Showing posts with label Economics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Economics. Show all posts

Saturday, September 20, 2025

Will America Get Old Before It Becomes Great Again?

This is the second in a series of the opportunities and threats to productivity. This week, I focus on the effects of labour supply on productivity, (see AI Productivity and the Promised Land). I am grateful for the aid and guidance from New Deal democrat for his help in data sourcing and analysis in the preparation of this report.

The Bank of Japan Governor Kazuo Ueda at Jackson Hole gave a sobering presentation on the macroeconomic effects of Japan’s aging population. In light of the President’s abrupt pivot on immigration policy, Japan’s path could foreshadow what happens to U.S. productivity in the coming years.
 
The accompanying chart shows the evolution of Japan and U.S. total factor productivity shown on a log scale since 1954. Since the peak of Japan’s bubble in 1990, Japanese productivity (blue line) has been flat. By contrast, U.S. factor productivity (red line) rose steadily during that period.


Much of the productivity headwinds can be attributable to age demographics.
 
The full post can be found here.
 
 

Special announcement: Humble Student of the Markets will cease publication on March 31, 2026. See this announcement for more details and updates.  

 

Saturday, March 29, 2025

Uncharted investor waters: From soft to hard power

Markets were rattled by policy under Trump 1.0 by his unpredictable and chaotic nature. Trump 2.0 promises to be more of the same. Other than the transactional nature of Trump’s deal making, what’s his ultimate end game?

It’s to undo the effects of globalization. The political backdrop can be explained by Branko Milanovic’s famous “elephant chart”. The graph charts percentile of global income distribution, or how rich you are on a global scale, on the x-axis, and the changes in real income between 1998 and 2008 on the y-axis. The winners of globalization were the emerging market countries whose population were lifted out of poverty and the elite of the industrialization countries, who engineered globalization. The losers were population in subsistence economies and the middle class of the industrialized countries, which has sparked populist backlashes such as the Make America Great Again movement, the AfD in Germany, the National Front in France, and so on.

Trump rose to power by tapping on the deep political discontent of globalization of MAGA Americans. Here’s what this means for investors.

The full post can be found here.

Saturday, February 3, 2024

How Trump's isolationism threatens long-term equity returns

Now that Donald Trump has become the presumptive Republican nominee for President, Wall Street is scrambling to model how a Trump White House may affect capital markets. A recent Bloomberg article summarized the consensus:
  • Bond market: Expect rising yields from upward pressures on term premium.
  • Currencies: Rising yields will put a bid under the USD.
  • Equities: Stocks in limbo as it’s difficult to form a consensus.
I wrote about the effects of a Trump victory about a month ago (see What the Politics of 2024 Tell Us About 2025) and highlighted the geopolitical risk from Trump’s foreign policy. Further analysis leads us to believe that Trump’s foreign policy could unravel the “Stocks for the Long Run” narrative popularized by Jeremy Siegel. This could have profound long-run implications for investors in their investment planning.


 
Here’s why.
 
The full post can be found here.

Saturday, September 18, 2021

Not your father's stagflation threat

Stagflation worries are rising. A recent analysis of search activity shows that searches for stagflation have spiked compared to other inflation search terms.


The latest BoA Global Fund Manager Survey also shows that stagflation concerns are rising.


These fears are misplaced. The conventional mechanisms for stagflation are not present. Instead, investors should be prepared for a different sort of stagflation threat.

The full post can be found here.

Saturday, July 17, 2021

How to engineer inflation

Both the June CPI and PPI came in hot and well ahead of expectations. There was the inevitable debate about the transitory nature of the price increases. Looking longer-term, however, the conventional models for explaining inflation have been unsatisfactory. 

Notwithstanding the numerous failures by Japanese policymakers, consider the US as another example. Let's begin with fiscal policy. It is said that deficit spending would lead to currency devaluation and inflation in the manner of the Weimar Republic. Nothing could be further from the truth. The blue line represents federal government deficits as a percentage of GDP. Deficits began to balloon in the early 1980`s with the Reagan Revolution and continued during the Bush I era. Did inflation (purple line) explode upward?

Monetary policy had its own failure. Monetarist Theory, as popularized by Milton Friedman, was another model that backtested well but failed out of the box. Friedman postulated that the PQ=MV, where the Price X Quantity of goods and services (or GDP) = Money Supply X (Monetary) Velocity. Friedman theorized that, over the long run, monetary velocity is stable, and therefore money supply growth determines inflation. All central banks had to do was to control money growth in order to control inflation.

It worked until about 1980. Monetary velocity had been stable until about then. Money growth didn't generate inflation because monetary velocity fluctuated wildly. Growth in money supply, as measured by M1, was often matched by declines in velocity. The Fed could engineer money growth and inject liquidity into the financial system without creating inflation.


In the face of the apparent failure of these conventional models, I offer an alternative vision of inflation and discuss the implications for investors.

The full post can be found here.

Saturday, June 6, 2020

What would a Biden Presidency look like?

Joe Biden has officially clinched the Democratic nomination for president, and his odds of winning the Presidency in November have been steadily rising, and he is now at 54% on PredictIt. For the uninitiated, the contract pays off at $1.00 if a candidate wins, so buying the Biden contract at $0.54 implies a 54% of a Biden victory.


The consensus view has the Democrats retaining control of the House. The PredictIt odds of the Democrats gaining control of the Senate has been steadily improving over the past few months, and now shows a slight edge for the Democrats. In the case of a 50-50 divided Senate, the vice-president casts the tie-breaker and the winner of the White House has control.



While this is not meant to be an endorsement of any candidate or political party, it is time to contemplate what a Biden victory might mean for the economy and the markets. If Biden were to win, there is also a decent chance that the Democrats might capture control of both chambers of Congress. How should investors react to that outcome?

The full post can be found here.

Tuesday, June 2, 2020

Brace for the second waves

As we progressed through the pandemic induced recession, there have been much discussion about a second wave. Second waves appear in many forms, and they can threaten the current consensus expectation of a V-shaped rebound.


Here are some of the second wave risks the market faces.
  • A second wave of COVID-19 infections
  • A second wave of layoffs and wage cuts
  • A second wave of bankruptcies
Finally, investors have to face the risk of permanent economic scarring that impair long-term growth potential. Under that scenario, slower growth rates will persist even after any recovery, and affect asset prices in ways that the market hasn't fully discounted.

The full post can be found here.

Wednesday, March 18, 2020

The 9/11 template

In my last post (see 2020 bounce = 1987, or 1929), I had been searching for a template for the current bear market. I had suggested in the past that the roots of this bear has thematic similarities to 2008 (see A Lehman Crisis of a different sort). Today, health authorities are urging the use of social distancing to mitigate COVID-19, while financial institutions practiced similar social distancing at the time of the Lehman Crisis, which ended by seizing up the global financial system.

As the growth of COVID-19 cases continues outside of China, one other template comes to mind. 9/11.


The full post can be found here.

Sunday, April 14, 2019

How "patient" can the Fed be?

Preface: Explaining our market timing models
We maintain several market timing models, each with differing time horizons. The "Ultimate Market Timing Model" is a long-term market timing model based on the research outlined in our post, Building the ultimate market timing model. This model tends to generate only a handful of signals each decade.

The Trend Model is an asset allocation model which applies trend following principles based on the inputs of global stock and commodity price. This model has a shorter time horizon and tends to turn over about 4-6 times a year. In essence, it seeks to answer the question, "Is the trend in the global economy expansion (bullish) or contraction (bearish)?"

My inner trader uses a trading model, which is a blend of price momentum (is the Trend Model becoming more bullish, or bearish?) and overbought/oversold extremes (don't buy if the trend is overbought, and vice versa). Subscribers receive real-time alerts of model changes, and a hypothetical trading record of the those email alerts are updated weekly here. The hypothetical trading record of the trading model of the real-time alerts that began in March 2016 is shown below.



The latest signals of each model are as follows:
  • Ultimate market timing model: Buy equities*
  • Trend Model signal: Bullish*
  • Trading model: Bullish*
* The performance chart and model readings have been delayed by a week out of respect to our paying subscribers.

Update schedule: I generally update model readings on my site on weekends and tweet mid-week observations at @humblestudent. Subscribers receive real-time alerts of trading model changes, and a hypothetical trading record of the those email alerts is shown here.



What are the limits to "patience"?
The credit market may be setting up for an unpleasant surprise. According to the CME's Fedwatch Tool, the market mainly expects no change in the Fed Funds rate for the rest of this year, with the possibility of a cut later in the year. It is not expecting a rate hike. Politico reported that Trump's economic advisor Larry Kudlow went even further: "I don't think rates will rise in the foreseeable future, maybe never again in my lifetime."


The minutes of the March FOMC meeting tells a different story. Since the Fed made the U-turn and adopted the policy of "patience", the Committee is not expecting any changes in rates for the rest of 2019:
A majority of participants expected that the evolution of the economic outlook and risks to the outlook would likely warrant leaving the target range unchanged for the remainder of the year.
However, some members would not rule out another increase in interest rates this year. The strength in the labor market could raise economic growth in the months ahead, though not as rapidly as last year.
Underlying economic fundamentals continued to support sustained expansion, and most participants indicated that they did not expect the recent weakness in spending to persist beyond the first quarter. Nevertheless, participants generally expected the growth rate of real GDP this year to step down from the pace seen over 2018 to a rate at or modestly above their estimates of longer-run growth.
There was also some uneasiness over the use of the word "patient" as it could be viewed as handcuffing future actions if the time came to raise rates:
Several participants observed that the characterization of the Committee's approach to monetary policy as "patient" would need to be reviewed regularly as the economic outlook and uncertainties surrounding the outlook evolve. A couple of participants noted that the "patient" characterization should not be seen as limiting the Committee's options for making policy adjustments when they are deemed appropriate.
Who is right? The market or the Fed? If the bond yields start to rise, what does that mean for stock prices?

The full post can be found here.

Sunday, March 24, 2019

How the market could melt-up

Preface: Explaining our market timing models
We maintain several market timing models, each with differing time horizons. The "Ultimate Market Timing Model" is a long-term market timing model based on the research outlined in our post, Building the ultimate market timing model. This model tends to generate only a handful of signals each decade.

The Trend Model is an asset allocation model which applies trend following principles based on the inputs of global stock and commodity price. This model has a shorter time horizon and tends to turn over about 4-6 times a year. In essence, it seeks to answer the question, "Is the trend in the global economy expansion (bullish) or contraction (bearish)?"

My inner trader uses a trading model, which is a blend of price momentum (is the Trend Model becoming more bullish, or bearish?) and overbought/oversold extremes (don't buy if the trend is overbought, and vice versa). Subscribers receive real-time alerts of model changes, and a hypothetical trading record of the those email alerts are updated weekly here. The hypothetical trading record of the trading model of the real-time alerts that began in March 2016 is shown below.



The latest signals of each model are as follows:
  • Ultimate market timing model: Sell equities*
  • Trend Model signal: Neutral*
  • Trading model: Bearish*
* The performance chart and model readings have been delayed by a week out of respect to our paying subscribers.

Update schedule: I generally update model readings on my site on weekends and tweet mid-week observations at @humblestudent. Subscribers receive real-time alerts of trading model changes, and a hypothetical trading record of the those email alerts is shown here.



Melt-up ahead?
While this is not my base case scenario, there is a decent chance that the stock market may melt-up in light of the Fed's extraordinarily dovish statement last week. One parallel to the market hiccup of late 2018 would be 1998, when the Fed stepped in to rescue the financial system in the wake of the Russia Crisis.


A melt-up in the current environment would be supported by the combination of loose monetary policy and easy fiscal policy.

The full post can be found here.

Sunday, February 17, 2019

Peering into 2020 and beyond

Preface: Explaining our market timing models
We maintain several market timing models, each with differing time horizons. The "Ultimate Market Timing Model" is a long-term market timing model based on the research outlined in our post, Building the ultimate market timing model. This model tends to generate only a handful of signals each decade.

The Trend Model is an asset allocation model which applies trend following principles based on the inputs of global stock and commodity price. This model has a shorter time horizon and tends to turn over about 4-6 times a year. In essence, it seeks to answer the question, "Is the trend in the global economy expansion (bullish) or contraction (bearish)?"

My inner trader uses a trading model, which is a blend of price momentum (is the Trend Model becoming more bullish, or bearish?) and overbought/oversold extremes (don't buy if the trend is overbought, and vice versa). Subscribers receive real-time alerts of model changes, and a hypothetical trading record of the those email alerts are updated weekly here. The hypothetical trading record of the trading model of the real-time alerts that began in March 2016 is shown below.


The latest signals of each model are as follows:
  • Ultimate market timing model: Sell equities*
  • Trend Model signal: Neutral*
  • Trading model: Bullish*
* The performance chart and model readings have been delayed by a week out of respect to our paying subscribers.

Update schedule: I generally update model readings on my site on weekends and tweet mid-week observations at @humblestudent. Subscribers receive real-time alerts of trading model changes, and a hypothetical trading record of the those email alerts is shown here.



Gazing into the crystal ball
In the past year, I have been fortunate to be right on the major turning points in the US equity market. I was steadfastly bullish in early 2018 after the correction (see Five reasons not to worry, plus two concerns). I turned cautious in early August because of the early technical warning, which was accompanied by deterioration in top-down data (see Market top ahead? My inner investor turns cautious). Finally, I turned bullish on stocks in mid-January 2019 (see Ursus Interruptus).


What's next, as I gaze into the crystal ball for 2020 and beyond?

The full post can be found here.





A Special Announcement
We told you so. We told you the market was going down.

Here is the track of Humble Student of the Markets, where we are neither perma-bulls nor perma-bears. Most recently, we have been correctly bullish since the correction of 2015, and turned cautious in August 2018 (see Market top ahead? My inner investor turns cautious, August 5, 2018).



We were also timely at the 2009 bottom. We issued a call to buy beaten up low-priced stocks with high insider buying a week before the ultimate bottom (see Phoenix rising? February 24, 2009).


The out-of-sample record of our model trading portfolio in 2018 was up 42.9%. For more details, see our weekly updates here.

The recent market volatility has brought a flood of new subscribers, and we are announcing a price increase, and a number of other changes in order to better control the growth of our community. However, all subscribers will be grandfathered at their old prices.

The following changes will occur as of March 1, 2019:
  • The annual subscription price will rise from US$249.99 to US$365 per year.
  • The monthly subscription price will rise from US$24.99 to US$36.50 per month.
  • The 24-hour subscription will no longer be offered.
  • The embargo period for free content will change from two weeks to four weeks.
Remember, if you subscribe now, you will be grandfathered at the old price - permanently.

Monday, December 17, 2018

How China and America could both lose Cold War 2.0

In a past post (see Pax Americana or America First?), I showed how the combination of the unequal sharing of productivity gains and the inward looking America First policies were eroding US competitiveness, and raising the fragility of the post-WW II Pax Americana boom.

Even though the US and China appears to be locked into a Cold War 2.0, I would like to demonstrate how both countries appear to be locked into paths that will eventually stall their growth.

The full post can be  found at our new site here.

Sunday, February 26, 2017

Brace for a volatility spike

Preface: Explaining our market timing models
We maintain several market timing models, each with differing time horizons. The "Ultimate Market Timing Model" is a long-term market timing model based on the research outlined in our post, Building the ultimate market timing model. This model tends to generate only a handful of signals each decade.

The Trend Model is an asset allocation model which applies trend following principles based on the inputs of global stock and commodity price. This model has a shorter time horizon and tends to turn over about 4-6 times a year. In essence, it seeks to answer the question, "Is the trend in the global economy expansion (bullish) or contraction (bearish)?"

My inner trader uses the trading component of the Trend Model to look for changes in the direction of the main Trend Model signal. A bullish Trend Model signal that gets less bullish is a trading "sell" signal. Conversely, a bearish Trend Model signal that gets less bearish is a trading "buy" signal. The history of actual out-of-sample (not backtested) signals of the trading model are shown by the arrows in the chart below. Past trading of the trading model has shown turnover rates of about 200% per month.



The latest signals of each model are as follows:
  • Ultimate market timing model: Buy equities*
  • Trend Model signal: Risk-on*
  • Trading model: Bearish*
* The performance chart and model readings have been delayed by a week out of respect to our paying subscribers.

Update schedule: I generally update model readings on my site on weekends and tweet mid-week observations at @humblestudent. Subscribers will also receive email notices of any changes in my trading portfolio.


Sell the news?
There has been much written lately about low level of stock market volatility, as measured by the VIX Index. It's interesting that these concerns have even surfaced in the latest FOMC minutes:
Financial asset prices were little changed since the December meeting. Market participants continued to report substantial uncertainty about potential changes in fiscal, regulatory, and other government policies. Nonetheless, measures of implied volatility of various asset prices remained low.
A little noticed change has occurred in the markets since mid-February. Even though stock prices were grinding upwards, VIX term structure began to steepen as 3-month VIX futures rose but 1-month VIX remained stable. As well, the bottom panel shows that SKEW, which measures the price of tail-risk protection, is rising. These readings indicate that the market is anticipating a near-term volatility event.



The most likely spark for a volatility event is Trump's address to Congress on Tuesday, when he is expected to outline his tax reform proposals. This speech has the potential to raise the "uncertainty about potential changes in fiscal, regulatory, and other government policies".

The stock market has rallied substantially in anticipation of Trump's proposal of tax cuts, tax holiday for offshore cash repatriation, and deregulation. As Trump's tax reform proposals become more clear, it is becoming evident that there are two likely outcomes. Either Wall Street will have to swallow the bitter pill of the protectionist measures of a Border Adjustment Tax (BAT), or they will get delayed and bogged down in Congress.

As the market has bought the rumor of tax cuts, it may now be time to sell the news.

The full post can be found at our new site here.

Thursday, February 23, 2017

Solving the data puzzle at the center of monetary policy

There has been much hand wringing by economists over the falling labor force participation rate (LFPR). As the chart below shows, the prime age LFPR, which is not affected by the age demographic effect of retiring Baby Boomers, have not recovered to levels before the Great Recession.



The lack of recovery in LFPR has caused great consternation over at the Federal Reserve. These readings suggest that there is still considerable slack in the labor market, despite the sub 5% unemployment rate.

A number of explanations have been advanced for this phenomena, such as jobless Millennials spending all their time playing video games in their parents' basement instead of looking for a job (via Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute).



Another possible explanation is the growth of disability as a shield against unemployment payments run out. As the Great Recession hit, disabled workers became discouraged and chose to rely on their disability payments instead of trying to find another job.


There may be another very simple alternative explanation for the collapse in LFPR. The answer is so simple, it's criminal that anyone missed it.

The full post can be found at our new site here.

Tuesday, February 14, 2017

Cry Havoc, and slip loose the dogs of (trade) war!

The WSJ reported that the Trump administration is considering a new tactic in managing its trade relationship with China. Here is the Bloomberg recap for those without a WSJ subscription:
Under the plan, the commerce secretary would designate the practice of currency manipulation as an unfair subsidy when employed by any country, instead of singling out China, the newspaper reported. American companies could then bring anti-subsidy actions to the U.S. Commerce Department against China or other countries, it said.

The discussions are part of a strategy being pursued by the White House’s new National Trade Council to balance the goals of challenging China on certain policies while keeping broader relations on an even keel, the paper said. The Trump administration would avoid, at least for now, making claims about whether China is manipulating its currency, it said.
While such an approach may seem clever, it has the risk of sideswiping American relations with a whole host of other countries other than China. As well, the imposition of countervailing duties is subject to a challenge under WTO rules.

The full post can be found at our new site here.

Monday, January 30, 2017

Forget politics! Here are the 5 key macro indicators of Trump's political fortunes

Wow, Trump's political honeymoon didn't last very long! In the past few days, there have been numerous objections of Trump's Executive Orders. I'll spare you the details of the protests and demonstrations, particularly from the Left. What stood out were the objections from the Right and within the GOP. As an example, Eliot Cohen, who served under Condeleeza Rice, fretted about the threats that Trump posed to the American Republic:
I am not surprised by President Donald Trump’s antics this week. Not by the big splashy pronouncements such as announcing a wall that he would force Mexico to pay for, even as the Mexican foreign minister held talks with American officials in Washington. Not by the quiet, but no less dangerous bureaucratic orders, such as kicking the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff out of meetings of the Principals’ Committee, the senior foreign-policy decision-making group below the president, while inserting his chief ideologist, Steve Bannon, into them. Many conservative foreign-policy and national-security experts saw the dangers last spring and summer, which is why we signed letters denouncing not Trump’s policies but his temperament; not his program but his character.

Precisely because the problem is one of temperament and character, it will not get better. It will get worse, as power intoxicates Trump and those around him. It will probably end in calamity—substantial domestic protest and violence, a breakdown of international economic relationships, the collapse of major alliances, or perhaps one or more new wars (even with China) on top of the ones we already have. It will not be surprising in the slightest if his term ends not in four or in eight years, but sooner, with impeachment or removal under the 25th Amendment. The sooner Americans get used to these likelihoods, the better.
Cass Sunstein objected to Trump's economic approach by invoking Fredrich Hayek:
If American conservatives have an intellectual hero, it might well be Friedrich Hayek -- and rightly so. More clearly than anyone else, Hayek elaborated the case against government planning and collectivism, and mounted a vigorous argument for free markets. As it turns out, Hayek simultaneously identified a serious problem with the political creed of President-elect Donald Trump.
Sunstein worried aloud about Trump's conservative credentials and autocratic tendencies:
In "The Road to Serfdom" and (at greater length) in "The Constitution of Liberty," Hayek distinguished between formal rules, which are indispensable, and mere “commands,” which create a world of trouble, because they are a recipe for arbitrariness. When formal rules are in place, “the coercive power of the state can be used only for cases defined in advance by law and in such a way that it can be foreseen how it will be used.”

Like the rules of the road, formal rules do not name names. They are useful to people who are not and cannot be known by the rule-makers -- and they apply in situations that public officials cannot foresee.

Commands are altogether different. They target particular people and tell them what to do. (Think Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s Soviet Union, Mao’s China, Castro’s Cuba.) They require the exercise of discretion on the spot. As examples, Hayek pointed to official decisions about “how many buses are to be run, which coal mines are to operate, or at what prices shoes are to be sold.”
Forgive me for being cynical, but blah blah blah...None of this matters very much.

The main objective of these pages is to make money for my readers. I try very hard to divorce my investment views from my political views. As the chart below shows, the stock market can prosper under both Democratic and Republican presidents.



With that preface in mind, here are some key metrics to watch that Donald Trump needs to achieve in order to politically prosper in his first term.

The full post can be found at our new site here.

Wednesday, February 3, 2016

Is the Fed tightening too much?

Regular readers will know that I have been relatively constructive about stock prices longer term, though I am bracing for further short-term volatility. However, the level of anxiety among my readers is high and I have had to play a game of whack-a-mole with bearish themes (as an example see Why China won't blow up the world (this year)).

One of the more recent explanations for the current bout of stock market weakness is that the Federal Reserve is engineering an extraordinary level of tightening, as measured by the Shadow Fund Funds rate (SFF). Such Fed action, it is said, is creating a high degree of stress in the financial markets and causing stocks to tank and risk appetites to shrink (annotations are mine).


How concerned should we be about this development?

The full post is at our new site here.



Site notice
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Thursday, August 6, 2015

The costs of Spain's astounding recovery: Bug or feature?

There has been some recent buzz about the economic performance in Spain. Bloomberg reported that Spain posted its best quarterly performance in eight years and June home sales was up 14%, which was the best performance since March 2014.

Indeed, Euro area statistics show that Spanish GDP growth has improved considerably.


Unit labor costs have nosedived since 2008 and Spain is becoming more competitive.


The unemployment rate has begun to improve, though it remains painfully high compared to the rest of the eurozone.



FT Alphaville documented the export revival in Spain:
One example of this is cars and trucks. Spain has long been the second-biggest manufacturer of vehicles in Europe. (The plants are all owned by the major German, Japanese, American, Korean, and French labels, but the cars are made in Spain.) However, the trade surplus has increased since the crisis.

At the 2007 peak, Spain made around 2.9 million cars. Now it makes closer to 2.6 million. Meanwhile, domestic car sales collapsed from about 1.6 million before the bubble to around 900,000 now, although Spanish new car registrations are now growing by more than 20 per cent annually. More than 80 per cent of the cars currently made in Spain are exported elsewhere.
In addition, the country is undergoing a productivity boom as the financial excesses of the last cycle have been repaired (emphasis added):
At the peak in the middle of 2008, Spanish banks were sending about 3.4 per cent of Spain’s GDP to foreigners. Now they send less than 1 per cent. Meanwhile, Spain’s banks still receive almost as much income from abroad, as a share of GDP, as they did before. The overall difference between payments to foreign holders of Spanish assets and income received by Spanish holders of foreign assets has shrunk by about 2 percentage points of GDP between the start of 2009 and the end of 2014.

The last point we want to highlight is that, despite the extensive deleveraging in the aggregate, particularly among Spanish businesses, the most productive and export-oriented firms actually increased their borrowing to expand capacity and invest in domestic production. This could help explain the post-crisis Spanish productivity boom.

Researchers at the Banco de Espana have found that the businesses which were relatively less indebted going into the crisis generally had better sales and profit growth since then. Importantly, these firms took advantage of changing economic circumstances by borrowing to boost capacity and hire more workers. By contrast, the businesses that borrowed during the boom generally had falling sales, and had to respond by firing workers, cutting investment, and repaying their debts. (This is sort of similar to what other economists studying the US have found.)

A triumph of the Grand Plan
In a past post (see Mario Draghi reveals the Grand Plan), I wrote about how the European elites planned to fix Europe. The ECB would do its best to hold things together with monetary policy, which bought time for member states to reform. By "reform" I mean a variety of macro and micro-economic solutions (see Draghi`s 2012 WSJ interview for details):
  • Macro solutions like "good" austerity, in the form of lower taxes and lower government expenditures
  • Micro solutions in the form of structural reform, whose objective is to get rid of the "jobs for life" idea. That means labor market reforms to eliminate job security and improve market conditions to encourage business formation as a means of fighting the problem of youth unemployment because their elders had "jobs for life".
A recent Bloomberg View article outlined and applauded the Rajoy government`s efforts in these areas. First, there was the macro leg of government austerity:
The government of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy bowed to austerity demands, cut public-sector wages and benefits, and increased VAT to 21 percent (with exemptions) from 18 percent. Had he stopped there, Spain might have bumped along the bottom for a good while longer, rather than seeing the recovery it's now enjoying.
The second and equally important part was the micro-economic solutions of structural reform:
But Spain's recovery today also owes a lot to hard reform aimed at particular failings in the economy. The Rajoy government braved street protests and the rise of an anti-reform left-wing opposition and persisted in a deliberate rewiring of the Spanish economy, with an emphasis on far-reaching labor-market and tax reforms.

In 2014, the government said it would gradually lower the corporate tax rate to 25 percent from 30 percent. The top marginal rate on personal income will fall to 45 percent from 52 percent. The government is limiting deductions, broadening the tax base and making a serious effort to curb evasion.

Companies have been given more flexibility to set wages and working conditions. Wage growth that had run ahead of productivity has moderated. The barriers that created Spain's notorious two-tier labor market, with its underclass of workers on temporary contracts, have begun to fall.
The draconian approaches began to pay off, though there was an element of luck involved.
Low inflation, a cheap euro, the fall in energy prices and renewed financial stability in Europe have supported consumer spending and lifted Spain's beleaguered retailers. Holidaymakers have favored Spain this season, too -- in part because visiting Greece without bundles of cash has presented difficulties. Put much of all that down to luck.

The price paid
To be sure, these gains were not without costs. FT Alphaville lamented that it is taking a decade or more for Spain to return to normalcy (emphasis added):
Spain seems to have done everything right — within the constraints imposed by membership in the euro area and the European Union more generally. Debt is down, reliance on foreign capital is down, exports and productivity are up. And the economy is, finally, growing at a brisk clip. The government is planning on cutting corporate taxes to boost investment and using some of the windfall from faster growth to lower personal income taxes, which ought to help households.

Yet for all the recent progress, Spanish unemployment remains tragically high. Anything resembling a healthy economy is still years away.

What else could Spain have done? What else can it reasonably be expected to do?

It doesn’t bode well for the future of the single currency if the country that followed the policy recommendations of Europe’s leaders most closely, and which embraced some of the best economic governance on the continent, requires a decade or more to return to normalcy after a crisis.
Moreover, long-term unemployment remains stubbornly high (via Ian Bremmer):


I recently wrote that Greece and the Eurogroup were talking past each other (see Greece: How both sides are right AND wrong). The Greek government was speaking the language of macro-economics while the Eurogroup was speaking the language of micro-economic adjustment. The ongoing discussions over Greece has become a European tragedy.

I also wrote that if the Tsipras government were to truly embrace and "own" the micro-economic structural reforms asked of them by the creditors, then Greece could see the light at the end of the tunnel (see Can Alexis Tsipras become the Greek Lula?).

Spain has done all those things. Their situation is improving, but the experience shows that the path is not easy, the task is not finished and Spaniards are still paying for those reforms. The Spanish experience raises a number of important questions about the European Grand Plan:
  • Does the Spanish experience vindicate the European Grand Plan?
  • Or is this a case of changing a light bulb by holding the light bulb and then moving the house around it?
  • Can this approach be characterized not as a bug, but a feature of a currency union without a political union?
Here is the most important question of all:
  • What lesson should Greece or any country contemplating joining the euro take away from this?


Thursday, July 23, 2015

Can Alexis Tsipras become the Greek Lula?

In the wee hours of Thursday morning, Greek parliament passed a second series of measures as a condition for negotiating further aid from the rest of Europe. Here is the BBC:
Greece has taken a crucial step towards a bailout after its parliament passed a second set of reforms.

The passage of the measures means that negotiations on an €86bn European Union bailout can begin.

The reforms include changes to Greek banking and an overhaul of the judiciary system.
More importantly for PM Alexis Tsipras, there were fewer Syriza defectors than there were in the last vote:
Among those who voted against were 31 members of his own Syriza party. However, this represents a smaller rebellion than in last week's initial vote.

Former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis was one of those rebels in the first vote who returned to vote with the government this time.

Mr Varoufakis wrote (in Greek) that he felt it was important to preserve the unity of the government, even if he believed the programme was "designed to fail" by Greece's creditors.
I have written before (see Greece: How both sides are right AND wrong) that Greece and Europe were talking past each other. While Europe was speaking the language of micro-economics (get the structural reforms right and growth will follow), the Greek government was speaking the language of macro-economics (you can't have growth if the combination of crippling debt and austerity pushes the economy into an economic depression). At the time, I wrote:
Here are the two basic scenarios that I am working with. Either Tsipras' ultimate objective is to take Greece out of the euro, which would also put their EU membership at risk, or there will be a deal.

If there is a deal, everyone will have to save face. The EU will make Greeks swallow tough Grand Plan restructuring reforms. At the same time, they will be able to demonstrate that the Greeks are taking sufficient pain that the other euroskeptic parties watching this drama will be deterred from taking the same path. The Greeks will get some form of back door debt relief, either as NPV debt writeoffs or some form of aid in the form of humanitarian or military aid to help with their budget.

In other words, it will be the typical European fudge solution. Everything else is theatre.
Now that the Tsipras government has surrendered to virtually all Eurogroup demands, the theatre continues, but on an more optimistic note.


A Nixon in China moment?
The passage of these painful reform measures have prompted a few optimistic notes for Greece. Jeffrey Frankel went so far as comparing Tsipras to Lula of Brazil, if he can effectively implement the reforms demanded by the creditors:
Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister, has the chance to play a role for his country analogous to the roles played by Korean President Kim Dae Jung in 1997 and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2002. Both of those presidential candidates had been long-time men of the left, with strong ties to labor, and were believed to place little priority on fiscal responsibility or free markets. Both were elected at a time of economic crisis in their respective countries. Both confronted financial and international constraints in office that had not been especially salient in their minds when they were opposition politicians. Both were able soon to make the mental and political adjustment to the realities faced by debtor economies. This flexibility helped both to lead their countries more effectively.

The two new presidents launched needed reforms. Some of these were “conservative” reforms (or “neo-liberal”) that might not have been possible under more mainstream or conservative politicians.

But Kim and Lula were also able to implement other reforms consistent with their lifetime commitment to reducing income inequality. South Korea under Kim began to rein in the chaebols, the country’s huge family-owned conglomerates. Brazil under Lula expanded Bolsa Familia, a system of direct cash payments to households that is credited with lifting millions out of poverty.
George Magnus echoed a similar level of optimism [emphasis added]:
Many people, certainly in the UK and the US, still see Grexit as the most likely outcome sooner or later. But it’s not an option we should wish upon the Greeks. Nor should we delude ourselves that Syriza’s economic and political agenda, until now at least, was ever compatible with lasting membership. But if Alexis Tsipras really does take ownership of the most important parts of the bailout programme and tacks away from the Left Platform in his own party, aided and abetted by steady, if slow, economic growth in Europe—including in Greece from next year—the outcome of this crisis could be far less apocalyptic than many assume.
Anatole Kaletsky, writing in Project Syndicate, said that outsiders should look past European theatre to see what matters is the Grand Plan of structural reforms (see my previous post Mario Draghi reveals the Grand Plan). As long as they are being implemented, Europe will allow Greece (or Spain, Portugal, etc.) to backslide on debt obligations:
This raises a key issue that the Tsipras government and many others misunderstood throughout the Greek crisis: the role of constructive hypocrisy in Europe’s political economy. Gaps between public statements and private intentions open up in all political systems, but these become huge in a complex multinational structure like the EU. On paper, the Greek bailout will impose a fiscal tightening, thereby aggravating the country’s economic slump. In practice, however, the budget targets will surely be allowed to slip, provided the government carries out its promises on privatization, labor markets, and pension reform.

These structural reforms are much more important than fiscal targets, both in symbolic terms for the rest of Europe and for the Greek economy. Moreover, the extension of ECB monetary support to Greece will transform financial conditions: interest rates will plummet, banks will recapitalize, and private credit will gradually become available for the first time since 2010. If budget targets were strictly enforced by bailout monitors, which seems unlikely, this improvement in conditions for private borrowers could easily compensate for any modest tightening of fiscal policy.
He concluded:
In short, the main conditions now seem to be in place for a sustainable recovery in Greece. Conventional wisdom among economists and investors has a long record of failing to spot major turning points; so the near-universal belief today that Greece faces permanent depression is no reason to despair.

A hard road ahead
The one common theme to all of this commentary is the kind of structural reforms as outlined in the Grand Plan. It doesn't just mean austerity, though that is one component, though not the key component. It means the kind of reform that makes the economy more competitive. James Suroweiki explained in a New Yorker article:
So what can Greece do? It really has only one option—to make the economy more productive and, above all, to export more. It’s easy to focus on Greece’s huge pile of debt, but, according to Yannis Ioannides, an economist at Tufts University, “debt is ultimately the lesser problem. Productivity and the lack of competitive exports are the much more important ones.”

There are structural issues that make this challenging. Greece is never going to be a manufacturing powerhouse: almost half of all Greek manufacturers have fewer than fifty employees, which limits productivity and efficiency, since they don’t enjoy economies of scale. Greece also has a legal and business environment that discourages investment, particularly from abroad. Contractual disputes take more than twice as long to resolve as in the average E.U. country. Greece has been among the most difficult European countries in which to start and run a business, and it has myriad regulations designed to protect existing players from competition. All countries have rules like this, but Greece is an extreme case. Bakeries, for instance, can sell bread only in a few standardized weights. Recently, Alexis Tsipras, the Greek Prime Minister, had to promise that he would “liberalize the market for gyms.”

The scale of these problems makes Greece’s task sound hopeless, but simple reforms could have a big impact. Contrary to its image in Europe, Greece has already made moves in this direction: between 2013 and 2014, it jumped a hundred and eleven places in the World Bank’s “ease of starting a business” index. And reform doesn’t mean Greece needs to abandon the things that make it distinctive. In fact, in the case of exports, the country has important assets that it hasn’t taken full advantage of. Greek olive oil is often described as the best in the world. Yet sixty per cent of Greek oil is sold in bulk to Italy, which then resells it at a hefty markup. Greece should be processing and selling that oil itself, and similar stories could be told about feta cheese and yogurt; a 2012 McKinsey study suggested that food products could add billions to Greece’s G.D.P. Similarly, tourism, though it already accounts for eighteen per cent of G.D.P., has a lot more potential. Most tourists in Greece are Greek themselves, a sign that the country could do a much better job of tapping the booming global tourism market. Doing so would require major investments in improving ports and airports, and in marketing. But the upside could be huge. Greece also needs to stem its current brain drain. It produces a large number of scientists and engineers, but it spends little on research and development, so talent migrates abroad. And there are other ways that Greece could capitalize on its climate and its educated workforce; as Galbraith suggests, it’s an ideal location for research centers and branches of foreign universities.
Here's the hard part, implementation requires buy-in, ownership of the reforms and, most of all, trust from all sides:
To implement such changes, Greece will have to overcome other problems. Reforms work best when the level of trust in political institutions is high. But the Greek state has a poor reputation among citizens, who see it as a pawn of special interests. (This distrust of the government is one reason for the country’s notoriously high rate of tax evasion.) On top of this, the chief advocate of structural reform to date has been the much hated troika, whose obsession with austerity has made the mere notion of reform anathema. Opening up the Greek economy would benefit ordinary citizens, since the economy’s myriad rules and regulations serve mainly to protect the wealthy and those lucky enough to have won a sinecure. But that’s a hard sale to make at a time when people are worried about holding on to what they have.

Attacking corruption
Yves Smith at Naked Capitalism is a bit more skeptical that Tsipras can actually implement the reforms because of the endemic level of corruption in Greece. She highlighted an article by Christos Koulovatianos, of the University of Luxembourg and John Tsoukalas, at the University of Glasgow:
As numerous Greek MEPs opposed the Eurozone summit deal, implementation will require a broad coalition of political parties. This column argues that corruption in Greek politics will prevent the formation of such a coalition. The heavy debt service leads parties to invent extreme ways of responding to super-austerity and to strongly oppose direct reforms that challenge existing clientelism. The way out is to sign a new agreement that combines debt restructuring and radical transparency reforms, including naming-and-shaming practices, to block clientelism in the medium and long run.
Correlation between the fiscal-surplus/GDP ratio (in percentage points) and the Corruption-Perceptions Index (CPI) for Eurozone countries (t-statistics in parentheses).

The argument against the effective reform implementation is there are few reasons for the various factions in Greece to cooperate:
The immediate argument in favour of broad coalition governments is that policy reforms and austerity have a high political cost. Cooperation among parties can make them share the political cost. In addition, a broad consensus among parties provides credibility to society concerning technocrat-expert suggestions for solving the fiscal profligacy problem. From the very beginning of the sovereign crisis in the Eurozone, the IMF has provided explicit guidelines in favour of broad coalition governments or for cooperation across parties (see International Monetary Fund, 2010a-d, 2011a-f, and 2012a-f for specific sentences expressing these IMF guidelines).1

In the case of Greece, coalition governments have never been broad across parties, and reforms have progressed slowly, despite the intense monitoring by the IMF (Campos and Coricelli 2015). According to the theory suggested by Achury et al. (2015), the corruption problem in Greece, combined with its high debt-to-GDP ratio, has led Greece into a trap.
There is a way out, but it won't be easy:
The ideal long-run solution to Greece’s problem would be to eradicate rent-seeking groups in politics. However, this requires time and a deep understanding of the problem. The short-run solution would be to restructure Greek debt, postponing payments and giving enough time for economic recovery. This short-run strategy could make benefits from a broad-coalition government more attractive to political parties, because it would take away the debt-servicing burden. The working hypothesis is that some rent-seeking activities would still be speculated by parties (Achury et al. 2015, Sections 2.5, 3.1.2, and 3.1.4).

Of course, such debt restructuring requires a new agreement. And certainly the EU should ask for reforms in exchange for debt restructuring. Whether these reforms could solve the corruption problem (or not) in the long run, is a matter of understanding the roots of the corruption problem in Greek society.
The vast majority of Greek citizens are not corrupt: Corruption is a social coordination problem leading to a prisoner’s dilemma

A small but critical mass of citizens and politicians break the rules of fair play and equitability against the law. Businesses that do not pay their taxes oblige other businesses to do the same in order to survive competition. Skilled young people who apply for civil servant jobs are obliged to invest in clientelistic political connections, after seeing inapt persons obtaining such jobs. Citizens see their taxes ending up in the private pockets of people they know, but are unlikely to win a court case because of the political support for involved persons. Lawful citizens, knowing that taxes will not finance public goods but private benefits, are unwilling to pay their income taxes, becoming friendly to parties that promise lenience regarding tax collection.

The list can go on and on, but the issue is not morality. It is the technical perils of a coordination problem that ends up in prisoner’s dilemma situations that arise in everyday life. The sad equilibrium is that Greek citizens do not feel equal among equals against taxpayer law. A feeling of social mistrust pervades citizens, especially young people.
Can the Tsipras led government succeed? In a previous post, George Magnus complained about how the Syriza government seemed to substitute one set of vested rent-seeking interests for another:
Greece has less than 200,000 doctors, lawyers and engineers and about 600,000 public sector employees, but they have organisation and impact. The number of the latter has fallen from about one million four years ago, but they retain a strong influence of all aspects of labour relations. Regarding the former, many professional associations self-regulate, and have acquired special tax, pension and legal privileges. Tax evasion and under-reporting of income is rife. According to Oxford law Professor Pavlos Eleftheriadis, in the 2010 legislature, 221 of the 300 seats were occupied by doctors, lawyers, educators, engineers and finance professionals.

Ironically, Syriza articulated a made-to-measure analysis and diagnosis of governance problems in its 2014 Thessaloniki programme, which sought to end “decades of misrule”, and transform Greece’s political system and institutions. It argued quite coherently that this was essential to break the vicious circle between political and economic inequality.

Yet, since being voted into office, it has offered little and done less to live up to this transformation. It is telling that Europe’s final loan conditions before the referendum laid considerable emphasis on governance enhancement, spanning measures to strengthen transparency, price competition, privatisation, and the rule of law, and to attack corruption, fraud and tax evasion. Alexis Tsipras rejected these and other conditions, and lumped them together, accusing his counterparts of blackmail. But without addressing these crucial matters, Greece cannot hope to succeed inside or outside the eurozone.
Alexis Tsipras did a complete U-turn after the "no" result in the referendum and acquiesced to creditor demands. Can he do it again to implement the kinds of reforms outlined above? If so, he will achieve the mantle of the Greek Lula.

Thursday, April 30, 2015

May Day thoughts on inequality (and development)

As Europe marks May Day with holidays, I thought that it would be appropriate to revisit the issue of inequality again.

In a past post (see Inequality and the genetic lottery: Two views), I showed that while global inequality has improved from 1988 to 2008 because of globalization as emerging market economies growth outperformed, wealth and income inequality within developed market countries have widened because the middle and working class in those countries lost because of the globalization trend. The winners were the top 1% and most of the emerging market world, while the losers were the poorest, largely because people in subsistence economies didn't participate in the benefits of globalization, and the middle and working class of developed market economies.


To me, the issue of inequality has never been about the fairness of the results, but should focus on the equality of opportunity. Imagine three people who were born at the same time named Bill Gates, all of whom had the same intelligence and abilities. Bill Gates 1.0 is the successful billionaire that we all know today. Bill Gates 2.0 was born a poor black kid in the American Deep South. Bill Gates 3.0 was born to a poor family living in a subsistence economy in Africa.


A development economies question
How can we create conditions so that Bill Gates 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0 all have equal opportunity? Given that kind of framework, the question then become a question of development economics. I have found neo-classical models of economics and the theory of comparative advantage does not explain everything. We all know about the economic miracles of China and India in the last 20-30 years. For me, the key question isn`t about India or China, but why did India and China succeed but not Kenya or Egypt, as they are all sources of cheap labor?

I have encountered a number of promising approaches. I have written about the works of Michael Porter and Jane Jacobs (Jacobs and Porter on development). The Porter book, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, asserts that competitive advantages are not static, but evolve over time. Porter went on to outline how the economies of countries evolve as they move up the value-chain.

Jane Jacobs published her work well before Michael Porter did and she is not as well known because she is more of an academic. However, her framework of moving up the value-chain framework is the same as Porter. What I find attractive about Jacobs is she identified the city-state as the unit of development, rather than a country, which makes sense to me as some countries can be highly economically diverse.

The question of how to resolve inequality isn't purely academic. The images from places like Baltimore and Ferguson are a reminder of how the effects of income and wealth inequality can boil over. Applying sound development economic solutions to the inequality problem will go a long way in alleviating much of those social tensions.


A question of culture
Despite the attractiveness of the Porter-Jacobs framework, it doesn't go fully in addressing some inequality problems. It`s may not be enough to ensure that people get equal opportunity, but how they go about attaining wealth and how they behave after they acquire wealth is also an issue.

In other words, there seems to be a cultural element to development economics.

One of the basic assumptions of economics is people are rational actors. They have rational expectations. Then how can we account for the NBER study indicating that 16% of NFL athletes go bankrupt within 12 years of retirement? Here is the abstract [emphasis added]:
One of the central predictions of the life cycle hypothesis is that individuals smooth consumption over their economic life cycle; thus, they save when income is high, in order to provide for when income is likely to be low, such as after retirement. We test this prediction in a group of people—players in the National Football League (NFL)—whose income profile does not just gradually rise then fall, as it does for most workers, but rather has a very large spike lasting only a few years. We collected data on all players drafted by NFL teams from 1996 to 2003. Given the difficulty of directly measuring consumption of NFL players, we test whether they have adequate savings by counting how many retired NFL players file for bankruptcy. Contrary to the life-cycle model predictions, we find that initial bankruptcy filings begin very soon after retirement and continue at a substantial rate through at least the first 12 years of retirement. Moreover, bankruptcy rates are not affected by a player’s total earnings or career length. Having played for a long time and been well-paid does not provide much protection against the risk of going bankrupt.
Are these people just stupid? If so, why does America spend weekends adoring people who run around a field with what amounts to the IQ on back of their sweaters?


Planning vs, winging it
It turns out that the attitudes about money therefore the behavior around wealth are cultural. Jessi Streib studied how couples from different class backgrounds interacted. In an article published in The Atlantic, she revealed that there are definite differences about how different people cope. Members of the working class have a tendency to go with the flow and "wing it":
People who grew up in households without much money, predictability, or power learn strategies to deal with the unexpected events that crop up in their lives. Often, these strategies are variations of going with the flow and taking things as they come. Sometimes there’s no other option.
By contrast, more affluent tend plan their lives a lot more:
People who grew up with parents who had more money, job security, and power grow up with more stable lives. In these conditions, they learn that managing their resources makes sense—both because their lives are predictable enough that they can plan and because their resources are plentiful enough that they can make meaningful choices. Spouses with middle-class backgrounds wanted to manage their resources by planning.
She relates an example of how couple coped (all names are have been changed):
One couple I talked to experienced these differences profoundly. Vicki grew up as the daughter of an upper-level manager while her husband John grew up the son of two factory workers. Vicki budgeted their money, making sure to save for their children’s college expenses and retirement. John thought their kids could figure out how to pay for college when they were older. People with working-class roots wanted to go with the flow and see what happened would figure out how to retire in the years to come. Vicki, a teacher, plotted how to become a superintendent. John, a restaurant manager, kept his eyes open for opportunities but did not plot how to get from one job to another.

Vicki also had her children’s lives planned before they were born—they would be good students and involved in many extra-curricular activities. John believed he should meet his kids before deciding on how to parent them and that it was not his place to decide who they should become. Vicki summed up their differences describing her own style as, “We need to plan! We need to schedule! We need to be neurotic!” and saying of John, “For him, it’s ‘It will always work out. It will always get done. Don’t worry.’”
Finance professionals know about the importance of a financial plan. "Winging it" is not a plan and can lead to disaster. Undoubtedly, that`s what happened to many NFL athletes who suddenly came into a lot of money. Were they irrational by ignoring the life-cycle hypothesis? A simpler explanation is that they were just "winging it" - and that approach creates a lot more risk to their lifestyle and future standard of living.

At the other end of the scale, there is an Old Money sub-culture who engaged in financial planning, but had Downton Abbey style taboo about talking about money (via Forbes):
The taboo among people with inherited wealth against talking about money is, like the taboo against incest, usually not spoken aloud, says Paul Schervish, director of Center on Wealth and Philanthropy and Boston College. “Most people are never told not to have sex with their brothers or sisters. You don’t hear your parents telling you that. That’s a taboo. It’s pre-vocal.”

The taboo against talking about money among people with inherited wealth has three main dimensions, he says: 1. inter-generational, in which parents and children don’t discuss money with each other, 2. publicity, in which wealth is not publicly disclosed (to the dismay of charities), and 3. peers, in which one does not discuss wealth with friends or colleagues so as not to either embarrass them or feel ashamed yourself.

Many of those with inherited wealth will have a trust official take their children aside and explain what the trust is and how much they might expect to inherit, and then teach their children to be relatively silent about that money to outsiders. “The family has enjoyed privilege financially, [so] they don’t want their children to … look down on other people,” says Schervish. “It’s part of their financial morality to not live an arrogant life about money.”

In fact, he says, those with inherited wealth often live frugally on purpose and drive Toyotas or forgo yachts because their inheritance is not growing dramatically, and the principal has to be protected from generation to generation.
Noah Smith featured the work of Roland Fryer, who has done extensive work on the black-white achievement gap in America, in a BloombergView article. The article is well worth reading in its entirety as it extensively details Fryer's research. Bottom line: Fryer also found a cultural effect:
One question Fryer has addressed is what causes the achievement gap. Along with Levitt, he found something very interesting. In kindergarten, the black-white gap can be entirely explained by a small number of variables, including socioeconomic status. But as the kids got older, a new racial gap appeared that wasn’t explained by those factors. That means that some other force is at work -- education, discrimination, cultural factors or something else.

Fryer set about trying to find those factors. For example, many have long argued that black culture discourages intellectual achievement, by branding academic pursuits as “acting white.” Along with co-author Paul Torelli, Fryer investigated the hypothesis. If academics are really considered “acting white,” then it stands to reason that getting good grades should be negatively correlated with popularity. Using data from a survey that asked students who their friends were, Fryer and Torelli constructed a measure of how popular each student was among members of his or her own race (the index is constructed so that having more popular friends confers more popularity than having less popular friends). The results fit the predictions of the “acting white” hypothesis -- as students get older, the correlation between grades and popularity goes up and up for white kids, but down for black kids.

An alternative hypothesis, of course, is that racial discrimination is the cause of the black-white achievement gap. Many teachers, if asked, will tell you that this is the case (though they will probably deny that the discrimination comes from their own classrooms!). It’s a very hard thing to measure. But, as Fryer and others have documented, racial discrimination has become less and less important in the U.S. employment market. That doesn’t prove that discrimination isn’t still the culprit at the grade school level, but it is suggestive.
Fryer’s solutions are not all politically correct. They involve specialized environments like charter schools and incentives to counteract the cultural stigma of “acting white” (emphasis added):
Taken all together, Fryer’s work suggests that educational investments, improved motivation and cultural change have a good shot at closing the stubborn achievement gap between black and white students. That isn't going to please education reform opponents such as Diane Ravitch, who denigrate charters and pooh-pooh the idea that better education could close the gap. It’s also not going to please a lot of conservatives, who typically oppose funneling more resources into government-funded education.

But Fryer’s message -- that the achievement gap isn't invincible, that it can be slain by better education -- is backed up by solid data and sophisticated empirical techniques. Those who deny Fryer’s conclusions will have a very hard time refuting the Clark Medal winner’s research.

Towards a better development economics framework
Basic training for economist involve a common framework for understanding human behavior. First and foremost, we assume that people are rational actors. The Washington Consensus, which has come to dominate economic thinking, believe in the Invisible Hand of the markets.

When the rubber hits the road in development economics, it can be very messy and un-PC. The neo-classical solutions that the markets will take care of everything risks the kind of social instability seen in places like Ferguson, Baltimore, or worse. Sometimes, even The Onion just nails a headline.


The Porter-Jacobs framework gets us part of the way there, but the results cannot be generalized. Yes, you can use comparative advantages, such as low labor costs and convenient geographic proximity to markets, to spur development. You can then leverage your position to educate your population and move up the value-chain with goods and services with more design elements and intellectual property, which creates better paying jobs. Still, it doesn't explain why India and China succeeded and Kenya and Egypt didn't.

The third element is the messy part and it is politically incorrect. It involves a study of the culture. to understand the elements of success and their impediments. Those solutions can be highly specific and may not be generalized to the rest of the human population. Consider the following question. Both the Jews and the Romani (Gypsies) have historically been outcasts in Europe. How did one group succeed and acquired power (e.g., the Rothchilds) and the other remains shunned throughout the region?