, it is a market timing, or asset allocation, model which uses trend following techniques as applied to commodity and global stock market prices to generates a composite Risk-On/Risk-Off signal (risk-on, risk-off or neutral). I have begun updating readers on the Trend Model signals on a weekly basis and via Twitter @humblestudent as new developments occur.

The chart below shows the actual (not back-tested) changes in the direction of the signal, which are indicated by the arrows, overlaid on top of a chart of the SP 500. You can think of the blue up arrows, which occurred when the trend signal changed from negative to positive, as buy signals and the red down arrows, which occurred when the trend signal changed from positive to negative, as sell signals.

Trend Model Signal History


A proof of concept
While the results from the above chart representing paper trading is interesting, there is no substitute for actual performance. As a proof of concept, I started to manage a small account that traded long, inverse and leveraged ETFs on the major US market averages and, on occasion, sector and industry ETFs. Trading decisions were based on Trend Model signals combined with some short-term sentiment indicators. The inception date of the account was September 30, 2013 and the chart below represents an interim report card of that account. (For more details on how the Trend Model or how the account is managed, see my post Trend Model FAQ).

When evaluating the performance of this trading account, keep in mind that this is intended to be an absolute return vehicle. While I do show the SPY total return, which includes re-invested dividends, for illustrative purposes, the SP 500 is not an appropriate benchmark for measuring the performance of this modeling technique.


A difficult environment
The account performance continued to be challenging this years, as it was up -4.4% in April and -6.4% YTD, though one year returns at 28.8% and returns from from inception (September 2013) of 27.9% are quite respectable.

Negative returns were affected by the difficult environment. The chart of past signals below show that choppy markets this year have resulted in choppy whipsaw signals which detracted from returns.

Trend Model Signal History

Returns were too good...
I have documented the current market environment in a past post (see How to make your first loss your best loss). Put simply, Trend Model returns have been too good. The recent history of 30-40% returns were supported by a stock market that went steadily up without a correction for several years. Now it`s payback time and a key test of how this strategy plays defense.under adverse conditions.


A friendlier environment around the corner
However, I am optimistic that the pattern of short-term choppiness is about to end and the Trend Model will show more positive returns in the near future. My analysis is based on a study by James Paulsen of Wells Capital Management which showed that when a long-term stock market price trend is extended, as it is now now, such conditions have led to reversals. I extended the analysis to show that the differential between the long-term (3-year) trend and short-term (6-month) trend is at levels consistent with past major inflection points like the Crash of 1929 and 1987 (bottom panel of chart). However, I would like to emphasize this analytical approach only predicts direction, not magnitude and therefore a major market crash is unlikely.


Incidentally, the short-term 6-month trend is similar to the Trend Model lookback period. Therefore its choppiness accounts for its recent disappointing strategy performance.

We can view the difference in long and short term trends from another perspective. MACD, which measures the divergence and convergence between long and short term moving averages, has deteriorated for US equities, The 20-year chart below depicts the monthly MACD readings (bottom panel) for the SPX. Note how the bars have gone negative, indicating that long and short-term trends have diverged. Such episodes have either seen the market either in bearish episodes on a coincidental basis or soon thereafter.

Negative MACD signals a bull to bear trend shift

In other words, the stock market appears to be topping and therefore we are seeing flat and choppy markets, which has led to disappointing Trend Model account returns. Once the market begins to fall, the Trend Model should spot the bearish impulse and profit by shorting into the decline, which I expect to be no worse than the 10-20% corrective episodes seen in 2010 and 2011.


Strategy characteristics still promising
Despite the challenging environment and near-term returns, keep the following in mind:
  • You can't expect to make 20% (my best guess long-term estimate for this strategy) without a 10-15% drawdown. So far, the drawdown has been 8.1%. Most hedge funds aim for a return to maximum-drawdown ratio of 2 to 1, but a 1.5 to 1 to 1 is a more realistic target. By comparison, the drawdown for equities was in the order of 50% and most balanced funds saw losses of about 20% during the 2008-2009 period. Using even a 1 to 1 ratio and working backwards, it would be hard to envisage a long-term return expectation of 50% for stocks and 20% for balanced funds today.
  • Long term returns continue to be respectable. The one-year return was 28.8% and return from inception (September, 30, 2013) was 27.9%.
  • Returns are highly diversifying compared to major asset classes. They are uncorrelated with equities (correlation of -0.23 with SPY) and bonds (-0.02 with AGG).
  • Returns are consistently positive, with a 68% monthly batting average.


2015: An acid test year
The market environment in 2015 has been challenging for the Trend Model trading strategy in 2015. In a year-end 2014 review, I postulated a positive year for US stock prices but with a much higher (see 2015: Bullish skies with scattered periods of volatility). Trend following models do not perform well in choppy markets. However, I believe that environment should turn more positive for this model soon as stock prices should start to trend downward soon and the strategy should profit by shorting into the downtrend.

To summarize, investment results this year have been challenging but continue to be promising for this model longer term. I am comfortable with the current hiccup in returns is a characteristic of a difficult environment for this class of model and that environment become more favorable in the near future. Readers who want to monitor the signals of the Trend Model to subscribe to my blog posts here, which include Trend Model updates, or follow me via Twitter @humblestudent.

Sunday, May 3, 2015

At last, is this the correction?

Trend Model signal summary
Trend Model signal: Neutral
Trading model: Bearish

The Trend Model is an asset allocation model which applies trend following principles based on the inputs of global stock and commodity price. In essence, it seeks to answer the question, "Is the trend in the global economy expansion (bullish) or contraction (bearish)?"

My inner trader uses the trading model component of the Trend Model seeks to answer the question, "Is the trend getting better (bullish) or worse (bearish)?" The history of actual (not backtested) signals of the trading model are shown by the arrows in the chart below. In addition, I have a trading account which uses the signals of the Trend Model. The last report card of that account can be found here.


Update schedule: I generally update Trend Model readings on my blog on weekends and tweet any changes during the week at @humblestudent.


The growth scare arrives
I have been forecasting an intermediate term top based on a growth scare catalyst in these pages in the past few weeks (see Growth scare = Tactical sell signal and New highs = A last hurrah?) and the growth scare seems to be arriving.

To recap, the technical picture had been deteriorating. While the long-term uptrend in stock prices has been intact, short-term trend, or momentum, had been choppy (see How to make your first loss your best loss). This analysis was based on work done by Wells Capital Management. Past episodes in the past 100 years of the combination of an extended uptrend and short-term momentum failure has resulted in stock market weakness. To illustrate my point in a different way, the 20 year monthly chart of the SPX below shows how MACD has weaken to a negative reading (bottom panel). Past instances of negative MACD (vertical lines) have marked market declines, either as a leading or coincidental indicator.


What appears ominous about the current experience is that it appears most similar to the 1999/2000 top, where MACD had gone negative in late 1999, rose and declined again in early 2000 as a precursor to the 2000 market top. Fast forward to today, MACD went negative in January 2015, rose in February and went negative again in March. However, I am comforted by the fact that this model is better at forecasting direction than magnitude. Given the lack of catalyst for a major bear market, my best guess is that any weakness will be more comparable to the market experience in 2010 or 2011 - a minor hiccup.

The apparent catalyst for a bearish impulse in stocks appears to be a growth scare. The horrendous miss of 1Q GDP growth of 0.2% (vs. an expected 1.0%) proved to be the first part of a double whammy for stock prices. These readings are consistent with New Deal democrat's characterization of the US economy as being in a shallow industrial recession, but with a resilient consumer economy. The latest ISM Manufacturing reading of 51.5 also tells the story of a slowing economy, but above 50 indicating expansion.


Despite the slowing growth evidenced by the 1Q GDP and decelerating ISM, subsequent reports showed that the growth in the Employment Cost Index remained robust, which meant that the Fed remained on course to raise rates some time this year. The market now has the worst of both worlds to contend with, slowing growth and the prospect rising interest rates. Indeed, the latest Fedspeak from Mester of the Cleveland Fed and Williams of the San Francisco Fed is, "All meetings are on the table."

Indeed, Ed Yardeni recently confirmed market expectations of slowing growth when he showed in his analysis that forward 12 month EPS estimates were falling across all market cap bands (annotation of forward EPS change are mine).



Bulls losing control of the tape
From a technical perspective, risk appetite is starting to wane and the bulls are starting to lose control of the tape. Both the American and European markets are starting to look a little wobbly as the major indices have weakened to test their 50 day moving averages. Such behavior is an indication of the loss of price momentum.


In the US, high-beta groups are are losing relative strength. The chart below shows the relative performance of various glamour and high-beta sectors and industries. All are in various stages of losing momentum. Faltering leadership by these stocks are often a precursor to further market weakness.


I was also disturbed by the price action of Apple after its earnings report beat expectations both on the top and bottom line. The tone of Street analyst reactions were positive after the report but the price reaction was not. The failure of heavyweight market leaders like AAPL to rally in the face of good news is another sign that the bulls are losing control of the tape.


Trade Followers, which monitors stock trader sentiment on Twitter, also noted a loss of momentum and flashed this warning (emphasis added):
At the close yesterday (4/30/15) a consolidation warning was issued from 7 day momentum calculated from the Twitter stream for the SP 500 Index (SPX). The warning comes from a negative divergence that lasted more than three weeks which was followed by a break of the confirming uptrend line that began in January. This suggests that sentiment on the Twitter stream is falling and likely turning from bullish to bearish.

As a reminder, a consolidation warning doesn’t mean the market is making a long term top. It merely means bulls are stepping aside and the bears are asserting themselves. When this occurs the market struggles to move higher and often dips more than 5%. Long story short, the odds favor lower prices in the short term.
Cyclical stocks are not showing leadership, either in the form of industrial or semiconductor stocks. More disturbing is the negative divergence between the Dow Jones Industrials and Transports, which may be flashing a Dow Theory sell signal.


What about the Almighty American consumer? Mr. Market doesn`t think much of her as Consumer Discretionary stocks have been losing momentum and they are now rolling over on a relative basis. This negative pattern can be seen at the sector level and across different consumer spending sensitive industries.


When I put it all together, the combination of declining relative strength among the glamour stocks and the failure of economically sensitive groups like cyclical and consumer discretionary stocks to take the mantle of market leadership add up to one thing. Risk appetite is waning as the market prepares for an economic slowdown.


The week ahead: Time to fade strength
With so many negatives for US stocks, does that mean that investors should rush and push the "sell" button on Monday morning?

While some caution is warranted, no one should panic. Despite the fact that the bulls may be losing control of the tape, there is no evidence that the bears have taken the decisive upper hand either. Recent bull and bear moves have been marked by a lack of conviction. Bespoke highlighted this chart of AAII neutral sentiment, which is highly elevated relative to its own history. That tells me that market psychology remains indecisive and we may continue to chop around for a few more weeks.


This chart from IndexIndicators.com tells a story of patience. It shows that the aggregate 14-day RSI for the SPX. While the pattern of lower highs are highly suggestive of a loss of momentum, readings are at levels where the market has staged rallies in the past. This suggests that bears should wait for strength to either short or sell into the rally.


For another perspective, this chart depicts the equity-only put/call ratio relative to its own 20-day moving average. Readings are neutral and I would therefore be inclined to wait until the ratio descended into the target zone levels before selling or initiating short positions.


In addition, while sector and industry level relative returns show that risk appetite is diminishing, the message from the credit market is that risk appetite remains healthy. The bears cannot be said to be taking authoritative control of the tape until the credit markets starts to get spooked. I will be watching this chart very carefully in the days and weeks to come as for a decisive signal that a stock market correction has begun.



As well, there may be a couple of bullish catalyst that could spark a rally in the near future. First of all, China is highly resilient despite all the negative news about its slowing economy. On the weekend, Barron's featured an article with a very bullish tilt on China:
Now here’s the scariest part: Economists and strategists suggest that this bull market has just begun, as China begins to open its stock markets to global investors. At 4442, the Shanghai Composite Index still is 27% below its 2007 peak of 6092. This means long-term investors with horizons of more than three years may need to hold their noses and look to pullbacks to build their Chinese portfolios.

“Despite the run-up in equity markets, this is just the beginning,” says Helen Zhu, BlackRock’s head of China equities. “Structural-reform progress, rather than cyclicality in economic growth, has played a large part in driving the strong returns, and by reducing the tail risks that have been associated with China.” Chuck Clough, CEO of Clough Capital Partners in Boston, which manages several funds including one focused on China, agrees. He thinks the Chinese are just starting to buy stocks again for the first time in recent years. “China is at the beginning of a big movement from savings toward stock investing,” he says.
I hesitate to gauge the Chinese economy based on its stock market, because their equity market is regarded as a casino. However, the charts of its neighboring Asian trading partners appear to be very healthy, with the exception of Australia. Mr. Market is therefore telling me that Greater China is alive and kicking and Asian bullish forces could serve to temper the decelerating US growth outlook and put a floor on US stock prices.


In addition, we could see a (temporary) resolution of the Greece-eurozone impasse next week. Athens is due to make two payments to the IMF in May, €200 million on May 6 and €750 million on May 12. While the Syriza government struggles with the May 6 payment, it is the May 12 payment that may push Athens into default. Their backs are to the wall, but Tsipras is signaling possible concessions. The Telegraph recently speculated that the Greeks will have to blink:
This Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA), which has hit €77bn since February, has been described the "Sword of Damocles" hanging over the country.

With negotiations showing little discernible progress, the ECB has touted plans to put a firm ceiling on ELA, as well as forcing banks to take a bigger haircut on the collateral they need to access the funds.

It is a stance that is beginning to scarily resemble the threats which resulted in Ireland eventually bowing to eurozone bail-out terms in 2010.
The most immediate effect of a settlement with Greece would reduce tail-risk and raise risk appetite. If a last minute deal does get struck, which is highly likely, I will be watching the market reaction to see how it reacts to the good news.

I have been getting nervous about the technical and macro conditions underpinning the stock market for several weeks. My inner investor has already de-risked and moved his asset allocation to a neutral policy weight.

My inner trader covered his short position and went to cash last week. He is waiting for the market bounce to opportunistically re-enter his shorts at higher levels. Depending on how things develop, it would not be a total surprise for the market to rally to test the old highs or even make marginal new highs. While the medium term trend is likely to be down, the short-term trend remains "data dependent".